A Kantian's Journey There And Back Again

Interlude: Musings of the Fellowship, Part IV

2006-06-24T14:00:00.000+03:00

In the few days that followed, Wittgenstein and Levinas were making great progress in healing. At times they even took part in conversations, but when I tried to ask about their experiences, they fell silent and their faces turned dark. Whatever horrors they have endured remained between them. Levinas told us that he too had wandered into the Citadel BAT to find the answer to the question of Being, but said that he was not altogether satisfied with the secrets it held. There was too much egoism here, he complained: the analysis of Dasein was too much centered on the individual and cared too little of the world of Others, of the relationships among which we live. When I pressed him about it, he did not want to explicate further and only said that "you will see for yourself." True enough, I thought, for I had come here to witness the Citadel for myself, and that is exactly what I shall do.

Dasein-Toni: Isn't Wittgenstein pretty when he sleeps? Just like a baby!
Kant: Yeah, he surely is. Lips pursing and all. And look: there is some drool on his pillow! How adorable!
DT: *chuckles* It is indeed. And he is such a good chap all around... hehe, I once heard this story about him. Want to hear it?
K: Sure, go right ahead.
DT: Well, Witty is very ascetic and likes routines. So, this one time he was visiting a friend in a great mansion, and the butler wanted to know what his favourite food was so that they could cook it for the nights festivities. Right. And guess what Wittgenstein answered?
K: Smashed potatoes?
DT: Uhh? No... that wouldn't be funny now would it?
K: Well, Smashing Pumpkins then? Haahaa!
DT: Very clever, wiseass.
K: Thanks.
DT: Oh, well, anyhow, he responded: "I don't care, as long as it is the same!" Haha, what a chap!
K: The same as what?
DT: Huh?
K: You said, "as long as it is the same." I asked: the same as what?
DT: What?! The same... just the same!
K: You can't say "the same" unless you specify the thing it is "the same" to. It's like saying "my nose is funnier than" or "raccoons are identical." That's a violation of the syntax of language.
DT: Oh, come on, you dillweed! It just means that his favourite food is the same, that he likes to eat the same food. That's how addicted to routines he is. I am sure you understand that.
K: No, as a matter of fact I do not understand the nonsense you spew out. I don't care how routined he is, he still can't break the laws of syntax.
DT: You are hopeless.
K: At least I am proficient in language.
DT: You are just a horribly pedantic nitpicking asshole that has no sense of humour.
K: No I am not.
DT: Yes you are.
K: You are.
DT: Fuck... I'm through with this crap. Why don't you give a synopsis of what we have learned instead of being a prick.
K: I will not.
DT: What?
K: I don't want to. You hurt my feelings.
DT: Come on, now. Don't be a baby.
K: Well, you seem to like Wittgenstein as a baby!
DT: Uhh... okay, what's this?
K: Nothing. Forget it.
DT: Kant... are you jealous?
K: No! No I am not. I don't care. You can like Witty as much as you want to. Go ahead. Never mind me.
DT: Oh, Kant, you fuzzy buzzy little pumpkin, come here! I still love you, my napkin.
K: Oh, grizzly-Toni, I've been so lonely lately! *sniff*
DT: That's okay, come here, let it all out...

Heartrending moments later...

DT: Could you give us the synopsis now, please?
K: Well, okay. Here goes. In the latest passages Heidegger examines the way in which Dasein exists in the world. He calls this manner of being being-in-the-world. The basic idea seems to be that the certain intensionality, or directedness, of Dasein creates a relation between the world and Dasein. This relation could perhaps be characterized as consciousness.
DT: Yeah, Dasein's ability to question its existence sort of creates a second-order being: being that not only is, but is also able to reflect on its being.
K: That's right. It is this reflexive relation that creates consciousness. A reflexive relation is, of course, a relation in which something is related to itself, in this case a being is related to itself through reflection.
DT: Of course. But didn't you have a similar thesis?
K: I sure did. The whole point of transcendental unity of apperception is that in order for us to be conscious to begin with, we must be able to say "I think" of any representation we have.
DT: You mean, of course, that consciousness arises when a being thinks of itself. That consciousness is nothing but continuous apperception.
K: Precisely. One could say that consciousness arises when a subject that examines an object takes itself as the object of examination: the subject examines subject and thus objectifies itself. The subject-as-an-object is the self we experience.
DT: Simply put: when a subject realises that when it examines a certain object it is in fact examining itself, then it becomes conscious. It sort of realises itself as a being among other beings. It is like a mental analogy for realising that the thing reflected in a mirror is oneself - indeed something that is often taken as a sign of consciousness - perhaps faultily though, because the inability to realise this may as well be a result of different eyesight or other factors.
K: Right. So we could say that Heidegger has the same sort of idea here: that the being of a being that realises its own being is different from the being of a being that does not realise its being.
DT: Whoa! Well, I guess it makes sense when I think of it - just seems like a load of indecipherable nonsense when I first heard it. A being that realises its own being is Dasein and the being that does not is just a present-to-hand-being, and the manner of being of the former is different from that of the latter. Okay, got it.
K: Glad to have you with us.
DT: Thanks, mr. smartypants.
K: Hah! Well, anyhow. To really examine being we must examine this manner of being that is our being, that is, being-in-the-world. For this reason objective sciences are not enough for resolving this issue, since they explicitly examine things of the world instead of our manner of being in the world. This is not very different from my thesis that transcendental philosophy, that is, philosophy that examines the mode of and the conditions for our being, precedes science as well as metaphysical expositions.
DT: Yeah. It could be said that science applies the methods and tools we have been given within the framework of our being, whereas your transcendental philosophy and Heidegger's fundamental ontology studies beyond these tools to their very nature.
K: Kind of, yes. But I think the talk about "beyonds" remain far too vague to properly grasp. After all, one could ask why sciences could not use their tools to examine their tools - a microscope can be used to examine another microscope and so on. What is important is that these tools are very fundamental indeed: reason, logic, senses. You can't use senses to examine the trustworthiness of senses, after all. Therefore empirical, scientific study cannot get to the bottom of things, because it cannot study the most fundamental tools it has in a proper fashion.
DT: Yeah, good clarification. It remains a huge problem as to how these tools should be examined then. Your transcendental philosophy attempts to explicate them through necessary conditions: you use certain counterfactual thought-experiments to show that in order for us to have a certain given thing, such as experience, in the first place, something else is required. Heidegger seems to want to examine these boundaries through phenomenological analysis: there is something to be uncovered in our very experience. It may not be scientifically valid information we get out of this, but it will be information nonetheless, and since science has already been ruled out as a possible source for knowledge about these things, the phenomenological analysis surely holds its ground.
K: Well said. I am not sure if anyone understands one bit of that, but at least it sounds cool.
DT: Thanks. That's what I live for.
K: Anyway. There is still another aspect to our study. It is the idea of authenticity.
DT: Yeah, almost forgot about that. Whac'ha think?
K: "Whac'ha"?
DT: Sorry.
K: You are pardoned. Now authenticity may sound complicated, but I think it is fairly simple. Dasein can be in different modes: it can sort of "live" its essence of questioning its being, that is, ponder about its existence; or it can choose not to do this. In our everyday life we are not pondering about this question of being, we are not perplexed about it, so to speak. In this mode we are non-authentic. We are more or less like other things in the world: we are men and women, we are desk-clerks, bus-drivers and university lecturers. In the mode of authenticity we face the problem of our existence, and I think it is safe to say that everyone is in this mode at least from time to time.
DT: Especially at night we tend to think the Big Questions: What is my purpose here? Who am I? Why am I me? What should I do with my life? Where am I heading? And so on.
K: Indeed. Some think of these more often than others, surely. Yet Heidegger clearly says that neither of these modes is "worse" than the other: it is certainly a poor life in which one never thinks of these things, but it is equally useless to be always indulged in mere pondering of being. That is: we must think of how we live, but we must also remember to actually live.
DT: It seems that at times Heidegger proves very important aspects of our being. He works a sort of fundamental psychology. He does not merely psychologize that we must remember to live our lives instead of just planning it, but shows its fundamental, almost ontological significance.
K: Quite. Now in the authentic mode, that is, in the pondering mode, we construct ourselves. It is in that mode where we take an inventory of our possibilities and actualities and choose our direction. Either we note that we are not what we should be and perhaps work to remedy that, or we see that we are on the right track. Or perhaps we simply think we are on the right track because we lack the insight to see otherwise. This is also an interesting point about being human: we ourselves change who we are by this immense psychological process. It is not easy to change oneself, but it is what we should do - and what, indeed, we must do. The phrase "I can't help myself" is the biggest lie there is.
DT: Agreed wholeheartedly! I don't know, but I have the feeling that Heidegger will find the key to happiness deep within our being, just where I think it ought to lie. It is not the world that makes us happy or unhappy, but it is us: we choose the way we relate to the world, and happiness is just one feature of this relation.
K: Yes, it would seem that this point can be extracted from Heidegger's philosophy. Whether he himself makes the claim, we shall see.
DT: Indeed. Thanks for the synopsis, Kant. I guess we ought to rest now, since tomorrow our journey continues to whatever horrors lie ahead. Good night.
K: Good night, Dasein-Toni.

The Rescue

2006-06-16T21:41:00.000+03:00

Kant: So, what's with you and feces, Dasein-Toni?
Dasein-Toni: Uhh... What?
K: Feces. According to my dictionary, feces means "The matter that is discharged from the bowel during defecation; excrement."
DT: I know what feces are! But what's your point?
K: Well, it is just that you used "poop" or "pooping" five times in your last entry.
DT: So?
K: You don't think that's weird?
DT: Why would I? It was just something that sprang into my mind.
K: You are wading through the endless maze that is the Being and Time trying to find the answer to the arcane question of Being, all the while witnessing unspeakable horrors and overpowering mental onslaught, and the first thing that comes into your mind is "poop"? Don't say there is nothing odd there!
DT: Well, perhaps I had to poop, so it came to my mind.
K: Yeah, right. It just happened to be so that in both consecutive days the first thing that sprang into your mind was "poop".
DT: Okay, so I have to poop often, big deal. What's with you anyway?
K: Fine. If you don't want to admit that you have a problem, that's all right.
DT: I don't have a problem with poop, ok!
K: Fool the other one.
DT: Don't make me smack you.
K: You wouldn't get so upset if I hadn't hit the nerve.
DT: Now that's just a load of crap.
K: Ahh, "crap", eh? Just the first thing that sprang into your mind, was it now?
DT: Gahh... you are so aggravating!
K: Just trying to help, that's all.
DT: Right. Why don't you say something helpful for a change then?
K: OK: You are a dumbass.
DT: WHAT?! How on Earth is that helpful you... you... man with a funny nose!
K: There is NOTHING funny in my nose. And you are pretty stupid really. Wonder if Wittgenstein, who happened to disappear before two doors that lead to torturing chambers would perhaps be in one of those chambers, hmm? Did it cross your feeble mind to check that, dumbass, did it? Huh?
DT: Gosh.
K: Gosh?
DT: You might actually be right! Damn. I really must go and take a look. I can't allow for the possibility that he is there, enduring horrendous agony in the hands of the infernal beasts of Citadel BAT! On to the rescue!
K: Hold on a sec.
DT: What is it now?
K: I just wanted to talk to you about your unhealthy interest in wombats.
DT: What the...?! Wittgenstein might be experiencing excruciating pain and you want to talk about my unhealthy interest in wombats?
K: So you admit it?
DT: Huh? No! No I don't admit to anything of the sort. I just happen to like wombats, that's all. Really.
K: Like feces?
DT: Oh, fuck you! I've had enough of this. I'm going to save Wittgenstein and you can drag your sorry ass behind me if you will, see if I care!

And so we rushed in urgent haste to the doors leading to the torturing chambers, Kant immersed deeply in ponderings about the true relationship between Dasein-Toni and feces. Was he forced to eat shit when he was a child? Did he poop in his pants in elementary school so that everyone pointed their evil fingers at him and laughed? Was he, perchance, called by names like "Poop-Toni" or "FecesBoy" in his early years, or later in adulthood by his abusive friends? Or perhaps he just has a really bad constipation or diarrhea... Most probably we will never know.

I reach the door to the torturing chamber number §10, reserved specifically for Anthropology, Psychology and Biology. The door is unlocked and opens with a reluctant squeal. All is silent within, and as I once before left it: the special sciences are still caged in the room, huddling in miserable silence. Yet there are fresh stains of blood. The smell in the room is overwhelming and I gag - I grieve that they must suffer this indignity of being forced to lie in their own waste. Wittgenstein is nowhere in sight. There is nothing but agony here, I think to myself, as I close the door and retreat back to the corridor.

Lump in my throat, I push open the second door, number 11. The iron maiden is still there in the corner, I note, as I scan the room for Wittgenstein, blood racing through my veins. And there he is! A ragged figure in the corner near what seems to me to be Ethnology, but it is hard to tell from all the dried blood. As I cry out "Witty!" I become face to face with my carelessness. A terrible fiend of the Citadel BAT steps forward to face me, nostrils flaring and red eyes glimmering with sadistic anticipation. Its figure is immense, towering at least three meters. Its skin is red with blotches of black as if burned. It resembles what we have come to know as a minotaur - perhaps it was here in the Citadel BAT that the minotaur of Minos was born among its kind. As the creature lungs at me, there is but a moment to act.

I draw out my copy of Kritik der reinen Vernunft and take a page at random. On it a text is written in glowing red letters. I draw a deep breath and start the incantation:

Man versuche es daher einmal,
ob wir nicht in den Aufgaben der Metaphysik damit besser fortkommen,

The creature halts in bewilderment, its face distorting before these Demonisch words. Encouraged, I speak the rest of the words more confidently in a commanding tone.

daß wir annehmen,
die Gegenstände müssen sich nach unserem Erkenntnis richten,
welches so schon besser mit der verlangten Möglichkeit
einer Erkenntnis derselben a priori zusammenstimmt,
die über Gegenstände,
ehe sie uns gegeben werden,
etwas festsetzen soll.
Es ist hiemit eben so,
als mit den ersten Gedanken des K o p e r n i k u s bewandt!

As the last words fill the air, the creature howls in pain and is sent into a horribly unnatural spin that lifts its huge body into air like it was but a leaf in an autumn storm. It strikes the opposite wall of the chamber with a deafening crash, sending bricks and dust flying in the room. And then, all is still.

The Copernican Revolution has spoken.

I rush to Wittgenstein who seems to be barely alive. His head hangs limply as I take him to my arms. "It is me, Dasein-Toni, you will be allright", I whisper to him softly and soothingly. He responds with a small smile and then tries to say something that ends in violent spasms and coughing. I give him some water, and he drinks eagerly, spilling the water.

Just as I am about to carry him out of the wretched place, he whispers: "Dasein... Toni... Take him... with you." He points weakly to a pile of rags beside him. At first I am confused, but then I recognize it as not a pile of rags, but a horribly abused human being. I bow to see his face and gasp, for he is not just an ordinary trespasser of Citadel BAT. "Levinas," I mutter in awe - will this place never cease to amaze me?

Weary yet content that I have found my friend Wittgenstein and, indeed, a new friend as well, I carry them out of the torturing chamber. I give them some more water, close the door and keep watch as they sleep.

Act VI: To Be or Not to Be - Is That a Question?

2006-06-15T15:45:00.000+03:00

I am hurled back into being and time (located oddly enough in Citadel Being and Time) onto a cold stone floor. I quickly rise up to take a look at my surroundings. The corridor is dark and silent. Behind me the two doors to torturing chambers are closed and no sound emanates from within. I can see tiny markings written in blood on both doors. Squinting, I can barely make out that they are numbers - or more precisely, clauses. "§10" on the left hand door, "§11" on the opposite side. I shiver at the memories of those clauses.

Adamant in my resolve, I leave these doors and the memories they hold. The corridor makes a sharp turn in the distance. Right before this turn there are two more doors, one on each side. That is where my journey will lead me.

