Interludial Recollections
”So, Wittgenstein, my faithful companion, what did we learn?”
“Ah, well, let me see. First we learned that the question about the meaning of Being is something that must be reawakened, and we looked into three erroneous ways of thinking about Being so as to avoid the question altogether.”
“Right – that was in clause §1.”
“Very much so, Dasein-Toni. Then we learned something about questions in general: question always has the questioned and the object of question. You ended up thinking that the questioned is what is meant by the question, and the object of question is that which would suffice as an answer to the question.”
“I did, Big W.”
“The question of Being is directed at being: its object is being. Therefore there can be no ordinary definition for Being, but that its definition must be something wholly different from defining, say, ‘riot’ or ‘that little pink thingy on your nose’. He also explained what he meant by Dasein, that being something that is and is capable of asking questions: you, me, Carnap before he was crucified. Heidegger also gave us a hint that the meaning of Being would somehow be found in the way it shows itself to us, and in the way we look at it, not in some logical inference through premises. This is also why, regardless of how it would initially seem, there is no circle in asking for the definition of Being.”
“Nice synopsis, Wittgenstein.”
“Thank you.”
“Shall we then go on, deeper into the mystical world of Heidegger?”
“Why certainly, Dasein-Toni.”
And so, my left hand in the hand of Wittgenstein, and my right hand securely in the same pocket where I keep my Kant, I will bravely move on in my journey, that even though just begun, already seems to have lasted forever. Two clauses down, 81 to go.
§3
Heidegger asks whether there is any point in asking about Being. A good question, I think. Quite surprisingly Heidegger takes science to his aid. According to him all sciences limit a piece of Being to study: history, psychology, physics, you name it. All these fields have certain basic premises, axioms if you will, that determine their applicability and area of inquiry. Now Heidegger goes on to say that the true progress of these particular sciences lies not within their books where they store facts, but in their ability to cause crisis in their basic principles.
This is fascinating. The book is written way before Mr. Kuhn ever expressed his idea of science as paradigmatic structures, and yet, isn’t it here, right in this passage? That the true progress of science is in its ability to cause paradigmatic shifts? When did physics progress the most since Newton? Of course when Einstein formulated his Theory of Relativity, and thus with a clean sweep upheaved the foundations of classical physics. This link to Kuhn is certainly intriguing, but hardly relevant to understanding Heidegger. It often seems like the true pioneers rarely get the credit for what they have done, and so someone who delves deep into ancient philosophers may indeed find ideas even thousands of years before their time. But let us return to the topic.
Heidegger then goes on spree of giving practical examples of this sort of crisises in foundations of different sciences, from mathematics through biology to studying literature. I wonder where the claim that Heidegger almost attempts to be vague comes from, because he seems to take great pains to explain things as concretely as possible. In any case, his ideas in this clause are quite clear: all of these sciences are based on some fundamental principles that determine the sciences themselves (it is those principles, ultimately, that explain why biology and physics are different fields of studies), and all those foundations are always limitations of Being. Physics takes one part of being (nature as a mechanical system – although this definition has to be refined in modern physics) and biology another (those beings that we consider living organism, that is: beings that have such a structural organization that they are able to direct themselves in nature). These all are based on Being as such, and in order for the foundations of particular sciences to be securely placed, Being itself must be securely grounded.
But that is not all: all sciences are created through what Heidegger calls “productive logic”. Should we be able to unhide the meaning of Being itself, we would be able to not only secure the existing sciences, but to produce new ones. He uses Ancients as his example, and in particular Aristotle, who gave rise to many sciences. I think this makes a lot of sense, because sciences tend to rise from philosophy: the cognitive science of today ultimately rise from metaphysics, through philosophy of mind to psychology and from there through neurosciences to cognitive science.
For Heidegger then the question about Being is not idle speculation, but a paramount of practicality: it is an a priori means to produce new sciences.