The companions with whom I was travelling are nowhere to be seen. Either they have suffered the same fate as I have or they have left on their own accord - I do not know either way. But there is yet some hope, I remember: Kant is securely in my pocket, ready to spring into action when needed. The power of Kant has only waxed in the course of the year, as has my mastery over him - my slave and bitch. I am also now reinforced with a copy of Sein und Zeit, Being and Time written in the original Demonic that is Heidegger's language.

It is Wittgenstein I am most worried about, when I think of it. When I came across him year a ago, he was but a starving man in rags, huddling pitifully in a corner. Whatever became of him, I can only guess. And I can only hope that, provided that he is still here, our paths will cross again.

But yes, onward I must go. Steeling myself and grasping my Kant tighter I step further into the corridor. Only the echoes of my footsteps greet me as I reach the bulky metal doors.

Part I, Chapter II, §§12-13

§12

In the beginning of this clause Heidegger reminds us that Dasein exists. This appears to be harmless enough a statement, but it is far more indepth than it would seem. We must remind ourselves of the fundamental difference between being and existing as Heidegger would have them. It is not just that Dasein exists, but that only Dasein exists. Most certainly, other things (things present-to-hand - Vorhandensein; that is, all those tables and cars and other things that are not Dasein) are, but they do not exist in the strictest sense of the word. Existence comes into play via the realization of being. Simply put: when a being (a thing) becomes conscious of its own being, it begins to exist. Dasein is, as we have learned, such a being. In addition, Dasein is the only being that can do this - because by definition Dasein is that which can question its own being.

Heidegger continues that, moreover, Dasein is whatever I happen to be. This is related to the idea that Dasein is always me - but as was emphasised, this means merely that we can only ever talk about Dasein in the first person; in this sense Dasein indeed comes close to being "subject", but it is to be remembered that Heidegger is deliberately trying to avoid the standard terminology and Dasein cannot therefore be equated with subject, although it most definitely makes matters easier to grasp, at least for my feeble mind!

Heidegger then says that Dasein's authenticity (dem. Eigentlichkeit) and its corresponding non-authenticity (Uneigentlichkeit) is only possible through this "egocentrism". He notes that Dasein exists always in either of these modi, or is indifferent to them. What are these modi, then? Well, Dasein is its possibilities - the existence of Dasein becomes determined through its possibilities. These possibilities allow it to choose, quite evidently (at least supposing that determinism does not reign and possibilities are therefore actual possibilities). He says that since Dasein is its possibilities, it can either choose (or, "choose" as he puts it, whatever he means by this obstruction of meaning I can only guess) itself or not. It can also lose itself or never reach itself in the first place - or even apparently reach itself without actually doing so. Perhaps surprisingly, it is not so that when Dasein reaches itself, then it is authentic. Instead, the possibility of losing oneself or not reaching oneself, that too is based on authenticity.

How to make sense of this? I guess the key to understanding this is the noticing of the fact that he explicitly says that non-authenticity is not lesser being than authenticity. So it is not about deficiencies, apparently. Being authentic is equally important to being non-authentic. We have but one option: to try to figure out what Dasein's authentic being is. Authenticity is of course about being what one is in a sense meant to be. An authentic piece of art is the real piece of art, the piece of art that we think it is; perhaps Mona Lisa and not its cheap copy. A diamond is authentic when it indeed is a diamond and not a piece of glass. So Dasein would be authentic if it really were Dasein. What makes Dasein Dasein? According to Heidegger, surely that it asks about its own being. Could it be so that when Dasein is faced with the question of its being, only then it is Dasein proper, that is, authentic? And when it is not exhibiting this ability, then it is non-authentic? This seems plausible enough, no? It is not that Dasein is not capable of anything else but asking questions about its own being, certainly, but that what makes it Dasein, and separates it from other mere things, is the fact that it is capable of doing that. Since authenticity is all about appearances (a rabbit is not a non-authentic wombat, since it is never even supposed to be a wombat – in the same sense art is not pseudoscience as it is not ever meant to be science in the first place; authenticity is about posing as something either rightfully or not), I hereby suggest that the authenticity of Dasein is to be understood through whether it poses itself as a Dasein, that is, whether it appears as a Dasein or not.

If this interpretation is to make sense, non-authentic Dasein must be understood as well: can there be non-authentic Dasein? I would think so: when I am walking down the street the people that I pass do not appear to me as Dasein, but as things – things that I must avoid, things among which I must move. One could say that this is obvious, since Dasein is only to be spoken of in the first person. True enough – so can I as a Dasein be non-authentic? Happily enough, I can! It would surely be a horrible fate to be faced with the question of one’s being, as they say, 24/7. To be hurled into an eternal flood of questions of one’s being. And that is no ordinary question: everyone has faced the horrible, crushing weight of the question “What am I? Why am I me?” – To be forever condemned to that question... now that is a terrible, terrible fate.

So, yes, I-as-Dasein can be authentic (when I am pondering my own existence) or non-authentic (when I am not, for instance when I am pushing out a good poop, my forehead wrinkled with concentration). Does this fit well with the idea that only in the authentic level can I truly either be or not be me? In one sense, yes: only on the authentic level I can be faced with the fact that I either am what I am “supposed to be” or I am not. When I am deeply immersed in the act of pooping, that is not something that is present – it matters not whether I am what I am supposed to be, but only that the damned poop comes out. In another sense, no: it could be argued that no matter what I might be thinking about at the moment (be that my being or my poop), I still am or am not whatever I am “supposed to be”. But I think this argument would be in error. Only in the context of some divine plan is the idea of “supposed to be” possible in any ontological (or ontic!) sense, and no such context is present in Being and Time. No, instead the “supposed to be” part is to be read as an epistemological condition: the Dasein may wish to be something, and that something henceforward becomes what it is supposed to be. Therefore only in the authentic state, in which Dasein may reflect upon its being, existence and potentialities, can Dasein truly fail to be what it is supposed to be, i.e. what it at that time wishes to be.

Yet it is worth emphasising that this does not make the matter merely subjective. Dasein can indeed think that it is what it wishes to be, but instead it is not. This is even quite common in the world of men – we think we have it all made, but instead the truth is quite different and far more bleak.

This, at least, is my rather lengthy take on what Heidegger is trying to say. Take it or leave it, but I am out of ideas!

Nonetheless, we must move on. The most important parts of the clause are the terms Being-in-the-World (In-der-Welt-Sein) and Being-in (In-Sein). Being-in-the-World is the mode of being of Dasein, that is, Dasein is in the world, according to Heidegger. And in order to understand Dasein, we must understand this being-in-the-world. As an attempt to explicate the term Being-in-the-world, Heidegger notes that it has three constituents.

(1) “In-the-world.” According to Heidegger this forces us to ask about the ontological structure of the world, about the concept of worldhood (Weltlichkeit). This he promises to give later in chapter three. Basically, as I understand this, it merely says that in order to explicate the idea of Dasein that always is in the world, the concept and nature of world must be explicated. We cannot understand Dasein if we do not understand the world it inhabits and its structure.

(2) The being that is always in the manner of being-in-the-world. Heidegger adds that this is the answer to the question “who?” This will be done in chapter four. It is worth noting that this relates to Heidegger’s idea of Dasein as a first-person-agent. Because Dasein can only ever be a first person, it is also prudent to ask who it is, instead of what – since “what” refers to beings that are not Dasein, but mere things present-to-hand. This idea is actually implemented in our language already, since we distinguish sharply between “(s)he” and “it”.

(3) Being-in as such. Heidegger does not say much about this but merely points out that the ontological constitution of this must be brought out – and that this will be done in chapter five. I guess we will be wiser then...

Even though being-in-the-world can be thus analysed, Heidegger emphasises that the whole “phenomenon” is always in view: that is, basically, that it must be understood as a whole. By this he must mean that the constituents themselves are not that important but the manner in which they relate to each other.

What I find particularly interesting is that Heidegger says that being-in-the-world is an a priori form of Dasein. It makes me feel all warm and fuzzy inside to see such Kantian approach here: this, of course, means that being-in-the-world is a kind of category for Dasein. The way Heidegger puts it makes it clear that Kant is in his mind here. We will return to this a bit later.

Heidegger turns to explicate the idea of being-in. He notes that, when we are talking about present-to-hand beings, that is, about ordinary objects of the world, their being-in is to be understood as being-in “the world”. By this rather confusing linguistic trick he means to say that they are in the world like things normally are within something: for example, a coat being in a closet or my mom in a supermarket. Therefore it is about spatial relations of two things, where another is spatially within another. This sort of being Heidegger dubs categorical, and it only fits of ordinary objects (or Dasein considered as ordinary objects, like my mom when I consider her as a “thing” in a supermarket, not as a specific subject.)

When we speak of being-in proper, then it is something that fits Dasein: it is how Dasein is in the world, and therefore it is existential – because Dasein’s being is existing. This cannot be thought spatially. Basically I understand him to mean this: when Dasein is, it always is as a thing that is capable of questioning its own being, and therefore it has a relation to its own being unlike tables and chairs – or ever wombats if we believe Heidegger. Since it has this relation to its own being, it also has a special relation to where it is. This is quite clear, when we think that we as conscious human beings are in places in a different sense than ordinary things are: we are able to recognize that we are in a certain place, and we are even able to philosophically reflect on our being there. (Why are we exactly here, on this very planet? – This question for one has had immense interest theologically, indeed to the point of considering the place where we are, the Earth, as the centre of the world.) Simply put: this kind of being that is reflected cannot be explained wholly via spatial determinations. My being in Finland is not a matter of mere spatiality, although it certainly does have that aspect as well, but also of there being some intersubjective, cultural thing like Finland that is based on complex relations between human beings. I can also have a different relationship to being in Finland than to being in a shop, for instance, since I may also think that I am a Finn. When we consider this further, we will find ideas such as that I can “be” in Finland without being in Finland – my heart may be in Finland, my thoughts may be in Finland. In any case, the basic idea is that our relation to the place we are in cannot be reduced to mere spatiality.

Heidegger also emphasises that being-in, as understood here, is also about being in something familiar. This I take to be another way of saying that we have a different relation to the thing we are in than in the case of mere things such as cars. It is familiar in the sense that we have a relation to it.

Heidegger’s idea is that being-in is an existential of Dasein. The term existential bears a relation to what I said earlier about Kant’s categories. Since this being-in is a mode of being for Dasein and it is existential being instead of mere categorical being, this existential becomes directly related with a category. If we take categories to be either ways in which things are (Aristotle) or ways in which objects are thought (Kant), then existentials become the Daseinic (Hah! Perhaps I just made up a word that even Heidegger didn’t come up with!) counterparts of categories that are only fit for present-to-hand-things. That is, we can take Heidegger as saying that the categories are not enough for exhausting the ways Dasein can be / can be thought, but in addition specific existentials are needed.

Didn’t get it? Worry not, for Heidegger promises to return to the analysis of being-in later on more thoroughly – here he merely wants to bring up the basic idea.

The following stuff is difficult for me to decipher – perhaps I am just becoming too tired of this mental onslaught. Nonetheless, Heidegger states first that two things cannot really touch each other, unless they are Dasein. That is, a table cannot truly touch the floor. This is, according to him, because the table would have to be something to the floor that the floor would face or meet. I take this to mean that since they do not have any relation to one another in the sense we have one to things, they cannot meet and therefore they cannot actually touch either. They may be spatially next to one another, but touching is something that requires some sort of relationship in the sense humans have relationships with each other. For me at least this is hard to grasp, even though I think I have a faint idea of what he is aiming at.

Nonetheless, he says then that Dasein’s being in a world is a fact. Now this would not be such a big deal, but he means something specific by this – the facticity of Dasein. Now there is a problem here because of English language. Heidegger distinguishes between Tatsache (a fact) and Factum (a fact), of which the first applies to present-to-hand-beings and the latter to Dasein. With this he means to explicate the difference between a table’s existence being a fact and a Dasein’s existence being a fact. I will not attempt to explicate this further here, for the simple reason that I am unable to. What is to be said, however, is that the fact of Dasein’s existence includes the idea of the Dasein being conscious of its existence, aware of it. This means that Dasein has, again, a relationship to its own being. It also has a relationship to the world it lives in, and this relationship has a great significance for Heidegger: it paves the way for one of his most important concepts: taking care (Besorgen). He says that he will deal with this later. Right now I think the important thing is that Dasein’s being in the world is always laden with this taking care. It is because of Dasein’s relation to its surroundings that it takes care of it: it deals with someone, produces something, cherishes, uses, examines, asks etc. All of these are acts of taking care, but so are their negations as well: neglecting, letting go, abandoning etc. So this term is to be understood in a very wide sense.

Probably the most interesting part is that besorgen is not to be understood as sort of gloominess, about being worried all the time. This is how it is often understood, but this is not the way Heidegger means it. Taking care has nothing to do with particular moods of particular people.

I collapse in exhaustion, totally drained by the jargon of Citadel BAT. Tomorrow, I promise myself, tomorrow...

§13, second day.

Heidegger notes that Dasein appears mostly in the mode of everydayness (Alltäglichkeit). By this he means simply that we do not normally go around being Daseins, that is, pondering our existence. Instead, we find ourselves shopping, walking, eating, talking, pooping... When Dasein is in the world in its everydayness it cannot be fully hidden, i. e. we must be aware of the fact that Dasein is. I take him to mean that it is downright absurd to take the skeptical stance with regard to our everyday existence - and like so many philosophers, he merely brushes skepticism aside as an inconsequential albeit annoying adversary. Therefore the fact that I am here is taken as a given. Heidegger then remarks that in this mode (of everydayness), the idea of knowing is present. This knowing consists of that-which-knows and that-which-is-known, roughly. In our everyday understanding this is reflected by the dichotomy between subject and object. Heidegger is adamant, however, that this manner of speech does not correspond to the dichotomy between Dasein and the world. This is important also when we consider the erroneous (although, I still hold, useful) analogy between Dasein and subject. Dasein is not a mere subject for Heidegger, this much is known already, but here we have the opportunity to reflect more upon the nature of this difference.

The way Heidegger brings this dichotomy up suggests this simple interpretation: that which is known as "subject" belongs to everydayness. It is, basically, the non-authentic Dasein. It is me and you when we are not acting as Daseins. This may be a strech, but my Kantian blood demands this analogy: the subject-object dichotomy is valid only of the empirical world, of the world of (everyday) objects. Kant has his transcendental subject and Heidegger has his Dasein. These concepts arise only on the level of philosophical reflection, for both of these philosophers. Only when we are pondering the nature of our own being do we have to resort to them. Or at least this is how I see it. Nonetheless, what is clear is that the subject-object dichotomy of everydayness is not sufficient for explicating the relation between Dasein and the world it inhabits. Something more is needed.

Heidegger explains further that when we speak of the subject-object relationship we most often "forget" to ask about the actual mode of being of the subject. This I think is a valid point, and extremely actual. For example in philosophy of mind this is very present: many philosophers, physicalists in the forefront, tend to examine the subject as a sort of object - thus in effect circumventing the whole crux of the problem altogether. This is essentially what is being said in, for example, Thomas Nagel's What Is It Like to Be a Bat? In that renown essay he ponders how we could ever scientifically explain what it is like to be, for instance, a wombat (and is that anything like being a bat, since it seems to be only a bat with a "wom" - like a woman is a man with a "wo"...). I think that Nagel's main point is that the difference between "what is x?" and "what is it like to be x?" is very fundamental and very difficult to overcome, since science deals only with questions of the former type. It is difficult to see how we could move from the former to the latter: to explain what it is like to experience red by explaining all the scientific facts associated with it. It seems to me that the only way to know what it is like to be a wombat is to be a wombat - to experience being a wombat.

Here it seems, Heidegger would agree with me. To him the question of the nature of the subject is fundamentally different from the everyday question of certain objects. The nature of the subject - the questioning being - is, of course, Dasein. So this is yet another way of saying that the ordinary questions as posed in, e.g., science are inadequate for a thorough analysis of the being of Dasein - philosophical, or even better, phenomenological study is required. In short: Heidegger's fundamental ontology is the only discipline able to truly examine Dasein's being.

Heidegger claims that knowing is in fact a mode of being-in-the-world. It is therefore a mode of Dasein's being. There is, I think, two ways of explicating this. The first is that since the being of subject (that is the one that knows, which to Heidegger's mind is the same as saying that knowing is in the subject) is not explicable in everydayness, it must somehow belong to Dasein. Another, and my preferred way, is this: Dasein is something that has the ability to make questions. To know is to answer a question, to have an answer. Therefore knowing is subject to making questions, and consequently it is something that belongs to Dasein.

Coincidentally Heidegger himself demonstrates the truth of his claim in a strikingly similar fashion a bit later on. He first notes that knowing is an aspect of taking care. It is not so that we simply stand before things, but that we have a relation to these things, or we must have to know anything about them. We are, simply, directed at things. This directedness can be "properly aimed" or not - we may succeed in directing ourselves to something or we may fail to do so. In this we are also in control: we can focus ourselves, direct ourselves better. This is what asking questions is about: when I ask, for instance, how come the sky is blue, I direct myself at this blueness of the sky, focus myself to it. By asking subsequent questions and by answering them I get closer to the reasons behind this blueness. And, when I get close enough in this regard, I know why the sky is blue. Only through this relation based on taking care and therefore on Dasein can we produce propositions (e.g. "The sky is blue because the pesky Martians painted it such") that may or may not reflect the structure of the world, or, as it is often said, correspond to the states of affairs of the world. Basically then, it is this directedness of Dasein that allows knowledge, and therefore knowledge is indeed something that belongs to Dasein. I can merely marvel the beauty of this deduction.

This then, according to Heidegger, shows that in knowing Dasein receives a new relationship to the world that becomes unhidden in being-in-the-world. That is, knowledge does not create this relationship, but is merely a development of it. This is equivalent to saying that it is being-in-the-world that is fundamental, not knowledge, and it is this being-in-the-world that we must examine. This also has some interesting connotations. One is the ever-present Heidegger's idea that fundamental ontology founds sciences, or is beyond or before sciences. Sciences produce knowledge, they make ever clearer our relationship to the world we live in and even allow us to modify or alter the world, and as such it has an important role. But that knowledge itself cannot ever go beyond itself, it cannot reach the pre-cognitive being-in-the-world in its most fundamental way of being - it cannot reach Dasein. It also has a connotation that is interesting within the field of philosophy: does not Heidegger opt for the primacy of ontology over epistemology? It is not knowledge that we must analyse and examine to secure the foundations of being, but instead the being-in-the-world, the fact of being itself. I think this primacy of ontology over epistemology, contra so many philosophers, including Kant, is evident here.

The rooms of this part of the corridor have been ransacked for all the knowledge they can produce. I think we are making progress, getting ever closer to the answer we are seeking for. Although there is much I do not understand, and probably even more that I only think I do, I am content and more restful. There is hope yet, even in the Citadel (wom?)BAT.

Back In Business

2006-06-12T15:04:00.000+03:00

In a sea of darkness a mangled body drifts in silence. There is nothing but the endless swirling of concepts and the ever present, ever elusive substance. And the broken mind of a Kantian too brave for his own good.

"Where am I?" The question echoes, gaining momentum until the lack of answer becomes a horrifying answer in itself. Desperation overwhelms. What is this place? How did I get here? How long have I been like this? The questions flood, each more urgent than the preceding one, until one question ends it all: "Who am I?"

Threads of memories dangle loosely in my mind, taunting me. I remember a citadel, I remember dark tunnels and torturing chambers and I remember... Heidegger. The word sends spasms through my mind - eerily familiar and strangely soothing, that name. Yes, Heidegger. That one is a handful, I remember that much. The citadel... Citadel of Being and Time, yes! The endless journey through the maze of near incomprehensible gibberish. Friends found and friends lost. The ghost of Wittgenstein and - I smile - the power of Kant.

Ah, but there is work to do. Who knows how long I have floated in this abysmal Limbo (A year and four days - note from the editor). Who knows what horrors they were that struck me down so, but who cares either, right? There is the Secret of Citadel BAT to discover, and discovered it shall be, or my name is not... uhh... what IS my name?

I think, therefore I am. That much is clear. Thanks Carty - for a dualist you ain't so bad. But I could not realise my being if I did not realise my potentiality for non-being. This one goes for Hegel, good job mate! And to realise my potentiality I must be able to overcome mere existence, to reach the non-existence, the potentialities and possibilities. Yes, that's right Heidegger, you old goober, I must be Dasein. And there it is! I am Dasein-Toni, and I am here to kick ass! (Got a bit carried away there, sorry.)

Yes, I am back and I WILL find the answer to the question of being!

Or at least find some better questions.

The Great Surrender

2005-09-10T13:11:00.000+03:00

Well, it seems like my motivation to continue with the blog was snuffed out by the trip. I am not sure if I will ever return to this project, but if I will, it will probably be after a while. I managed to delve through the introduction, which is probably the most important part of the book, so that's something. And it stands alone even if no additions will be made.

Thanks to all that have been there to tell me that I do not suck whenever I had some doubts about continuing the project. At least now I do not stop because no one reads it ;). And my apologies.

Yours faithfully,
Dasein-Toni

Vacation

2005-06-17T03:13:00.000+03:00

I will leave on a trip to continental Europe on 18th of June. I will return some three weeks after, around 10th of July. I will most probably not be able to continue the blog during this period, so the journey will halt for the time being (Yes, pun intended).

Yours faithfully,
Dasein-Toni

Act V: Existential Analytics and Torturing Chambers (§§9-11)

2005-06-08T17:13:00.000+03:00

As I turn the key (Named: The Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein) on the lock of the door above which it says: "This way first", I begin to tremble. This far I have only been to the waiting halls and antechambers of the Citadel Being and Time, or Citadel BAT, for short. The horrors witnessed there have at times nearly crushed my mind, but it might be nothing in comparison to what lies ahead. Among the perils there lies the mystical, foul demons of Sorge and fearsome dragons of Fallenness. But in the process I have also gained confidence, courage and friends. There is hope yet.

The door opens with a reluctant squeal. We half expect to see bloodthirsty beasts of the BAT spring at us, but the hallway before us is quiet and empty. In the furthest corner I think I see movement within the shadows, but when I blink, all is still. Must be my imagination, I think as I remind myself to remain calm. We enter the hallway in expectant silence.

We have taken only a few steps into the corridor when the door behind us clangs shut with a deafening boom of grim finality. There is no turning back now, I think as we advance further into the eerie corridor that soon starts its ominous descend ever deeper and deeper into the Citadel.

Part I, Chapter I, §§9-11

The first chapter intends to expose the existential analysis of Dasein and to show how this relates to other similar studies.

§9

First Heidegger states that we will here analyse that being that we ourselves always are: Dasein, “here-being” or “there-being”. This sort of being, Dasein, has a relation to its own being: to it its being is like something. According to Heidegger, this brings forth two things:

(1) The essence of this being is included in that it must be. Therefore the what-being (essence) of Dasein is to be determined from its being (existence), if we wish to speak of essence at all. Therefore Dasein’s essence is not in its properties, but in its way of being, it’s mode of being. I think this is to be taken as saying that the essence of man is not any set of properties, but in the way man is: as something that has the ability to have a view on its own being, to question it and to try to understand it. Dasein does not, therefore, express some object such as a table, but a way in which something is – no matter what the actual object that has this mode of being happens to be. I take this to mean that a computer can be Dasein, if it can question its own being, and a human can be non-Dasein, and actually is just that when turned into a corpse (or a vegetable - like me).

(2) Dasein is always my being. I take this to mean not that Heidegger is saying that all Daseins are him, but that of every Dasein we must use a personal pronoun: me, you, him etc. Basically, I understand this as a similar thing to Kant’s Transcendental Unity of Apperception, that is, the necessary condition for a subject to be a subject is that he is able to say “I think” of every perception that he has. Heidegger is saying, I believe, that every Dasein can say of himself that “I am”, so to speak. Every Dasein is “I”, for himself. Heidegger then differentiates between Dasein and Vorhandensein, that being a sort of “present-to-hand-being”, as it is sometimes translated. Things that are not Dasein can be present to hand, that is, as something that is before us, accessible and present - a mere object that cannot be a subject. To these present-to-hand-beings their being is irrelevant (as it is, assumably, irrelevant to a table that it exists). But for Dasein, as explained before, his being cannot be irrelevant.

Heidegger says that Dasein is always its own possibility. This possibility is not something it owns like something that is present-to-hand. It is not an object. This possibility is Dasein. But what does Heidegger mean by “possibility”? In the introduction we saw that possibility for Heidegger is something that the Dasein can be. This is: the horizon it sees before itself. I think that I can be a philosopher. It is possible for me, and it is something that I can reach. I can become a philosopher, if I choose to. Now the totality of these possibilities is for Heidegger the Dasein’s possibility, and this possibility is what the Dasein is – of course, this Dasein is a particular Dasein, like me, not Dasein in general. Dasein is in the world, with all his desires, dreams, wants and principles. This totality of what the Dasein sees is his possibility, and it is this totality that determines what the particular Dasein is. In non-Heideggerian: I am the totality of my dreams, beliefs, desires, thoughts and so on and so on. That is, as me. Of course, I am also a body, but that body is not the Dasein. When I speak of me, I speak of me-as-a-subject: me-as-a-Dasein. It is not, for Heidegger, just that I have dreams and beliefs, but that I am those. This is a strong claim, but I think it holds. As long as this “possibility” is defined broadly enough (as it is now: it is simply the totality of all that I consider myself to be in relation with), it spans the whole of my subjectivity. And as a subject, I am these subjective notions. As an object I might be a body, but as a subject I am something that has a relation to his body. I think of my body in a certain way. This which in me thinks of things in a certain way is the Dasein.

It should be made clear that this is in a sense Heidegger’s philosophy of mind. Heidegger seems to think that being a subject is simply to “be there”, to have a relation to where one is. This returns us directly to the common notion that for a subject, for a consciousness, things are like something. For a table the floor on which it stands is not like anything, but for me it is. This like-being, so to speak, is not something that the object itself has, but what the subject projects to it. Therefore Heidegger says that being a conscious subject is to have this like-relation to things. And what is then this subject? It is the totality of these like-relations. Why? Perhaps – I am just speculating here – because if we take away all these like-relations, what do we have left? Nothing at least that would make the thing we are left with conscious (there is nothing that is like something to it). Perhaps the only thing that he has is the potentiality of being in like-relation to something. That is, the Dasein. Is the Dasein then the necessary condition for being a subject? An impersonal subjectivity? Those of you that know of these things must have already guessed what I am aiming at: is the Dasein the transcendental subject? That same limit of subjectivity that for Kant was the transcendental subject, for Wittgenstein the eye, and for Husserl the transcendental ego? It seems plausible.

But I am not through with Heidegger's philosophy of mind yet. What is known as Brentano’s thesis is that being a subject is about being an intentional being – that is, having intentional states of mind. Intentionality means having a certain directed relation to things. Basically: my states of mind are directed at things. Either things within my consciousness, within my body or totally external to me. Is Heidegger an intentionalist? I cannot see why he would not be. After all, the whole point of Dasein is that he can ask questions. What are questions? They are something that have the one who asks it (the subject) and the question itself that is directed to something of which it is asked (the object). This ability to ask questions is then equivalent with the ability to have a certain directed relation to objects. Also, the like-relation is such a relation: something (object) is like something to something (subject). The being-like-something is intentional, because the state of mind is directed at an object of which the being-like-something is said. I think this is enough to prove that Heidegger is an intentionalist. Let the demons of the Citadel Being and Time strike me down, if they will to oppose my judgment!

In any case, it is important to understand that for Dasein existence comes before essence (Heidegger is an existentialist) - because the essence is a way of being - and that it is always egocentric (this has unwanted connotations – it would perhaps be better to say me-centred).

Heidegger says that Dasein must be exposed through existential analysis of its existence (that is, through analysing the formal structure of Dasein’s existence), but in this we must not start by postulating a certain kind of existence, but we must start from the vague generality of Dasein’s existence: averageness. This everyday averageness of Dasein is the foundation of its ontic being (ontic, remember, was about things that are, in opposition to the way things are in general), and as such it is the closest to us in the ontic sense. But that which is closest to us ontically is the furthest away from us ontologically (That which is closest to us has a structure that is hardest to determine, because we cannot detach ourselves from it to see it in its totality) . Therefore, according to Heidegger, this averageness can now be “passed by”. I am rather baffled at this. Reading again and again what Heidegger is saying about this does not make it any clearer, to my utter annoyance. It seems to me that Heidegger might be trying to say that the averageness is something that we always are, but what is not something directly associated with the structure of being. That is, averageness is a name for all the vague additional stuff in our lives that obstructs our being, even though it is in a sense a foundation for our being (in the ontic sense). But this does not open up for me, and I will have to look at this later, if I can.

Nonetheless, the explications gained from analysing Dasein are called existentials. They are the ways Dasein can be – in this they share a relation to categories (for Aristotle: ways for objects to be, for Kant: ways to think of objects). Therefore existentials are the specific ways in which the Dasein is – apart from other beings. Categories explicate the ways non-Dasein-beings can be. For Heidegger existentials and categories are both the fundamental possibilities for things to be. The existentials pertain to beings that are who (existence) and categories to beings that are what (being present-at-hand in general – objects). How these two are related together can be resolved only after the horizon of asking the question about being has been uncovered.

§10

We come by two metal doors on both sides of the corridor. Looking at my fellows for support, I swallow and turn the handle on the door on the right side.

The door opens silently and reveals a horrid sight. The special sciences known as Anthropology, Psychology and Biology are caged in a room filled with torturing devices. On the wall it reads in letters of blood: "The special sciences work within the Being and cannot explain it. Thus as slaves to Fundamental Analysis of Dasein, they must forever succumb to my rule." In horror I realize that these poor bastards are of no use in finding the meaning of Being and are therefore abandoned in this torturing chamber of particular sciences. The meaning of Being can only be exposed through fundamental analysis on the existentiality of Dasein, and never through the special sciences that only explicate empirical matters within the framework of existentiality of Dasein. I hastily close the door, grieving for the fate of these sciences.

§11

As I open the other door, I find myself face to face with another torturing chamber. I hear some muffled screams about the difference between primitivity (as studied in anthropology and ethnology, a level of sophistication of a culture) and averageness. A bloody iron maiden of “natural world” (which has been at least in part constructed by the Dasein himself) is also seen in the corner. I feel sick, and gagging I close the door and hope that the next corridor will expose something else than mere cruelty of massacred empirical sciences.