Okay, so I find myself in agreement with Heidegger once more, and indeed am beginning to feel more and more enthusiastic about his philosophical program. But already I see in myself some marks of Heideggerian speech, and I try to concentrate on not giving into his terminology. It is just so easy to fall victim to his usage of words, for once you grasp what he means by Dasein, it is simpler by far to stick to it instead of trying to express it through ordinary language. I am beginning to understand those that speak Heideggerian, to my utter horror. But that does not mean that I consider it anything else than pure lazyness, and something that I would rather try to avoid.
§4
I feel like being caught in some sort of vortex. Every other clause seems to me simple, and every other makes me feel utterly helpless in my confusion. So if the last one was easy, this one starts with incomprehensibilities. After reading the first few sentences through again and again (to some extent it might be the fault of the translator, though), I am beginning to grasp his intentions. Because sciences are activity of Dasein (that was, again, a common name for all those beings that are able to ask questions), the sciences themselves are restricted by the same restrictions as Dasein. Heidegger then says that Dasein is different from every other being, and that science is only one of the ways for a Dasein to be. Basically, I think Heidegger is trying to say that even though science is one way for us to act, it is not the only way (which is clear), and also that the way we are in the world differs from every other way of being. This is clear too, because even though I, rocks, numbers, unicorns and sonatas are, there is a certain uniqueness to the way I am, that is, as a conscious being. Of course there are some ways in which those other being things are unique, but that is not relevant here. (As if I was in any position to say what is relevant in this place.)
And then again, Heidegger slaps me in the face and calls me his bitch (Which is something that Kant doesn't take lightly, because I am his bitch, really.). Dasein differs from every other being ontically (note that ontic and ontological are two separate things for Heidegger – I am not sure how to determine the difference, but apparently ontology is something that is concerned about the forms of or structures of how things are, whereas onticality is about the things themselves. I think that this might actually reflect the Kantian distinction between transcendentality and empiricality, where the former studies the structures of experience itself, and the latter the objects within the experience.) in that it is being whose being is about this being itself. Oh, God, what have I plunged into? I think I can manage this however, if you give me a chance to make an attempt at explanation.
For Heidegger seems to be saying that our being is about our being – basically. What does this mean? I believe it means that it is in a sense in our essence, in our very being, to question about our being. This seems plausible: I am sure everyone has had their philosophical moments when they wonder about their own being, and indeed their very subjectivity (“Why am I me, and not, for example, you?”). So Heidegger is simply making the claim that it is this trait that makes us different from all other as Dasein. Of course, it doesn’t seem to be overruled that there are other Dasein in the world, for example chimpanzees and dolphins. But that again is highly irrelevant. So our being is in a sense reflexive: it is turned into itself, and its purpose seems to be in itself. Does that make sense? I hope so.
Heidegger goes on to define existence, and again I am at loss. Apparently existence is that being to which Dasein relates in some way or another. Heidegger says that the essence of this being cannot be understood by asking what it actually is, because its essence is in that it always has its particular being, that must be its own. To be honest, at this point, I have no idea what he means. I have the feeling that existence is something that fits only for the Dasein – that it is about how the Dasein is. But I really cannot explicate further, for I have only a vague idea of what Heidegger might have in mind, and I will have to wait and see whether it will open itself to me later on. I am starting to feel desperation, and must remind myself to focus.
Heidegger says that Dasein understands itself always through its existence, through its possibility to either be or not be itself. This gives me the idea that perhaps existence is indeed about how Dasein is, but that I was looking for the meaning of this from too theoretical a point of view. Could it be that through our own actions, desires, motives, intentions and goals we construct our existence? That existence is about what I am – and in that I can either choose to be what I am, or choose to change myself. Existentiality for Heidegger is the structure of these sorts of considerations, and it seems to relate itself to existentialism in general: we are free to construct ourselves as we see fit, and in that our existence is a sort of field of possibilities. I can become a philosopher, or perhaps a hairdresser. I am fundamentally free to choose, and it all comes down to my way of being, either as a philosopher or a hairdresser. But I am not yet a philosopher, am I? So I relate to my own existence in that I am in a sense trying to reach it. So it would become clearer and more understandable to say that we understand ourselves always through our existence: we understand ourselves as like something. I think I have gained some sort of vague insight into his thinking, but I will have to wait and see whether the next thing he says will bring this structure tumbling down upon me.