Interlude: Musings of the Fellowship, Part III

2005-06-06T13:42:00.000+03:00

DT: So, guys, how does the quest look so far?
K: To be honest, I think he has a lot in common with my philosophy. Take for instance the division between phenomenon and logos. Tell me it doesn't reflect my division between sensibility and understanding or reason.
DT: All right. It doesn't reflect your division between sensibility and understanding or reason.
K: But it does!
W: I agree with Kant. You must be bloody stupid to not see it.
DT: I... I... He told me to say that!
TA: It was just a manner of speech, a mere rhetorical device, Dasein-Toni.
DT: Blah, whatever. Go on with your stupid speech Kant.
K: You are.
DT: What?
K: Stupid.
DT: No, you are!
K: No, you are.
W: Guys!
K: Grmph, well, anyway, as I was saying to Stupid-Toni: Heidegger's analysis of phenomenology through the concepts of phenomenon and logos bears similarities to my division between the different faculties of cognition. Most notably the idea that phenomenon is something that is passive from our point of view and logos is active synthesis of us humans. Heidegger does seem to assume that the phenomenon appears by itself, in a sense, whereas the logos actively expresses that which appears in an objective way.
W: That seems to me quite a correct analysis, Kant, but there is something that cannot be overlooked. You divided the cognition to sensibility, understanding and reason...
DT: Sensibility passively receives intuitions or perceptions, understanding synthesises them into concepts or generalities and reason makes active judgments and thus forms new concepts through the concepts given by the understanding, right?
K: Yes, Dasein-Toni, I think you nailed it. Quite remarkable for someone so stupid.
DT: Just because you got PMS, it doesn't mean that you can go bitching all around.
K: How rude!
W: Oh, stop with the bickering already. As I was saying, the division to three does not neatly fit to Heidegger's division to two. Some of the attributes given to phenomenon fit sensibility and some understanding, whereas some of the attributes given to logos fit understanding and some reason.
K: Yes, that is most definately true. It seems to me that Heidegger uses the transcendental method in many things, and even considers some of my ideas quite correct, but then ends up following a quite different path. It is very difficult for me to decipher whether he is actually being more precise or vague.
TA: It is also notable that his historical method bears many resemblances to Hegel's philosophy. It might also be this temporal aspect that makes the philosophy in the end so different from yours, Kant. Consider that your system might indeed be formally better built, but it doesn't fit the bill: it omits the temporal aspect, and that is why it seems clearer. It is like a simplified approximation of the reality. When Heidegger takes into account the historicality of Dasein, it naturally becomes more complicated. Also, history might not be that easy to formalise.
W: Very true, Tobi-Ass, very true. What also crossed my mind was that Heidegger gives far more emphasis to subjective emotions and perspectives, much more worth on the individual's way of seeing himself. Where Kant's system is universal, Heidegger's is not.
K: What do you mean?
W: Well, you thought that rationality is some universal or an absolute. All people would act the same way if they were totally rational. This is the foundation you set your ethics: what is ethical is something that is detached from the particular considerations and in accordance only with the reason itself. You also think that the Categories are the same for all humans.
K: Well, surely they must! They are the necessary conditions for any experience whatsoever.
W: Yes, indeed, I understand that. Yet this is all based on some structure of the mind, and this structure is highly formal. It might be that you have expressed the formal conditions, but you also forget the power of the mind that you yourself set out to prove: the mind can impose itself on the world of appearances, and indeed does that. This is what I tried to say in the Tractatus: even the mood or the outlook of the subject changes the world. Because the world is the world as it appears, how we are in a sense "tuned" to the world, our emotional landscape, if you forgive me the expression, affects the way the world is.
K: But I am no subjective idealist, surely you know that! We cannot change the world at whim.
W: True, and I am not saying that we can. I am simply saying that you assumed that the phenomenal world we experience is something that is shared by all individuals, but there is nothing in your philosophy that would prove this. It is all based on your assumption of the universality of rationality. I am simply saying that perhaps the structure of the world is common to all subjects, and thus the phenomenal world is indeed intersubjectively accessible, but the content of that world is not intersubjective. The world is indeed my world, for it is determined in part by my mood, my desires, my wants, goals and beliefs. The structure of the world is that of language, and therefore of logic, and in that sense we share our world. But you give far too little emphasis on the subjectivity associated in the way we perceive the world.
DT: Hah! That ought to teach you, Kant! You are so totally owned!
K: Regardless of my idiotic companion here, I must concur. So you are saying that Heidegger takes this into account and this leads into a very different considerations, even if the starting point is nearly the same?
W: I am saying exactly that. You know, if I didn't know better, I would think you two were married.
TA: How do you know they aren't, Sir Wittgenstein?
W: Well, of course because "Kant is a bachelor" is an analytic judgment.
TA: Uhh, but the judgment is synthetic.
W: Leave it for the Dialectical Necromancer to spoil the joke.
TA: Sorry.
DT: Okay, fellows, we must try to form a synopsis of the introduction, to see with what we will have to work on in the future, and what is the general plan of taking over the Citadel of Being and Time.
K: Great idea, Einstein.
DT: You can't even know who Einstein is.
K: You underestimate my skills, Dasein-Toni. I deduced early on that the necessary condition for an overhaul in physics is that the vessel through which the paradigmatic shift is to manifest itself must be something solid and singular. This leads me, in accordance with the Principle of Synthetic Unity of Imagination, to the inescapable conclusion that this solid singular object must be a rock. This is evident because the foundations of Newtonian physics are solid as rock, and so it takes a rock to move them. But because the Unity is something that must necessarily accompany all objects of experience, the transcendental condition of there being a paradigmatic shift is that it is done by a singular rock. Of course, this would translate into German, that is, the Language of the Germs, as Einstein - "ein" being one, and "stein" being a rock. Now the last part of the deduction is to show that it is necessary that this Einstein is intelligent as hell, and because of that intelligence it would most definately enter into common speech as something that denotes someone with high intellectual capacity. But because of the necessary existence of sarcasm, I understood that this could also be used as a slander. See, easy as formatting a hard drive by accident.
DT: Whatever, asshole.
W: I believe that is the most beautiful piece of deduction ever produced.
TA: I concur.
K: Thank you, members of the fellowship. It is well appreciated.
W: In any case, let me give the synopsis, if you people don't mind?
DT: Not at all, Witty. Please proceed.

W: All right, then. According to Heidegger, the meaning of Being has been overlooked in philosophy. After proving that asking for its meaning does not include a circular reasoning, he shows us that it must have a different kind of meaning than other concepts. That meaning cannot be a theoretical one, because that would always require premises, and this would mean reducing Being to something other that is - but there is no way that these other beings could exhaust the meaning of the Being they themselves take part in.

The meaning of Being is in the way it manifests itself, and therefore the method of phenomenology is to be used to unhide it. Moreover, the being that is able to ask questions, Dasein, is privileged in this study. Because only Dasein can question its own being and thus understand it, the study must be founded on analysing how Dasein purports to understand itself.

Dasein understands itself in time and through time. Therefore a historical approach of Dasein is necessary, and to uncover the foundations of this understanding all that is piled on it and obstructs it must be removed through the method of historical destruction. So the study begins from time and the way Dasein understands itself in time, and through the foundations that are unhidden, we can attempt to understand the more general Being.

DT: Very good, Witty. So, which way to go, Tobi-Ass?
TA: I believe it is that door above which it reads: "This way first".
DT: I am glad that you are with us, Tobi-Ass. We would be lost without your special abilities.
TA: Why thank you, Da...

A sudden loud crash interrupts the conversation. We all startle and turn around to find a pile of stones fallen from the ceiling of the antechamber. Amidst the dust we can hear loud coughing and cursing.

IS: Mein Gott, scheißlich Glück!
DT: Sir? Are you all right?
IS: Bestimmt, I am fine. Mein apologiesch for crasching amidscht you scho.
DT: Who are you?
IS: Ach, natürlich. Ich bin I-Say-Aah, und I wasch examining thisch wunderbar Platz, when the floor gave in unter mich.
DT: What is that demonic speech you spew out of your mouth?
IS: Demonisch, indeed! I am one of the schecret organischazion of Demon-Babblersch.
TA: I know that group! You are able to decipher whatever occult gibberish the likes of Heidegger use in their unspeakable spells. I bow before you, I-Say-Aah of the Demon-Babblers!
IS: Ach, I had expected one of the Dialectical Necromancersch of Hegel to posschessch schuch knowledge! Rische, Schir Tobi-Aschsch, for you need not bow before ich.
DT: We would be honoured if you joined our quest, I-Say-Aah. What say you?
IS: Aah!

And so the party had gained another member. As most of you might be aware, this means that there is room for only one more. Six is the utmost total of party members in any quest. In any case, the Introduction has been unhidden, and so our journey leads further into the depths of the Citadel. Hand in hand and singing merry travelling tunes, the Fabulous Five enters the First Part of the Dungeons of Being and Time, to style... uhh, to retrieve back to light the hidden Words of Power of Heidegger.

Act IV: The Path Made Clear

2005-06-06T02:13:00.000+03:00

Into the mood

While examining the gothic inscriptions on the wall of the antechamber, I find a copper plate on the wall. At first it looks blank, but soon I begin to recognize very fine lines in the shining surface, almost too insignificant to notice. Unable to decipher the curves, I call Tobi-Ass to my aid. He examines the plate for a while and then nods slightly. “I know what this is: it contains arcane knowledge on Heideggerian terminology. It is normally only readable to Heideggerian initiates, and I am surprised to find out that you could even make out the lines, even if not uncover their meaning. Heidegger must have a stronger hold on you that you would perhaps care to admit. Mmm. I know how to deal with this. Stand back!”

I step back hastily and watch as Tobi-Ass sets his cheek (well, asses have no hands, but asses do have cheeks. He can’t use his hoofs, now can he? Oh, well, come to think of it, he could, but that wouldn't be nearly as fun. And considering how unfunny this is, it is best that he sets his cheek instead of his hoof...) against the plate and whispers softly: “Ich habe ein Bratwurst in meine Lederhose”. I hold my breath.

Nothing happens. Kant and Wittgenstein share glances - apparently they know something that I don't... probably has something to do with their mastery of the foul language Tobi-Ass has been forced to learn in his studies of Dialectical Necromancy. Tobi-Ass coughs nervously and murmurs: “Blah. That was of course the secret entrance code for the even more secret organization of snowunicorns, how could I forget.” He then sets his cheek again on the plate and speaks in a clear, loud voice: “Nacktfrosch”.

The plate immediately starts shimmering and letters of fire emerge to fill the surface. “There you go, Dasein-Toni”, Tobi-Ass declares proudly, and a lump in my throat I shuffle nearer and immerse myself in the secrets of the plate.

Introduction, Part II, §§7-8

§7

In the beginning of the seventh clause, Heidegger explains that we must now explicate the method used in studying the meaning of Being. That is, the method of ontology. As Heidegger’s ontology differs from every other kind of conception of ontology, he states that this method should not be looked for in the history of philosophy. Then he states that the method must be that of phenomenology. Also, it is important to note that phenomenology is not an aspect or a field of philosophy, but a mere method: it only explicates how the study is conducted, not what is studied.

What is phenomenology? I am fully aware that I am on a thin ice here, for my arcane knowledge on the occult magic of phenomenology is rather limited. Heidegger himself is at this point so vague, that I start to wonder if even he knows! He says that phenomenology is a maxim (I kick Kant’s ankle sharply and he whispers: “a subjective law, or a principle!”) that could be expressed by the slogan: “Into the things themselves!” Okay, Heidegger, sounds classy, but what do you mean? He explicates that phenomenology does not accept any principle that is not conclusively proven, and it opposes pseudo-questions that prevail through generations. As soon as I exclamate that this is what all sciences purport to do, he himself admits that someone could say that. Indeed! And what does he do then? Nothing. Or, not exactly true: he says that we are in fact dealing with such self-evidencies, and that he is just explicating the preliminary idea of phenomenology here. Well, all fine and dandy, Heidegger – at least now I know that phenomenology adheres to the same principles as any other science that should be taken seriously.

But I have not slept through all of my phenomenology classes (Actually, I have not slept through any of my phenomenology classes, because I have never had any). Phenomenology is something that concerns itself with what is experienced. That is, it analyses our experiences. Everything in phenomenology should be directly based on experience, or should be reduced through proven steps to something that is thusly founded. The exact details are not of importance in our preliminary examination: I think it is enough to understand that as we found out in the former clauses, the study must start from the everyday existence of Dasein, and therefore it must be based on the way Dasein experiences the world it lives in. This, of course, gives direct justification for choosing the method of phenomenology.

Heidegger states that the word phenomenology translates directly as “science of the phenomena”, that is, as a science that studies appearances, or how things appear to us. He then sets to explain the two constituent words of phenomenology, phenomenon and logos, in a more detailed manner.

A. The concept of phenomenon

He throws a lot of Greek on my face in an attempt to either explain in detail what he is speaking of, or to put me off balance. In any case, the basic idea that can be found within the lesson on Greek is clear: phenomenon means something that shows/presents itself or is evident. But Heidegger also notes that something can appear either as something that it is, or as something that it is not, depending on the aspect we take to it. “It appears that the tyre is flat” expresses “appearance” in a positive sense (we think that it is rather clear that the tyre is indeed flat), or “It appeared to be solid, but in fact it wasn’t” expresses “appearance” in a negative sense (something appeared as it really was not). We could also explicate the difference through the English word “to seem”, which holds similar connotations. In any case, the word phenomenon then includes the idea that something can appear to us either as it is, or as it is not.

He also explains at length how such terms as “express” or “imply” or some such bear a relation to “appear”. Such a case would be symptoms of a disease, where the disease that itself does not appear is expressed by the symptoms, or that the symptoms imply the disease that itself does not appear. This is not appearing in the negative sense, because that which does not appear at all, cannot either appear as it is or as it is not. So even though different sorts of indications share the structure of appearance, they must still be distinguished from each other.

The next part is nigh unintelligible. That is okay, I think, because Heidegger himself expresses that this is a source of a lot of confusion. Nonetheless, I will try to explain the different ways for things to appear.

(1) Something can appear as it is, or as it is not. In this the thing is somehow present, but can be distorted.

(2) Something appears only through sort of symptoms or indications. In these cases the thing is not itself present at all (it does not appear in the sense of (1)), but something indicates it, points to it. This way of appearing can be divided into three different senses:

(2. 1.) Something “lets itself be heard/known”. It appears in the sense that things that point to it are manifest, but it itself is hidden. Diseases are mostly like this, for example.

(2. 2.) Something appears as an indicator itself. The symptoms of a disease are like this: their appearance implies something that does not itself appear, that is, lets itself be heard (very Heideggerian. Tsk, tsk, Dasein-Toni!).

(2. 3.) Something appears so as to both indicate something, and to hide that which is indicated. This is difficult to understand at first, but Heidegger points nicely to Kant. This makes it clear that the appearances as used by Kant mean appearances in this sense (although according to him Kant confused the different meanings from time to time): they are appearances of the Ding an sich, the thing in itself, but even though they in a sense express the things in themselves, they also hide them. That-which-lets-itself-be-heard is cloaked by that-which-is-heard, so to speak. Thus instead of speaking of “appearances”, we should say “mere appearances”.

Heidegger pulls the threads together (phew!) in a rather nice way. If we consider the word phenomenon, it holds within it a manifold: appearance (1), presentation (2.1.), manifestation (2.2.) and mere manifestation (2.3.). Manifestation could also be translated as expression, for example. As a synopsis: appearance is something that is itself present, either like it really is, or like something else (in which case the term deception could perhaps be used). Presentation is something that is itself not present, but is presented or indicated by something: for example a disease. Manifestation is that-which-presents some presentation, that is, for example, the symptoms of a disease. Mere manifestation is a manifestation that simultaneously presents or indicates something and hides it (so that it cannot be found even in principle).

As a closing remark, Heidegger states that the phenomenon in the sense it is used in phenomenology differs from the usage of appearance in the common speech. What is appearance in common speech, for Heidegger? Simply our perceptions. I take this to mean that for Heidegger phenomenology is not a science about perceptions, but about something rather different, although interconnected. What that is, is expressed above in (1)-(2). We will now turn to the concept of logos.

B. The concept of logos

Logos means “speech”. It is also, according to Heidegger, translated as reason, proposition, concept, definition, foundation or relation. This shows that the concept of logos is horribly vague. Heidegger purports to find the foundation of the word to explain how the ambiguous term “speech” could be defined so as to include or derive all these other meanings.

Heidegger states that logos as “speech” should be understood more like as making it evident what the speech is about. Logos brings something forth that is seen by the speaker to be seen by all that take part in the discussion. This becomes clear, when it is understood that when I speak something – as I do now, even though through text – I speak of something that appears to me, and labour to express it so that those that listen to me could see that same thing. So Heidegger distinguishes between that which is said from that which the speech is about. You see what is said, but that does not always suffice for you to see what the speech is about. This seems to me like a more general conception of word and its referent. Heidegger also notes that acts of speech such as praying or begging bring forth that which is seen by the speaker, but in a slightly different way. This “bringing forth” Heidegger labels as “to make evident”. “I have an itch” makes evident that I have an itch, even though this analytical way of putting this probably doesn’t do justice to Heidegger.

But logos also makes something evident as something. This takes Heidegger to his conception of truth, for logos can either be true or false. As true it brings something forth in a way that it becomes unhidden – it makes it evident as unhidden. As false it brings that something forth in a way that it becomes obstructed. But, Heidegger goes on: this is not what truth really means; truth is something linked with our perceptions. Truth is not a property of a proposition, but a property of perception. Perception is true in this sense if it shows something like it is, and false if it does not. This is, of course, diagonally opposed to almost every modern conception of truth, that take truth to be a property of a proposition, that is, as something that belongs to reason, not perception. I will not explicate Heidegger’s idea further, because it would take us far too deep into modern truth theories. But I will, nonetheless, offer a link (that is, a teleport to a pocket dimension) a short explication of what Heidegger means by truth: http://www.mv.helsinki.fi/home/tkannist/thoughts/heidegger.htm.

Heidegger ends the presentation by noting that logos is synthesis whenever it is not pure, direct understanding of perceptions. (That is, I assume, always.) By synthesis he does not as much mean linking together as bringing something forth as something, that is, in connection with something else. This is highly Kantian, even though Heidegger to some extent denies this. For Kant logos without synthesis would appear when some being could directly perceive objects as they are (Kant actually speaks of such a possible being in theory – and notes that God would be such a being, if He exists). All the cognition available for humans is synthesis for Kant, that is, based on forming concepts from perceptions. This means that particular perceptions are synthesised into concepts that are sort of generalisations. Heidegger does not stray far when he speaks of synthesis as being-in-connection: when we understand something as something, we always in a sense put it in relation with other things and judge that it bears resemblance to some things, and does not to others. This connection to Kant is made clear, when we take an example: I see a red car. That red car is seen by me as something, that is, as red and as a car. Because that particular object is for me red, it is then something that in a sense takes part in the concept “red” (and the same applies to being a car). To see the car as red is to see it in relation to at least other colours: not seeing it as e.g. blue.

The important thing to understand here is that synthesis always offers a possibility of obstruction. This is clear: when I see the object as a car, I can either be right in seeing it as a car, or be in error. It might, after all, be a huge turnip that appears as a car (or, it should be said: imposes as a car). But when I see the thing directly, not as something, I cannot be in error. This is also evident in the Kantian interpretation: God cannot err, because there is nothing he could make an error of!

As a conclusion, Heidegger offers some ways to derive the other meanings of logos from this original conception of logos as bringing forth or making evident in speech. There is nothing particularly interesting there, but the understanding that Heidegger thinks the other meanings indeed follow.

C. Preliminary conception of phenomenology

In this last section Heidegger pulls together the results of A and B. He first notes that there seems to be an inner relation between phenomenon and logos. Through analysis of the word “phenomenology” he ends up with the definition: phenomenology brings forth through itself that which appears as it in itself appears.

Huh? What sense to make of this? I must admit, that Heidegger’s use of words here is of no use to me. Perhaps I would fare better if I tried to derive the meaning of phenomenology myself through what I understand of phenomenon and logos? It is worth the attempt, I guess. Now logos brings forth something that is seen by the speaker. Phenomenon is an appearance, or that which appears. Phenomenology should then apparently bring forth phenomena, those that appear. But I believe that phenomenon here means also to appear as itself (as something that is like itself, more precisely). So in this interpretation, phenomenology brings forth those that appear as themselves to appear as they are themselves. I think this is at least close to what Heidegger says above, so I am carefully confident that I got the idea. Could I perhaps, then, somehow express this idea so that it would be understood? (Hah, a nice example of what we spoke of in the presentation of logos). Well, I can try.

Phenomenology is the study of appearances. Appearances are something that are not only perceptions, but some things that present themselves in some way – either as themselves or as not themselves. I have a lot of these appearances: the computer screen before appears to me like a computer screen (of course, it might not be one), for example. Phenomenology would then study these appearances. But how? By bringing these appearances forth into objective discourse. But bringing forth was to bring forth as something. As what does phenomenology attempt to bring forth these appearances? As themselves, that is, as appearances! Phenomenology studies appearances as appearances, not as something else. It does not study appearances as psychology does (as manifestations of some deeper level activity), but simply as appearances themselves. So it is made evident what Heidegger said before: phenomenology has no specific subject matter, but it is a method. It does not matter what the appearances are about, because phenomenology simply studies the appearances, not the things they present, or manifest, or whatever. I hope this is clear enough.

What is phenomenology suppose to “bring forth”? What is that which is to be called “phenomenon”? Reading this part again and again, I scratch my head in confusion. Could it be that Heidegger is saying, that the “phenomenon” itself is something that is present in all appearing, something that is necessarily indicated by all appearances? (Remember, this is (2.1.).) It seems plausible. This would explain why Heidegger turns so suddenly from phenomenon to Being. It seems that Heidegger has found the connection he needed: that which is indicated by all things that are, is the being of Being itself. Being is manifested (2.2.) through particular modes of being, or simply through things that are. And so Heidegger comes to the conclusion that what phenomenology is ultimately studying is Being itself and states: “Ontology is possible only as phenomenology”. (Remember that ontology bears special meaning for Heidegger).

I must say, that this is remarkable. The sheer complexity of the structure Heidegger builds is formidable, and yet he manages to tie the knots in a rather beautiful way. Assuming, that I understood what he was trying to say. I am truly beginning to like this man who demands so much of one’s brains, forces one to think until steam arises from one’s ears, but in the end also gives a lot. Not only has he managed to point of evident flaws in the foundations of our thinking, the vacuity of conceptions like “being”, but he has also, at least this far, managed to give plausible answers. He is difficult to understand simply because he thinks so differently, and forces one to think differently too. It is always difficult to learn another way of thinking (consider learning mathematics or logic for the first time). But when one learns to navigate, in a sense learns to swim in the new ocean, it starts to feel natural. I only hope that I have not already lost my touch in reality, and already speak in Heideggerian so that my words are incomprehensible. In some cases it is understandable because of the sheer complexity of the ideas I am trying to express, but it cannot be continuous. It cannot be a habit. Cold shivers run down my spine: have I become so immersed in the spell that is Being and Time, that I cannot even recognize the threat anymore? I must focus, however, and so let us move forth to end our survey that today is exceptionally long.

Phenomenology is then the study of the being of Being – ontology. When ontology was considered before, it was understood that Dasein is the fundament from which we must set out. I do not understand where Heidegger gets this from, but it still sounds plausible: Phenomenology of Dasein is hermeneutics, that is, interpretation of itself. Dasein’s phenomenology is then about Dasein trying to understand itself through interpreting itself. From this Heidegger finds the last loose thread and ties it to his knot: hermeneutics is the analytics of existence’s existentiality. As we might remember, existence was about Dasein’s being as like something for itself. Existentiality concerns the structure or form of this Dasein’s consideration of itself as like something. Hermeneutics is then, I believe, a science that studies Dasein as it sees itself: interpretation of Dasein’s way of being in the world. What is Dasein’s way of being? Most prominently culture: literature, history, sciences.

So philosophy for Heidegger is phenomenological ontology that starts from hermeneutics of Dasein and from those foundations aims to the Being itself.

This ends our analysis of §7, which has been clearly the longest clause this far. I feel quite good, because I was expecting a real intellectual breakdown, but instead gained a whole lot of clarity. Either I am starting to understand what this book is all about, or I am finally becoming insane.

§8

The analysis of Being must start from a particular mode of being: Dasein. Through the historical analysis of Dasein, it is possible to set the horizon of the study that is the Being and Time, or so says Heidegger. He then ends the whole of Introduction by explaining the structure of the tome in short:

The first part studies Dasein’s relation to time and explicates time as a transcendental horizon for asking about Being. (Transcendental horizon would mean that the necessary condition of asking about Being is the study of Dasein’s relation to time.) It divides into three questions:
(1) The preliminary fundamental analysis of Dasein.
(2) Dasein and temporality.
(3) Time and Being (Very clever to switch the order…)

The second part uses the method of phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology. It also divides into three sections:
(1) Kant’s (Woohoo!) ideas of schematism and time as the first step of the problematic of temporality.
(2) Descartes’s Cogito Sum’s ontological priming and the connection of Medieval ontology to the problematic of res cogitans (That would, as far as my Latin is concerned, a thinking being/thing).
(3) Aristotle’s study of time as a method of seeing the phenomenological foundations and limits of the ontology of Antique.

So, I have crawled through the endless ideas hurled at me during my journey through the entrance hall and its corridors that lead to the antechamber of the citadel that is Being and Time. Through the copper plate, with the assistance of Tobi-Ass the Dialectical Necromancer, I have interpreted the keys to the halls of the citadel. And one by one, we shall enter these halls to find the truths they have hidden. The journey will be long and arduous, I am sure, yet my initial success has given me courage. There is sense to be made here, no doubt. With the help of my newfound (and newly gravedigged) friends, we shall see our quest through and escape the Citadel of Being and Time with the well-guarded truths that it harbours deep within its endless corridors and vast halls.

Interlude: Musings of the Fellowship, Part II.

2005-06-04T19:46:00.000+03:00

I find a dark corner of the antechamber, and carefully take out Kant from my pocket.

DT: How are you faring Kant?
K: As well as one could expect from someone stuffed into your smelly pocket.
DT: Grumpy, eh?
K: ...
DT: I am sorry that I have kept you there, but it is not safe for you here. I am not at all sure if your transcendental reflection holds any power in this place. But as Wittgenstein has managed to survive here for so long, I thought it would be safe to let you out for a while.
K: Very considerate of you.
DT: Well, what do you think of this place? What does Heideggerian philosophy sound like to you?
K: Actually, I think - which by the way is something that should always be able to accompany all of the sensible manifold of intuitions in order for me to recognize these experiences as my own, which in turn is then necessary for...
DT: Yes, the Principle of Transcendental Unity of Apperception. You are drifting Kant.
K: Sorry. You know me.
DT: I believe we all know you and your ability to start sentences far better than to finish them.
K: Grmph. Well, as I was saying, I think that Heidegger is actually a rather Kantian philosopher in many ways - stop giggling, it sounds better than saying that he is a me-like philosopher. His method is that of transcendental philosophy. He takes experience as granted and purports to show through careful transcendental analysis of these experiences what their necessary conditions are. His Dasein is in accordance with my division between transcendentality and empiricality. Dasein is something that is always within the world, and that bears a relation to the world as partly its constituter.
DT: I agree. His methods are those of a transcendental philosopher. But surely he has differences too?
K: Most definately. For one, he seems to be far more realistic than I would dare to be. Sure, I postulated the Ding an sich, but that is of course something that is beyond our cognition's reach. Heidegger too assumes the world behind the interpretations of Dasein, but he seems to also assume that we can through careful analysis say something of the world itself. The other possibility is that he actually drops the whole notion of Ding an sich and restricts himself to the phenomenal world, and that Dasein is in fact something that bears a relation to this phenomenal world. But this would of course leave the questions concerning how this phenomenal world comes to be totally unanswered.
DT: He also seems to have a different view on temporality than you do.
K: Yes. It is more fundamental to him. To me time is just one of the forms of sensibility, necessary condition for any possible object of experience to be represented in a manifold of sensible intuition within our cognition.
DT: You are saying that all intuitions or perceptions are always in space and in time, yes?
K: Sure. That's what I said, didn't I?
DT: Uhh, well, sort of.
K: Anyway, even though I do recognize the time's importance in self-consciousness and in experience in general, I have not reduced the mode of being for subjects to temporality as clearly as Heidegger is doing.
DT: Heidegger thought that you were simply too fixated in Cartesian concepts.
K: Bah, what does he know.
DT: I think he has a point.
K: Et tu, Dasein-Toni? I am hurt.
DT: Stop being a jerk, Kant.
K: But... but... I am not a Cartesian philosopher!
DT: I am not saying that you are - I recognize your philosophy for what it is, non-Cartesian critical philosophy. I am just saying that you too were blinded by the way Descartes set his questions. You were still working within the problems Descartes saw as important, to the extent that you didn't question some of your basic premises or concepts sufficiently enough. One of those is Being, as expressed by Heidegger. You spoke of subjectivity and Categories and understandability and all those things without ever stopping to ask what it is for these to be.
K: Fair enough.
DT: You also didn't have a more general temporal aspect to your philosophy, did you?
K: What do you mean?
DT: Well, to you subjects were in a sense stationary in time. Understanding, sensibility and reason as faculties of cognition were perhaps not objects, but they lacked a temporal dimension as well.
K: But time is just a form of sensibility!
DT: Is it indeed? Wouldn't you then agree that understanding must work outside time?
K: I guess.
DT: But what is activity of understanding, if it doesn't happen in time?
K: Well... Uhh... Look now, I died two hundred years ago, so wouldn't you think I deserve a break?
DT: Of course you do. Your work in philosophy has been prolific, to say the least, but it was not conclusive. Temporality was still something to you that it shouldn't have been, and so it evolved in later philosophy especially through Hegel. Heidegger is also someone who is deeply influenced by a historical approach to philosophy. Both of the aspects Heidegger is examining here, Being and Time, seem to me to rise from transcendental reflection and in that he is following your footsteps, but they are also some things that you never took into account well enough.
K: I can do nothing, but agree.
DT: That's a good boy! What about the decorations her...

My idle chatter is suddenly interrupted by a flash of light and a smell of sulphur that follows it. I find myself staring mouth open at a floating ass (yes, the animal, of course...).

TA: Good day to you, Sir Dasein-Toni! I am Tobi-Ass of the Secret Order of Dialectical Necromancers. I have been watching you and marked your progress. I am sympathetic to your cause and wish to offer you my skills.
DT: Dear God! Why is it that you look like an ass?
TA: Uhh...? Oh, yes! It is just the form I take in the bit-universe.
DT: Bit... universe?
TA: Yes. We of the Secret Order of Dialectical Necromancers have for the longest time known that we all exist solely within a network of computers that they call the Internet.
DT: Computers? What are you talking about?
TA: Perhaps it is best that I will not confuse you with my occult lore.
DT: Okay, whatever. So, Tobi-Ass, what are your skills?
TA: As one might guess, I am proficient in the arcane magic of Dialectical Necromancy, and I am a devout follower of Hegel. I am able to help you in many ways throughout your journey in this dark place. I too have a bone to pick with Heidegger, and would happily travel with you into the depths of his realm, to find out the truth about Being and Time.
DT: That's all fine and well, but what I really wanted to know was: what are your statistics?
TA: Statistics?
DT: Yes.
TA: Oh! Statistics! Of course. Just a minute, I will have to look for my character sheet.
DT: ...
K: Character sheet?
DT: Of course. That is where his statistics are.
K: ...
TA: Ah, there it is. Okay, so I am a 14th level Dialectical Necromancer. I am only 55,000 experience points from the 15th level - that's only one archdemon, mind you! - so I should get a level raise sometime soon. My strength is 13, dexterity 16 - I am very nimble, I can show you some tricks with my fingers - constitution is 7. Okay, that is a bit measly, but I still have 38 hit points. That is, you can hit my neck four times with a long sword with all your might (not counting the strength bonus, of course) and I will still have enough hit points to survive a magic missile. In any case, my wisdom is 17. It used to be 18, but I got into a rather unhappy encounter with a mind flayer with a bad temper. My intelligence is 18, of course, and charisma is rather high. Or would be, if I didn't look like an ass. 17 it reads in the sheet, but my metamorphosis to an ass drops it to 7. It is better than being a hairy ass, though. Should one look like a hairy animal such as an ass, it would be 3 no doubt.
DT: But, Tobi-Ass, that sounds wonderful! I think we could use a guy like you, with those dialectical necromancy -skills and all. Welcome aboard!
TA: Thank you. I will float around in my ass-form if you don't mind. I am trying to keep my identity a secret.
DT: Sure, that's fine. Right, guys?
K: Of course. I am used to seeing floating asses.
W: Yes, it is fine. Welcome aboard, Sir Tobi-Ass of the Secret Order of Dialectical Necromancers.
TA: Thank you fellows. I am sure our adventure will be a success.