Heidegger also says that the question about existence is Dasein’s ontic “purpose”, that is, I think, that the purpose of life is simply to construct ourselves the way we see fit, to ponder upon one’s possibilities and choose our paths in life. Sounds good to me. After this Heidegger claims that fundamental ontology, from which all other ontologies (sciences, I believe) only can evolve, is to be searched within Dasein’s existential analytics. Basically I understand this to mean that we must analyse the ways we are, the structures of our existence, to find the fundamental ontology. This sounds hopelessly Heideggerian, and I am at loss how to escape this. But in any case, it seems that Heidegger is advocating a view by which we must seek for the foundations of ontology through our way of looking at life, from our purposes and desires, from our motivations, intentions and wants. Is Heidegger here saying that ontology in the end is based on values, on ethics? That the fundamental ontology is found only through careful examination of the structures of our own values, of our ways of seeing possibilities in our lives and pursuing them? Is he saying that ethics is the first philosophy? I feel like my mind is torn to tiny shreds and thrown into the wind, and I try to gather up the pieces of my cognition to form a sort of vague idea of Heidegger’s views.
The next piece is important, yet I feel that its point is slipping away from me. Heidegger says that Dasein has many special positions. One special position is ontic: existence determines this being in its being. The second one is ontological: Dasein is itself ontological on the basis of its existence. Dasein also has a third special position as the ontic-ontological condition of all ontology. And so the Dasein has been shown to be ontologically primary being that precedes all Being that is the object of inquiry (or questioning).
Now this piece basically blows my mind away. The headache that started earlier today has returned with vengeance. There is just too many beings and ontologies and onticalities and existences to handle. I will, nonetheless, try with my last remaining strength to speculate what Heidegger might mean. The ontic considers the things that are, so Dasein’s ontic position must have something to with its position among thing that are, and in this that which makes it special is its existence: that is, its ability to reflect upon its own possibilities and construct a purpose for itself. In that it is indeed very different from, say, rocks. The ontological level considers the structure of being, and in this Dasein is again different, for as said before, its being is itself ontological, as its mode of being includes its ability to reflect upon itself. That is: its primary mode of being is to question its own being. Dasein is interested in its own being, and ultimately differs in its structure of being exactly in that its structure includes its way of reflecting upon this very structure. I think it is safe enough to say that not only do we have a self-consciousness that reflects upon itself, but that it is indeed a necessary condition for us: we can do nothing else than be self-conscious and reflect upon ourselves. This has a striking resemblance to Kant’s Transcendental Unity of Apperception, in which he considers the ability to reflect upon oneself as the necessary condition for being self-conscious.
I feel like running a mental marathon. What is that last part then about? Heidegger is there grounding Dasein as the basis of all ontology. He says that not only does Dasein try to understand itself, it is also trying to understand that which is not Dasein, i.e. the nature, the objective world. And as ontology is basically reflection upon the structure of being and Dasein is not only one that is doing that, but the only being that can do that (remember that Dasein’s determining attribute is its ability to ask – something that all other beings lack), Dasein is the necessary condition of all ontology in general – for it is the only being that can have an ontology, i.e. an inquiry to the structure of Being.
I am not sure if that above there is in any way intelligible. But in some vague way it seems to make sense. If Dasein is the only being that can ask questions, then it is also the only being that can reflect upon the being itself, and thus do ontology. In the end, perhaps all this can be crystallized in one single, clean sweep: only self-conscious beings are able to ask, and only asking beings are able to attempt to understand being – even if those other kinds of things are themselves part of being.
I pass out, but content that Wittgenstein will look out for me. Tonight I will most definitely dream some pretty surrealistic dreams. Heidegger seems to be getting into me, turning me slowly into a speaker of Heideggerian. But there is still hope for me, for my disability to speak properly is based on my inability to truly understand what Heidegger is trying to say – it is impossible to explicate something that one does not understand. But one thing is beginning to look frighteningly clear: this book will either kill me, or render me insane.
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