And so we journeyd on, stronger than before due to our suprise reinforcements. The appearance of a powerful Dialectical Necromancer gave me enough courage to take Kant out of the pocket, at least for the time being. The next clause will be something that we will have to tackle later, for its sheer lenght is intimidating. Until then, friends.

Act III: From Being to Time

2005-06-04T16:43:00.000+03:00

Preliminary Considerations

I have now travelled through the corridor that leads from the entrance to the antechamber of Being and Time. I have both gained great insight, and experienced utter confusion. I have understood the terminology of Heidegger to some extent, and in the process started to speak in Heideggerian as well. The spell that is the Being and Time is potent indeed, and I must take better care not to fall totally under its influence. The tome twists my mind into this and that direction, leading me on to believe that I understand, and then in a single show of power strike me into spinning amidst the endless maze of concepts. Is this the good cop – bad cop strategy at work here? You know that one where the bad cop intimidates the interrogated and then the good cop steps in, so that the contrast is made clear. This has been noted to work: the interrogated will succumb to the good cop after being treated by the bad cop, simply because he is so relieved. Perhaps Being and Time is doing the same thing?

I do not know. There is yet the antechamber before me, and in there perhaps things will become clear at last.

On the door to the antechamber there is a picture of a snake turning onto itself, eating its own tail and forming a circle. This I recognize as the ancient, mythical Oroborus. Perhaps it is chosen as the sign of this place, for it seems to me that Being is like this serpent. It is not only a mere circle, but its own meaning turns back onto itself – its whole essence is that of an endless circle, where one can travel on forever. The true Being cannot be seen from within the circle, for one will only see endless repeat, questions turning back into themselves in a never ending cycle. The truth of Being, the essence of it, is only understood as the circle itself. Perhaps this makes sense, perhaps not. I put my musings aside, and turn the handle of the door to the antechamber and enter, fearful of what will await me there.

Introduction, Part II, §§5-6

§5

In the preceding clauses Heidegger purported to show that examination of Dasein is primary to examination of Being itself. Now the problem then naturally arises: how to examine the Dasein? First Heidegger notes that Dasein is ontically the nearest to us, but ontologically furthest away. What does he mean? Well, as we factually are the Dasein, we are not only close to it, but as close to it as we can get. Basically I think this can be analogized to our subjectivity, which is something that is present in everything we do, because we arethat subjectivity. But it too is ontologically the furthest away, because precisely due to this ontic closeness it is so difficult to see the structure of our subjectivity. What is it to be a subject? How to explain this, if one has no experience of ever being anything else? How does one set out to recognize that which is our subjectivity in our experience, to say what is it like? What is a colour like? Or an emotion? We are too close to Dasein to see it clearly.

And so Heidegger says that Dasein is trying to understand its own being through understanding what it is not, by reflecting on the non-Dasein, that being the world itself. The world is our mirror through which we try to understand ourselves. So it is only through that being into which the Dasein is always in relation (the world) that any understanding can arise. Dasein is always understood as being already in a relation to the world, and it is understood only through understanding this relation, and for each Dasein this relation is individual.

Heidegger says that we have a huge amount of different interpretations of Dasein at our disposal. He lists for example psychology, anthropology, ethics and history as such interpretations, and then asks whether the existential analysis of these fields is done carefully enough. By this he means that if these are ways to see the Dasein, have we sufficiently studied the structure of these ways: have we determined the foundations of these disciplines clearly enough to see how they really purport to explain Dasein?

Heidegger says, in my opinion, that Dasein should not be examined theoretically, but practically. It should be studied through examining its everyday mode of being. We must try to understand how Dasein really is in its everyday being – not idealise it through some semi-arbitrary theoretical structure. He then states that we shall find out that meaning of Dasein is its temporality. He does not explicate further what this means here; that will be done later. But instead he says that this interpretation of Dasein sets the foundation from which we stand a chance to find the answer to the meaning of Being in general.

Time is not time in its ordinary sense for Heidegger. (Surprise, surprise.) Time is that from which the Dasein attempts to understand itself. It is the horizon of interpretation of Being. I do not claim to understand what Heidegger is saying here, because I don’t believe it is understandable as of yet. But it seems that he is trying to get from the ordinary conception of time as a sort of dimension into a more fundamental conception: in which time is a sort of basis from which any understanding is possible. I will call this conception of time here Time, for it seems to me that there is still need for the ordinary sense of understanding time, for it is something that is derived from Time itself. I am not doing this to sound mystical, but only to differentiate between these two. I will also at times speak of Time as temporality. By this I try to express that this is not about certain moments of time, or how it expresses itself in reality, but about the phenomenon of Time in general, temporality. The basic difference Heidegger is explicating here is that between time itself and things that are in time. Form and content.

This is important to see: being in time presupposes Being, but Time itself does not presuppose Being for Heidegger, but indeed takes part in its determination. Heidegger calls this meaning of Being that is determined by Time its “temporal qualification/determination”. The meaning of Being must then be partly exposed through examination of temporality.

Fair enough, Heidegger, although I do not really understand why this is so. It seems to me as vaguely acceptable that Time is something that understanding requires, but I am unable to explicate my sentiments, and as Heidegger himself leaves this more or less open for the time being (no pun intended), perhaps we should too. Being is always temporal, let us remember this, and also bear in mind that Heidegger is not speaking of some naïve conception of time as physical time, but as something far more fundamental. Whatever that is, we will probably find out later.

This leads us then to considerations of history, as Heidegger says that the meaning of Being cannot be stationary, but is always understood through Time, and thus as something dynamic, more or less. To understand Being, we must understand historiality (again, this is not the same thing as history), which is the manifestation of Time. So, let us move on.

§6

Historiality is the form of Dasein’s being as something “happening”. Well, this is strange, but I think he means that Dasein is acting in the world, and this way of being as something that happens, or acts, is called historiality. History then is the succession of these happenings, or events. The historiality of Dasein is hard to grasp. Heidegger is saying that the past of Dasein is not something that comes behind it, but that always already goes before it. But this sounds totally incomprehensible. How can past go before anything, as it is something that is behind? I think this is only understandable as follows: Dasein is always temporal, and is therefore always determined by its historiality. That is, Dasein understands itself as a temporal being, and as a continuum, so to speak. Now it is in a sense true that past goes before us, because my past does not only tell me what I have done, but also where I am coming from, and thus where I am heading. It is like looking at a car’s path to a single point, and seeing that this path determines the future of the car to some extent. If the history of a car includes coming to a corner too fast, its future consists of sliding off the road. So the past in this sense does go before the Dasein, not only behind it.

But there is also another aspect to the historiality of Dasein: it cannot be understood merely as the history of one Dasein, but as the history of a whole culture. Culture is something that arises from tradition, and thus arises from the past. But this culture is also something that in a most profound way affects the way we will continue to do things. We are always within a culture, and thus within a history, and this history forms a context for us to develop in. In this sense the past determines Dasein and its future, and goes before the Dasein as well as behind it.

This temporality of Dasein has been ignored, according to Heidegger. It is to be understood that questions are always temporal, and are partly determined by the context of the culture they rise in. This is, I think, very understandable, because the questions we tend to ask in our culture are based on our culture itself: for example the scientific knowledge we possess. Questions concerning environment arise only when the relationship between our culture and its environment become problematic. Now Heidegger notes that the question about Being is of course itself also temporal, and this has been forgotten. He speaks of tradition that hides its own foundations. So Heidegger arrives at his most peculiar idea: the whole history of Western philosophy has been a certain line of interpretation, and now we must return to the roots to reinterpret the Ancients. But not just because they were somehow far wiser than us, but because they had the context in which the question about Being arose, and that context has been hidden by the tradition that forgot the problems and instead concentrated on the answers. And here Heidegger exposes his idea of destruction – the tradition must be broken into pieces to find out that which it has hidden. In this sense we must travel back through the history of philosophy to its roots to once again give philosophy some meaning. And it is this that must be done to expose the meaning of Being.

Destruction is not negative, but positive. It is supposed to recover something, not to make it obsolete. Heidegger then says something delightful: Kant is the first one to expose the problem of time. But Kant couldn’t have understood Time, because he bypassed, as Heidegger says, the ontological analysis of subject’s subjectivity. He then gives a demonstration of his destruction by tracing Kant’s error into Cartesian conception of subjectivity, that Kant used (I do not strictly agree: I am sure Kant’s idea of subjectivity is affected by Cartesian subjectivity, but for Kant subjectivity is very different from the Cartesian one – but I believe Heidegger’s idea is simply to show that Kant is still attached to Cartesian principles and this makes it impossible for him to see what he should see: that he never ever asked about the meaning of being itself). This Cartesian conception is then retraced to his usage of Medieval concepts and so forth back into the Ancients themselves.

He says that for the Ancients the meaning of Being included its temporality (its mode of being was linked to the present), and that for one Plato understood the essence of human as something that speaks – unlike other beings. Therefore his philosophy is dialectical. Thus Heidegger ends the clause by saying that indeed, the search for meaning of Being must be started from this sort of destruction that takes us to the “spring” of the question itself.

The next clause is the longest by far, and I will have to rest before entering its wonders. After the next analysis I believe I have finished the Introduction as a whole. I am starting to calm down and get a better handle on Heidegger. I think I understand the basic idea that he is aiming at, and this makes it easier for me to get a hold onto the details. There is still much in his philosophy that I do not understand. It also always makes me wary if I agree too much. It is often a sign of not understanding. What sounds good is not always good, but if one does not grasp the ideas properly enough, it is nigh impossible to really criticise the validity of the ideas. My whole brainpower is going into understanding what he is trying to say. In that very little energy is left to actually appraise this what he is saying, and also there is the possibility of reading too much into Heidegger. Assuming that he makes sense, but that I just don’t understand it, makes me look for possible ways to explain his words. In this it might be that I am inserting ideas into them that do not really exist there.

But I am confident that if I get it wrong, Heidegger will mob the floor with my misconceptions sooner or later. In any case, it will be a long and arduous summer.

Interlude: Musings of the Fellowship, Part I.

2005-06-04T13:10:00.000+03:00

DT: Ludwig?
W: Yes, Dasein-Toni?
DT: Is it true that your brother was a one-handed pianist?
W: Indeed it is, and a good one at that, I must add.
DT: It is just so strange to think of a one-handed pianist. Then again, I guess I am a one-handed pianist even though I have two hands, so perhaps the difference is just in the nature of the disability.
W: To some extent, yes, but we must bear in mind that even you, Dasein-Toni, could learn to play the piano with both hands, if you tried really hard.
DT: That was a nice thing to say, Big W.
W: My brother on the other hand, no pun intended, of course, didn’t manage to grow another arm as much as he tried.
DT: Pardon? Grow another arm? How would one go about doing something like that anyhow?
W: He used to sit hours in a corner staring out of the window, using his willpower to make it grow.
DT: You are pulling my leg.
W: No, no, it is true. Well, at least he used to sit in a corner doing something.
DT: But how do you know he was using willpower to grow his hand back? Did you ask?
W: No, I didn’t. You can’t really go to someone and ask: “So, huh, u usin' like ur willpa'wa to make ur arm gro' back on? Like, cool, huh huh.”
DT: Well, I am sure I too would have troubles to sound like Beavis and Butt-head.
W: Pardon?
DT: Ah, never mind. Just a facet of modern society you managed to miss by dying, that’s all.
W: I didn’t die.
DT: Oh, yes, sorry. You came here to look for your stolen ideas and got lost. We thought you did, though.
W: They are saying that I am dead?
DT: I am afraid so.
W: How intolerable! When I get back from this dump, I will set things straight.
DT: I am sure you will find Derrida delightful.
W: Who?
DT: Never mind. --- So, about your brother. Perhaps he was just looking out of the window? People do that sort of thing even when they have two hands.
W: Grmph. Perhaps you are right. Oh, well, but anyway. A fine pianist, nonetheless.
DT: I am sure. You know what’s weird, Witty, though?
W: That if you take a carrot and stick it in the forehead of a snowman, it still doesn’t look like a snow-unicorn.
DT: Uhh, yeah, okay, that’s weird, but I was thinking more of the fact that all notable one-handed pianists were left-handed pianists. If you calculate the odds, it simply doesn’t work. Although, there are not so many renown one-handed pianists in the world. It might be that either left hand is better for playing a piano (which would explain my lack of success, as I play on my right hand), or that as most people are right-handed, they tend to lose their right hand.
W: How come?
DT: Well, at least for me it works that way. Whenever I fall or stumble, my right hand reacts the fastest and gets the bruises. I nearly always end up with bruises in my right hand instead of left, so if there is an accident, perhaps it is more probable for the better arm to get smashed? And that would be, according to probabilities again, the right hand: leaving you as not only a one-handed pianist, but a left-handed at that.
W: Fascinating.
DT: Well, yeah. But that’s enough of that, I think. The last time you gave such a nice synopsis of what we went through before. Would you care to do one again, today? Yesterday ended with such a confusion, that a brief recollection would be in order.
W: Why, certainly, Dasein-Toni. Should there be any readers left, it would be good for them too, do you not think so?
DT: I surely would, if there were anyone reading. It is just so quiet and lonely down here. Eerie, even.
W: I know what you mean, Dasein-Toni. But endure we must, so on to the briefing.
DT: Ready when you are, Wittgenstein.
W: Right. In the clause §3 we ended up with the idea that all sciences are based on some axiomatic foundations, and that their value of progression is in their ability to cause crisis in those foundations. We also understood that all these foundations are parts taken from the most general Being, and that understanding this Being would be useful in two ways: in securing the foundations of particular sciences, and to produce new sciences altogether.
DT: That we did indeed, Witty. We also noted a connection to Kuhn that was interesting.
W: Who is Kuhn?
DT: Ah, I always forget that you di… went missing a half century ago. It’s just one guy.
W: Anyway, in clause §4 we plunged knee deep into shit.
DT: Wittgenstein!
W: Uh, sorry, but we did. Well, umm, found ourselves in dire straits indeed. Mr. Heidegger tried to explain to us his concepts of ontology, onticality, existentialism and existence, and to prove that Dasein was the most primary way of Being, through which all other ways are determined. I will try to explain briefly what is meant with these concepts.
Ontology:it deals with the structure of Being. It is not ontology in the common sense (that is, in the sense whether substances exist or what is causality), but a name for a discipline that tries to uncover the underlying structure of Being.
Onticality:this is about the things that are. Whereas ontology concerns the structure of Being, onticality studies things within that structure.
Existentialism: in the same way as above, this studies the structure of ways of Being, that is, existence. It is about the way existence manifests itself, how it is structured and how it functions, in a sense.
Existence: this was the trickiest of all. Existence seems to be a sort way of being only available for the Dasein, because it includes the ability to both see one's possibilities and reflect on themselves as well as to choose between the possibilities. It is the Dasein’s way of considering itself like something, and to affect this somethingness. It seems to be a common name for all the individual ways for the Dasein to perceive itself, and thus it is always in connection with the individuality in question. Existence is always determined in relation to the individual of whose existence it is about.
DT: Huh, those terms give me the creeps.
W: So do they to me. But with those we must dance, you and I. Let me just add that Heidegger’s conclusion was that Dasein is the most fundamental mode of being, because it is in special position both ontically (the only ontic being that can ask questions – in non-Heideggerian this would mean that they are the only entities in the universe that are able to ask questions, and they are privileged in that sense) and ontologically (the only being whose being is about its being – we are determined by our ability and desire to wonder about ourselves and our being). Dasein is then the ontic-ontological condition for ontology, as Heidegger put it. This is probably explained best by saying that Heidegger wants to express his idea that conscious beings (or beings that can ask) are the necessary condition for there to be any sensible structure to ontology at all (it is downright useless to ask about the structure of ontology without there being someone to ask about it – that is, Dasein).
DT: Fascinating, Witty. I think he, in a most perverse way, has a point there. I have pondered about the problematic of questions a lot lately, and it seems clear to me that answers hold no value, or indeed, no sense whatsoever without the questions. The question is primary, not the answer. Consider this answer: 2.718. What is the value of that? Quite simply: nothing before one explicates the question to which it is the answer. That is the approximate value of Napier-number e. (The exact value of this answer is known to all mathematicians and physicists, and I will not pursue it here.) Isn’t Heidegger simply saying that the answer to the meaning of Being can be considered sensible only if we explicate the question itself? Didn’t he actually say that in the beginning of the introduction, when he stated that we must first try to look at the question from a proper angle? Ah, I think I have indeed understood what Heidegger is maintaining here!
W: Fantastic, Dasein-Toni! And here we find another of the ideas that I lost!
DT: We did?
W: Sure. Do you remember that in Philosophical Investigations I pointed out that the concept of “the shortest way” is meaningless unless we first explicate where is it that we want to go, and from where?
DT: I do indeed. (After all, I am writing your lines too, you silly man.)
W: Well, that is all about the primacy of the question, again. The answers themselves only exist in relation to the questions. Of course, it could be argued that the objects that would become the answers do exist before the questions – like 2.718 was real before anyone asked about the Napier-number’s approximation. And I believe Heidegger is saying that, when he differentiates between the questioned and the object of the question. The object of question is impossible to reach unless the questioned is first set. That is, the things that would become the answers can exist without the questions, but they are answers only when a question is asked. Therefore Heidegger is saying that before we can even begin to seek the answer to the meaning of Being, we must first determine the exact question we are asking, and because only Dasein, that is, us, can ask questions, we must first ask: what is Dasein? Here is the primacy Heidegger purports to show.
DT: There is another question I would like to ask from you, Witty, if you don’t mind.
W: Shoot.
DT: “Shoot”?
W: I am trying to relate to the modern society and make my feeble attempts at not only to be Wittgenstein, but to be Cool-Wittgenstein.
DT: Oh dear.
K: You called?
DT: Ah, Kant! No, dear, go back into the pocket, I didn’t mean to call you.
K: Uhh, okay. Well, play with Wittgenstein then. I don’t mind. Really.
DT: Yeah, yeah. So, Wittgenstein: isn’t here another of your ideas manifest? I am referring to Heidegger’s apparent primacy of ethics – that after all is something you also attempted to say in the Tractatus, is it not?
W: Yes, it is indeed. In Lecture on Ethics I also express the primacy of ethics. In Tractatus I say that the world of the sad is a different world than the world of the happy. Not only does sadness change the way we see the world, it changes the world itself. This is ultimately because ethics and through them emotions, values and all those things are transcendent. They are not in the world, but beyond the world, determining the world. This is basically a rather Kantian notion, because it rests on the idea that the world we live in is a world-as-we-see-it, not the cognition-independent world. The transcendental subject is the eye, the border of the world that is the field of sight. If the world is a world of answers, then it is determined by the questions, and the questions are, in the end, something that arises from values, desires and ethics. Truly, ethics is primary to ontology. Through this it might be easier to understand why Heidegger says that Dasein is primary to ontology.
DT: Very interesting, thank you Witty. Not only am I starting to understand Heidegger, I am beginning to see how his philosophy fits the overall picture. And I just started the Being and Time. This has been a wonderful chat, and later on today we must travel onwards, to the second part of introduction that spans the clauses §§5-8. But first, let us rest a bit.
W: That would be prudent.

Act II: The Plot Thickens

2005-06-04T01:43:00.000+03:00

Interludial Recollections

”So, Wittgenstein, my faithful companion, what did we learn?”

“Ah, well, let me see. First we learned that the question about the meaning of Being is something that must be reawakened, and we looked into three erroneous ways of thinking about Being so as to avoid the question altogether.”

“Right – that was in clause §1.”

“Very much so, Dasein-Toni. Then we learned something about questions in general: question always has the questioned and the object of question. You ended up thinking that the questioned is what is meant by the question, and the object of question is that which would suffice as an answer to the question.”

“I did, Big W.”

“The question of Being is directed at being: its object is being. Therefore there can be no ordinary definition for Being, but that its definition must be something wholly different from defining, say, ‘riot’ or ‘that little pink thingy on your nose’. He also explained what he meant by Dasein, that being something that is and is capable of asking questions: you, me, Carnap before he was crucified. Heidegger also gave us a hint that the meaning of Being would somehow be found in the way it shows itself to us, and in the way we look at it, not in some logical inference through premises. This is also why, regardless of how it would initially seem, there is no circle in asking for the definition of Being.”

“Nice synopsis, Wittgenstein.”

“Thank you.”

“Shall we then go on, deeper into the mystical world of Heidegger?”

“Why certainly, Dasein-Toni.”

And so, my left hand in the hand of Wittgenstein, and my right hand securely in the same pocket where I keep my Kant, I will bravely move on in my journey, that even though just begun, already seems to have lasted forever. Two clauses down, 81 to go.

Sigh.

Introduction, §§3-4

§3

Heidegger asks whether there is any point in asking about Being. A good question, I think. Quite surprisingly Heidegger takes science to his aid. According to him all sciences limit a piece of Being to study: history, psychology, physics, you name it. All these fields have certain basic premises, axioms if you will, that determine their applicability and area of inquiry. Now Heidegger goes on to say that the true progress of these particular sciences lies not within their books where they store facts, but in their ability to cause crisis in their basic principles.

This is fascinating. The book is written way before Mr. Kuhn ever expressed his idea of science as paradigmatic structures, and yet, isn’t it here, right in this passage? That the true progress of science is in its ability to cause paradigmatic shifts? When did physics progress the most since Newton? Of course when Einstein formulated his Theory of Relativity, and thus with a clean sweep upheaved the foundations of classical physics. This link to Kuhn is certainly intriguing, but hardly relevant to understanding Heidegger. It often seems like the true pioneers rarely get the credit for what they have done, and so someone who delves deep into ancient philosophers may indeed find ideas even thousands of years before their time. But let us return to the topic.

Heidegger then goes on spree of giving practical examples of this sort of crisises in foundations of different sciences, from mathematics through biology to studying literature. I wonder where the claim that Heidegger almost attempts to be vague comes from, because he seems to take great pains to explain things as concretely as possible. In any case, his ideas in this clause are quite clear: all of these sciences are based on some fundamental principles that determine the sciences themselves (it is those principles, ultimately, that explain why biology and physics are different fields of studies), and all those foundations are always limitations of Being. Physics takes one part of being (nature as a mechanical system – although this definition has to be refined in modern physics) and biology another (those beings that we consider living organism, that is: beings that have such a structural organization that they are able to direct themselves in nature). These all are based on Being as such, and in order for the foundations of particular sciences to be securely placed, Being itself must be securely grounded.

But that is not all: all sciences are created through what Heidegger calls “productive logic”. Should we be able to unhide the meaning of Being itself, we would be able to not only secure the existing sciences, but to produce new ones. He uses Ancients as his example, and in particular Aristotle, who gave rise to many sciences. I think this makes a lot of sense, because sciences tend to rise from philosophy: the cognitive science of today ultimately rise from metaphysics, through philosophy of mind to psychology and from there through neurosciences to cognitive science.

For Heidegger then the question about Being is not idle speculation, but a paramount of practicality: it is an a priori means to produce new sciences.

Okay, so I find myself in agreement with Heidegger once more, and indeed am beginning to feel more and more enthusiastic about his philosophical program. But already I see in myself some marks of Heideggerian speech, and I try to concentrate on not giving into his terminology. It is just so easy to fall victim to his usage of words, for once you grasp what he means by Dasein, it is simpler by far to stick to it instead of trying to express it through ordinary language. I am beginning to understand those that speak Heideggerian, to my utter horror. But that does not mean that I consider it anything else than pure lazyness, and something that I would rather try to avoid.

§4

I feel like being caught in some sort of vortex. Every other clause seems to me simple, and every other makes me feel utterly helpless in my confusion. So if the last one was easy, this one starts with incomprehensibilities. After reading the first few sentences through again and again (to some extent it might be the fault of the translator, though), I am beginning to grasp his intentions. Because sciences are activity of Dasein (that was, again, a common name for all those beings that are able to ask questions), the sciences themselves are restricted by the same restrictions as Dasein. Heidegger then says that Dasein is different from every other being, and that science is only one of the ways for a Dasein to be. Basically, I think Heidegger is trying to say that even though science is one way for us to act, it is not the only way (which is clear), and also that the way we are in the world differs from every other way of being. This is clear too, because even though I, rocks, numbers, unicorns and sonatas are, there is a certain uniqueness to the way I am, that is, as a conscious being. Of course there are some ways in which those other being things are unique, but that is not relevant here. (As if I was in any position to say what is relevant in this place.)

And then again, Heidegger slaps me in the face and calls me his bitch (Which is something that Kant doesn't take lightly, because I am his bitch, really.). Dasein differs from every other being ontically (note that ontic and ontological are two separate things for Heidegger – I am not sure how to determine the difference, but apparently ontology is something that is concerned about the forms of or structures of how things are, whereas onticality is about the things themselves. I think that this might actually reflect the Kantian distinction between transcendentality and empiricality, where the former studies the structures of experience itself, and the latter the objects within the experience.) in that it is being whose being is about this being itself. Oh, God, what have I plunged into? I think I can manage this however, if you give me a chance to make an attempt at explanation.

For Heidegger seems to be saying that our being is about our being – basically. What does this mean? I believe it means that it is in a sense in our essence, in our very being, to question about our being. This seems plausible: I am sure everyone has had their philosophical moments when they wonder about their own being, and indeed their very subjectivity (“Why am I me, and not, for example, you?”). So Heidegger is simply making the claim that it is this trait that makes us different from all other as Dasein. Of course, it doesn’t seem to be overruled that there are other Dasein in the world, for example chimpanzees and dolphins. But that again is highly irrelevant. So our being is in a sense reflexive: it is turned into itself, and its purpose seems to be in itself. Does that make sense? I hope so.

Heidegger goes on to define existence, and again I am at loss. Apparently existence is that being to which Dasein relates in some way or another. Heidegger says that the essence of this being cannot be understood by asking what it actually is, because its essence is in that it always has its particular being, that must be its own. To be honest, at this point, I have no idea what he means. I have the feeling that existence is something that fits only for the Dasein – that it is about how the Dasein is. But I really cannot explicate further, for I have only a vague idea of what Heidegger might have in mind, and I will have to wait and see whether it will open itself to me later on. I am starting to feel desperation, and must remind myself to focus.

Heidegger says that Dasein understands itself always through its existence, through its possibility to either be or not be itself. This gives me the idea that perhaps existence is indeed about how Dasein is, but that I was looking for the meaning of this from too theoretical a point of view. Could it be that through our own actions, desires, motives, intentions and goals we construct our existence? That existence is about what I am – and in that I can either choose to be what I am, or choose to change myself. Existentiality for Heidegger is the structure of these sorts of considerations, and it seems to relate itself to existentialism in general: we are free to construct ourselves as we see fit, and in that our existence is a sort of field of possibilities. I can become a philosopher, or perhaps a hairdresser. I am fundamentally free to choose, and it all comes down to my way of being, either as a philosopher or a hairdresser. But I am not yet a philosopher, am I? So I relate to my own existence in that I am in a sense trying to reach it. So it would become clearer and more understandable to say that we understand ourselves always through our existence: we understand ourselves as like something. I think I have gained some sort of vague insight into his thinking, but I will have to wait and see whether the next thing he says will bring this structure tumbling down upon me.

Heidegger also says that the question about existence is Dasein’s ontic “purpose”, that is, I think, that the purpose of life is simply to construct ourselves the way we see fit, to ponder upon one’s possibilities and choose our paths in life. Sounds good to me. After this Heidegger claims that fundamental ontology, from which all other ontologies (sciences, I believe) only can evolve, is to be searched within Dasein’s existential analytics. Basically I understand this to mean that we must analyse the ways we are, the structures of our existence, to find the fundamental ontology. This sounds hopelessly Heideggerian, and I am at loss how to escape this. But in any case, it seems that Heidegger is advocating a view by which we must seek for the foundations of ontology through our way of looking at life, from our purposes and desires, from our motivations, intentions and wants. Is Heidegger here saying that ontology in the end is based on values, on ethics? That the fundamental ontology is found only through careful examination of the structures of our own values, of our ways of seeing possibilities in our lives and pursuing them? Is he saying that ethics is the first philosophy? I feel like my mind is torn to tiny shreds and thrown into the wind, and I try to gather up the pieces of my cognition to form a sort of vague idea of Heidegger’s views.

The next piece is important, yet I feel that its point is slipping away from me. Heidegger says that Dasein has many special positions. One special position is ontic: existence determines this being in its being. The second one is ontological: Dasein is itself ontological on the basis of its existence. Dasein also has a third special position as the ontic-ontological condition of all ontology. And so the Dasein has been shown to be ontologically primary being that precedes all Being that is the object of inquiry (or questioning).

Now this piece basically blows my mind away. The headache that started earlier today has returned with vengeance. There is just too many beings and ontologies and onticalities and existences to handle. I will, nonetheless, try with my last remaining strength to speculate what Heidegger might mean. The ontic considers the things that are, so Dasein’s ontic position must have something to with its position among thing that are, and in this that which makes it special is its existence: that is, its ability to reflect upon its own possibilities and construct a purpose for itself. In that it is indeed very different from, say, rocks. The ontological level considers the structure of being, and in this Dasein is again different, for as said before, its being is itself ontological, as its mode of being includes its ability to reflect upon itself. That is: its primary mode of being is to question its own being. Dasein is interested in its own being, and ultimately differs in its structure of being exactly in that its structure includes its way of reflecting upon this very structure. I think it is safe enough to say that not only do we have a self-consciousness that reflects upon itself, but that it is indeed a necessary condition for us: we can do nothing else than be self-conscious and reflect upon ourselves. This has a striking resemblance to Kant’s Transcendental Unity of Apperception, in which he considers the ability to reflect upon oneself as the necessary condition for being self-conscious.

I feel like running a mental marathon. What is that last part then about? Heidegger is there grounding Dasein as the basis of all ontology. He says that not only does Dasein try to understand itself, it is also trying to understand that which is not Dasein, i.e. the nature, the objective world. And as ontology is basically reflection upon the structure of being and Dasein is not only one that is doing that, but the only being that can do that (remember that Dasein’s determining attribute is its ability to ask – something that all other beings lack), Dasein is the necessary condition of all ontology in general – for it is the only being that can have an ontology, i.e. an inquiry to the structure of Being.

I am not sure if that above there is in any way intelligible. But in some vague way it seems to make sense. If Dasein is the only being that can ask questions, then it is also the only being that can reflect upon the being itself, and thus do ontology. In the end, perhaps all this can be crystallized in one single, clean sweep: only self-conscious beings are able to ask, and only asking beings are able to attempt to understand being – even if those other kinds of things are themselves part of being.

I pass out, but content that Wittgenstein will look out for me. Tonight I will most definitely dream some pretty surrealistic dreams. Heidegger seems to be getting into me, turning me slowly into a speaker of Heideggerian. But there is still hope for me, for my disability to speak properly is based on my inability to truly understand what Heidegger is trying to say – it is impossible to explicate something that one does not understand. But one thing is beginning to look frighteningly clear: this book will either kill me, or render me insane.

Act I: In the Courtyard of Hell

2005-06-03T19:53:00.000+03:00

Into the Dark

With sweaty palms and wildly beating heart, I open the cover of Being and Time and enter the shadowy world of Heidegger, repeating my mantra “Synthetic Unity of Apperception Is Your Friend” over and over again, clutching to the last remnants of the world of light I am about to leave behind. As I turn the first page, I plunge deep into the gorge that is Being and Time, through a dimensional portal that takes me within the pages of the book, as if into a parallel universe.

A vast courtyard opens before me. The ground is covered with ash so grey that it is only matched by the gloomy skies above me. A straight, cracked stone road leads to a massive undecorated wall. At the base of the wall there is something that looks like a small wooden door, with something hanging on it that I cannot yet make sense of. As I slowly make my journey towards the looming citadel in the distance, I note that there are torn bodies of logical positivists splattered around the ground, breaking the otherwise monotonous grey view. A crow is picking the eye of one of the poor bastards. All in all, it is starting to look rather cosy. Somewhat encouraged, I pick up the pace.

As I arrive at the door, I find that it is actually much larger than I had previously assumed. The discouraging wall is towering before me, reaching the very skies. I remind myself of the beauty of synthetic a priori judgments and steel myself. On the massive, black wooden door a crucified body hangs limply. Above the crux there is a plate that reads: “Rvdolph Carnap – Rex Positivisterum”. I bow my head before this atrocity. Positivister is of course a masculine noun of second declination, not third, and thus its plural genitive should be positivistrorum. Probably didn't fit the plate, and they thought they would get away with it. I lift my shaking head back up. Above the gruesome sight of massacred Latin, there reads in letters of blood: “Niemand verarscht mit Heidegger”, that is, “Nobody messes with Heidegger”.

Oh, well, too late, buddy.

Luckily, Heidegger is one of those guys whole leave the keys under the welcoming mat (that reads: "Those who will to enter, prepare to throw away all your hope". Aww, such a nice thing to say!).

Reminding myself again of the basic Kantian principles, I put the brass key into the lock, turn it and open the door, stepping into the dark antechamber of Introduction.

Introduction: §§1-2.

§1

The entrance hall of hell is actually rather nice. Apart from the occasional Greek (which is actually quite fun to attempt to decipher) that is not at all translated (except by the helpful translator of my book – in fact, I am attempting to evade the Heideggerian speech by using the Finnish translation. Thus I must always translate the used terms into English, so I do not revert to simply repeating the gibberish I read. I think I am being quite crafty here. Which isn’t actually true, as the real reason behind this is that I haven’t got my hands on the English version…). The first clause sets out to explain why we should reawaken the question about Being.

Heidegger claims that Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophies have been trivialised regarding Being in three ways, which he then sets out to explain in brief.

(1) Being is the most general concept. After saying this he throws lines after lines of Greek and Latin to my face, as if this is supposed to make it clearer. Nonetheless, after being briefly blinded, the idea becomes clear enough: philosophers have assumed that being is something that is so general, that it need not be defined. He pulls out the corpse of Hegel and speaks through his mouth: “Being is an undefined necessity”. But he says that even if this was so, it only goes on to prove that the concept of being is the vaguest, not the clearest. I nod in careful agreement, expecting some plot behind the seeming simplicity of his ideas. Perhaps I have been spotted and the spell is working through my mind as I type this. Must focus. Yes, the second one:

(2) The concept of “Being” is indefinable. According to Heidegger those that claim this have understood that Being is not something that is. But it doesn’t follow, or so he says, that Being is indefinable, but merely that it cannot be defined in the common way (you know, that “A bookshelf is …” kind of way). Well, I am left wondering how the hell should it be defined then. Heidegger doesn’t, at least not at the moment, offer any options. Just states that this indefinability does not free us from asking for its meaning, but indeed challenges us to do exactly that. Well, as a philosopher with too much time on my hands, I really must concur. I have always found it so that if something is the most basic thing, it is simply compulsive to ask “but, what does it mean?”. Gosh, I am beginning to like this guy already.

(3) “Being” is the most self-evident concept. After all, don’t we all understand what is meant with such statements as “the sky is blue” or “my hair is on fire”? Well, Heidegger says that this sort of understandability only shows our lack of understanding. Okay. He says that we already understand being, but at the same time the meaning of being is “cloaked in ambiguity”. This proves that the question of the meaning of “being” must be reawakened. I guess he is saying that if something is understandable to us, but we don’t really know what it is, it is necessary to find out. I am not sure if I agree (the blood of a pragmatist runs too thick in me), but his next clarification is okay: in the field of basic philosophical concepts it is dubious to claim self-evidentiality, when the object of analysis is the self-evident. Well, yeah, I guess you are right Heidegger.

He then ends this survey by saying that it seems that not only is the answer to the question about Being vague, but the question itself is without direction. Not very optimistic of you, Heidegger.

I am doing fine, I think. Not at all as scary as I had thought. Perhaps it is just a ruse to get me to advance further, or perhaps Heidegger is just a misunderstood, lonely puppy in need of a friend. Perhaps all those mutilated positivists in his courtyard were just for fun. Nothing personal. In any case, I am prepared to enter deeper into his lair. I think I can smell some pies in the oven already.

§2

Oh, well, that didn’t last long. The next clause made my lurking headache start its creeping advance upon my forehead, so I had to take a break and get some painkillers. The smell of pies turned out to be a still smoking corpse of some other hapless adventurer (looked like a humean philosopher to me, so I kicked it while I passed by).

Heidegger wants to explain what asking a question means. This is actually a rather interesting topic for me, because I have pondered these things for quite some time now (it is not enough to ask questions, it seems, but one must also ask what asking a question is about - where does it end!?). Heidegger first states that asking a question always precludes that-which-is-sought with the question, a target if you will. But he also distinguishes between the “object of question” and the, well, “questioned”. Could it be that the object of question is the answer, or that-which-would-become-the-answer? The questioned then would be that which the question is about, I guess. Basically, if I ask “what is the sum of three and five?” here the questioned would be “the sum of three and five” and the object of question would be eight. When I ask a question, I must first formulate the question so that I ask what is being questioned, or asked, and only then can there be hopes of successfully identifying the object of the question. It seems to me here that Heidegger is being very realistic, because he assumes that all questions have answers, and seems to think that the formulation (i. e. what is meant with it) of a question is enough to determine its answer.

Or then I am completely off. Never mind me. One question arises from this, though: what is the question itself, or the act of questioning, if it is not the questioned as expressed here? I think Heidegger is thinking of a sort of simple state of mind. Perhaps the act of questioning itself arises from a mere need, a desire. He doesn’t seem to explicate this, but only says that “questioning is about the one-who-questions relating (being in relation, basically)”, or some such. Ugh, I don’t know.

He speaks of transparency of the question too. A question about Being must be made transparent. I have no idea what he means by this, beyond that he seems to be thinking that being transparent is somehow about being visible, being comprehensible. Being clear. My head is beginning to twist and bend under the pressure.

Well, in any case. He now turns to the question concerning Being. The questioned is Being, in this question. What we must do is to explicate the question itself so that we could make some sense of it. According to Heidegger, that which the question searches is not as much unknown as totally unfixed. That is, we understand what we ask when we ask about Being, but we really don’t know where we should seek the answer: being is everywhere, all around us, in everything we do. Which direction should we head?

What should one make of sentences like this: “The being of being “is” not itself something that is.” Like, d’oh! Let’s see if we can make sense of this. The being of being is probably the “way being is”, so to speak, that is, the meaning of being (am I making any sense? I don’t suppose I am). That meaning of being “is” (well, it really must be “is”, because it can’t be is, as we are trying to say what “is” is – I am starting to feel nauseous) not something that is. Okay, well, let’s try this: the meaning of “being” is not alike to other meanings of things. When “earwax” means something, it then is something. But when “being” means something, it cannot be something. The meaning of being must be something unlike the meaning of other things. I guess Heidegger is simply saying that the idea that “being is something” is the reason why being has been thought to be some sort of primordial, indefinable concept, as it really cannot be anything. That is: we have been looking for the meaning of being from a wholly different place, or from a wholly erroneous angle. And indeed, he says that we must avoid “telling a myth”, by which he means that we shouldn’t reduce being to something other that is – as we do with other things. He says that when we ask about being, we are in a sense “interrogating being about its own being” – and so wholly another approach must be invented for this to make sense.

Oll Klear, but please, mr. Heidegger, do tell us how to proceed! You have made me desperate, and you have made me understand my lack of understanding, but how to rise from this quagmire?

Heidegger says that we must first make sure that we approach Being in a correct way for it to, in a sense, present itself to us truthfully in our interrogation. Okay, admittedly that was pretty Heideggerian. Gah! But I will not give in. The Being is like something, and we are trying to find out what that something is. In order for it to show itself to us as it really is, we must look at it from a correct angle. I guess it could be much like looking at a square: in order for us to really see it as it is, we must look at it straight from the front, otherwise it is distorted (although our brains are rather apt in distorting it back to a square, but anyway - the analogy is meant to carry only as far). But how to make sure the aspect is right? He understands that there are many ways in which we use being, and we must go through them all to somehow get a grip onto what is common to all these beings. Sounds laboursome.

Heidegger then goes on to express his most notorious term: Dasein (literally something like being-here or herebeing). He himself defines it as follows: “This being that we always are and whose possibilities of being include the ability to ask, we name terminologically as Dasein.” What is he trying to say? I actually feel quite content at this point, and dare to say that he means that every conscious being that is able to reflect upon himself (or to reflect at all, but I assume that something that is able to ask, is able to ask about itself too) is Dasein. What is common to all beings that share consciousness, is that things are like something to them. The warmth of the Sun for a rock is not like anything – the rock hasn’t got a perspective on the warmth. It just Is, so to speak. But it is like something to me. But this may not be enough here: I think Heidegger would also include the ability to reflect upon oneself. In this Kant is smiling happily, for it is in accordance with his Principle of Synthetic Unity of Apperception (something that I will not pursue here – this is the domain of Heidegger, and bringing Kant here would perhaps only call wrath down upon me). Is then Dasein simply a name for all those beings that are conscious? That is, a subset of all those things that are, and a subset that is identified by its members’ ability to reflect upon themselves, to ask about their own being – to be self-conscious? At this point it seems plausible, so I wipe the sweat off my forehead and journey on, faithful in that I am on the right path.

Heidegger then says that the analysis of Being must be started from the analysis of Dasein. I guess this is so, because we are conscious beings, and thus we must start the analysis of ourselves by analysing what this consciousness is that determines us. But Heidegger identifies a possible circle here: we seem to try to define Being in its being, and only then ask the question about Being. That is, we as Dasein already are, so if we start from that and ask the question about Being, we seem to already presuppose Being as something. This sounds like something that might be one of the most crushing problems for Heidegger, but he himself is adamant that this is not the case. I am intrigued: how come?

Well, he says, we can determine Being in its being even before we have an explicit concept of the meaning of Being. If this wasn’t true, then we couldn’t have ever formed any kind of ontological knowledge whatsoever! Well, Heidegger, I really must again succumb to your reasoning and find it in the right, insofar as I understand it. Using something is simply not the same as being able to explicitly define that something. This is evident in everywhere I turn: I use the keyboard now, but how to define a keyboard? Even though I might be able to do that after giving it some thought, it simply isn’t necessary for my usage of the keyboard to define the keyboard. So, Heidegger maintains, we can go on using Dasein as the basis of our inquiries, even though it already uses the concept of being, that we are to define. I agree, so let us crawl onwards.

So, Heidegger concludes the clause by saying that there can be no circular reasoning in asking for the meaning of Being, because the meaning is not something that is derived from premises through logic (which would be a necessary condition for something to even be a possibly circular reasoning), but the question purports to simply show the foundation, or unhide it. We must remember that for Heidegger truth is “unhiddenness”. I cannot explicate this further here, but what Heidegger is saying, I believe, is that the meaning of Being cannot be deduced – it can only be shown.

* * * My ponderings are suddenly interrupted by coughing sounds from behind a corner * * *

I startle and hug my Kantian notion of free will harder. Another feeble cough resonates in the hallway, and I recognize that it is no threat. Quietly and carefully I walk around the corner to find a huddled man, shivering on the cold, marble floor, with ragged, torn clothes.

“Sir?” I ask uncertain. The figure coughs again and turns his worn out face towards me. “My God!”, I gasp, “Wittgenstein? Is that really you?” – this place is far more wondrous than I had expected. I never expected to find Wittgenstein, forlorn in this cursed place.

He gives a brief nod and rises to his feet, shaking. “My good man, what is that you are doing here?” I ask in wonder and give my coat to him to warm him up.

“He… he…”, another spasm of cough interrupts him, “stole my ideas!” What an odd thing to say, that Heidegger stole Wittgenstein’s ideas? “I came here to look for them, but I got lost somewhere between Dasein and unhiddenness.”

"Now, who would have thought…", I think, and ask:“What idea did he steal, good man?”

“Many ideas, but in particular the idea that some things can only be shown. Remember that in Tractatus I wrote that the form of picturing can only be shown, not pictured?”

“Yes, I remember that. Language is a picture of reality, and the form of the picture is something that accompanies all pictures, but that itself cannot be pictured, but only shown. That is, basically, that logic cannot be proved or explained, but that it simply is, and shows itself through its usage, I believe.”

“Yes, something like that. And now, here he is, that pesky Heidegger, speaking of Being only showing its truth.”

“I see now. I hadn’t thought of that before. You say he stole other ideas from you?” I wonder what sort of ideas these two so remarkably different philosophers might still share.

“Well, not as much stole as borrowed and forgot to return. But that’s okay, I once borrowed Levinas’s vacuum cleaner and sold it onwards, so I guess I deserve the bad karma. But I would still like to find the ideas again.”

“Well, then, perhaps you would care to join me in my mission to uncover the truths of Being and Time?” I asked hopefully, encouraged by his returning strength, although somewhat surprised that he would do that to Levinas, who, after all, is such a nice guy.

“Certainly. Let us go forth!”, he exclaimed enthusiastically.

And so we did, Wittgenstein and I, hand in hand, to enter ever deeper into the conceptual maze of Being and Time. Exhausted, but hopeful. There is a sense of wisdom in the words of Heidegger, and there is faith in me that I will resolve his puzzles.

And So It Begins

2005-06-02T23:55:00.000+03:00

Heidegger's Being and Time is often considered one of the most difficult philosophical books ever written. But after being encouraged by Kant's Critique of Pure Reason to an unhealthy degree, I feel ready to embark on an epic journey into the depths of Being and Time.

Those who have made the journey never return quite the same - if, indeed, they return at all. The walls of philosophy departments around the world whisper dark tales of those who foolishly indulged themselves in the arcane knowledge hidden deep within the pages of that fabled book, sorrow-filled stories of the Unprepared and Naïve. According to ancient lore, Being and Time is an intricate spell, designed to deviously ensnare its victims by working gradually within the hapless mind of the unsuspecting reader. The results are notorious: those that claim to have found the wisdom of Being and Time lose their ability to communicate successfully with other denizens of the world altogether, and instead spew out unintelligible Heideggerian. "Das Nichts nichtet!" they scream out repeatedly, mesmerized by the sheer tautological force of those words, helplessly lost in their Heideggerian insanity. It is a fearsome fate, to be sure. Yet, my friends, therein lies my destiny. Through the pages of Being and Time my path runs, beckoning me.

I have taken an alias, a name to cover up my true origins. I shall attempt to enter the world of Being and Time unnoticed by assuming another identity. From this point onward, I shall not be known as the Kantian named Toni Kannisto, but as Dasein-Toni. I will leave my Kant behind in appearance, but I shall hold onto the light of Kritik der Reinen Vernunft in my heart when the world around me becomes too dark, and embrace my Transcendental Unity of Apperception for comfort, and by the power of Kant I shall endure. Let the Daseins and unhiddennesses come, for I am prepared! I will delve deep into the mysteries of Being and Time, and emerge from the gorge of occult metaphysics untouched by the incantation that would transform me into a babbling speaker of Heideggerian. I shall enter the domain of Heidegger, liberate his wisdom from the clutches of nonsensical gibberish and shout out the truths of Being and Time in Plain Language.

Or die trying.

So this is the story of one little Kantian with too much time on his hands. This is A Kantian's Journey There And Back Again! -Dramatic Silence- Or at least There; the Back Again part is something I wouldn't count on, really.

Will I become just another notch in the cover of Being and Time, or will I conquer the juggernaut of philosophy? Will I unhide the Truth hidden between the pages of the mystical tome? Will my Kant persist through the suffocating darkness that is the Being and Time, or will Dasein overcome the Principle of Transcendental Unity of Apperception? Will the chaos of terminological whirlwind or the tsunami of poorly defined concepts turn me into a peg-legged carrot with bad eyesight?

Stop asking and read the damned diary.