Act IV: The Path Made Clear

Into the mood

While examining the gothic inscriptions on the wall of the antechamber, I find a copper plate on the wall. At first it looks blank, but soon I begin to recognize very fine lines in the shining surface, almost too insignificant to notice. Unable to decipher the curves, I call Tobi-Ass to my aid. He examines the plate for a while and then nods slightly. “I know what this is: it contains arcane knowledge on Heideggerian terminology. It is normally only readable to Heideggerian initiates, and I am surprised to find out that you could even make out the lines, even if not uncover their meaning. Heidegger must have a stronger hold on you that you would perhaps care to admit. Mmm. I know how to deal with this. Stand back!”

I step back hastily and watch as Tobi-Ass sets his cheek (well, asses have no hands, but asses do have cheeks. He can’t use his hoofs, now can he? Oh, well, come to think of it, he could, but that wouldn't be nearly as fun. And considering how unfunny this is, it is best that he sets his cheek instead of his hoof...) against the plate and whispers softly: “Ich habe ein Bratwurst in meine Lederhose”. I hold my breath.

Nothing happens. Kant and Wittgenstein share glances - apparently they know something that I don't... probably has something to do with their mastery of the foul language Tobi-Ass has been forced to learn in his studies of Dialectical Necromancy. Tobi-Ass coughs nervously and murmurs: “Blah. That was of course the secret entrance code for the even more secret organization of snowunicorns, how could I forget.” He then sets his cheek again on the plate and speaks in a clear, loud voice: “Nacktfrosch”.

The plate immediately starts shimmering and letters of fire emerge to fill the surface. “There you go, Dasein-Toni”, Tobi-Ass declares proudly, and a lump in my throat I shuffle nearer and immerse myself in the secrets of the plate.

Introduction, Part II, §§7-8

§7

In the beginning of the seventh clause, Heidegger explains that we must now explicate the method used in studying the meaning of Being. That is, the method of ontology. As Heidegger’s ontology differs from every other kind of conception of ontology, he states that this method should not be looked for in the history of philosophy. Then he states that the method must be that of phenomenology. Also, it is important to note that phenomenology is not an aspect or a field of philosophy, but a mere method: it only explicates how the study is conducted, not what is studied.

What is phenomenology? I am fully aware that I am on a thin ice here, for my arcane knowledge on the occult magic of phenomenology is rather limited. Heidegger himself is at this point so vague, that I start to wonder if even he knows! He says that phenomenology is a maxim (I kick Kant’s ankle sharply and he whispers: “a subjective law, or a principle!”) that could be expressed by the slogan: “Into the things themselves!” Okay, Heidegger, sounds classy, but what do you mean? He explicates that phenomenology does not accept any principle that is not conclusively proven, and it opposes pseudo-questions that prevail through generations. As soon as I exclamate that this is what all sciences purport to do, he himself admits that someone could say that. Indeed! And what does he do then? Nothing. Or, not exactly true: he says that we are in fact dealing with such self-evidencies, and that he is just explicating the preliminary idea of phenomenology here. Well, all fine and dandy, Heidegger – at least now I know that phenomenology adheres to the same principles as any other science that should be taken seriously.

But I have not slept through all of my phenomenology classes (Actually, I have not slept through any of my phenomenology classes, because I have never had any). Phenomenology is something that concerns itself with what is experienced. That is, it analyses our experiences. Everything in phenomenology should be directly based on experience, or should be reduced through proven steps to something that is thusly founded. The exact details are not of importance in our preliminary examination: I think it is enough to understand that as we found out in the former clauses, the study must start from the everyday existence of Dasein, and therefore it must be based on the way Dasein experiences the world it lives in. This, of course, gives direct justification for choosing the method of phenomenology.

Heidegger states that the word phenomenology translates directly as “science of the phenomena”, that is, as a science that studies appearances, or how things appear to us. He then sets to explain the two constituent words of phenomenology, phenomenon and logos, in a more detailed manner.

A. The concept of phenomenon

He throws a lot of Greek on my face in an attempt to either explain in detail what he is speaking of, or to put me off balance. In any case, the basic idea that can be found within the lesson on Greek is clear: phenomenon means something that shows/presents itself or is evident. But Heidegger also notes that something can appear either as something that it is, or as something that it is not, depending on the aspect we take to it. “It appears that the tyre is flat” expresses “appearance” in a positive sense (we think that it is rather clear that the tyre is indeed flat), or “It appeared to be solid, but in fact it wasn’t” expresses “appearance” in a negative sense (something appeared as it really was not). We could also explicate the difference through the English word “to seem”, which holds similar connotations. In any case, the word phenomenon then includes the idea that something can appear to us either as it is, or as it is not.

He also explains at length how such terms as “express” or “imply” or some such bear a relation to “appear”. Such a case would be symptoms of a disease, where the disease that itself does not appear is expressed by the symptoms, or that the symptoms imply the disease that itself does not appear. This is not appearing in the negative sense, because that which does not appear at all, cannot either appear as it is or as it is not. So even though different sorts of indications share the structure of appearance, they must still be distinguished from each other.

The next part is nigh unintelligible. That is okay, I think, because Heidegger himself expresses that this is a source of a lot of confusion. Nonetheless, I will try to explain the different ways for things to appear.

(1) Something can appear as it is, or as it is not. In this the thing is somehow present, but can be distorted.

(2) Something appears only through sort of symptoms or indications. In these cases the thing is not itself present at all (it does not appear in the sense of (1)), but something indicates it, points to it. This way of appearing can be divided into three different senses:

(2. 1.) Something “lets itself be heard/known”. It appears in the sense that things that point to it are manifest, but it itself is hidden. Diseases are mostly like this, for example.

(2. 2.) Something appears as an indicator itself. The symptoms of a disease are like this: their appearance implies something that does not itself appear, that is, lets itself be heard (very Heideggerian. Tsk, tsk, Dasein-Toni!).

(2. 3.) Something appears so as to both indicate something, and to hide that which is indicated. This is difficult to understand at first, but Heidegger points nicely to Kant. This makes it clear that the appearances as used by Kant mean appearances in this sense (although according to him Kant confused the different meanings from time to time): they are appearances of the Ding an sich, the thing in itself, but even though they in a sense express the things in themselves, they also hide them. That-which-lets-itself-be-heard is cloaked by that-which-is-heard, so to speak. Thus instead of speaking of “appearances”, we should say “mere appearances”.

Heidegger pulls the threads together (phew!) in a rather nice way. If we consider the word phenomenon, it holds within it a manifold: appearance (1), presentation (2.1.), manifestation (2.2.) and mere manifestation (2.3.). Manifestation could also be translated as expression, for example. As a synopsis: appearance is something that is itself present, either like it really is, or like something else (in which case the term deception could perhaps be used). Presentation is something that is itself not present, but is presented or indicated by something: for example a disease. Manifestation is that-which-presents some presentation, that is, for example, the symptoms of a disease. Mere manifestation is a manifestation that simultaneously presents or indicates something and hides it (so that it cannot be found even in principle).

As a closing remark, Heidegger states that the phenomenon in the sense it is used in phenomenology differs from the usage of appearance in the common speech. What is appearance in common speech, for Heidegger? Simply our perceptions. I take this to mean that for Heidegger phenomenology is not a science about perceptions, but about something rather different, although interconnected. What that is, is expressed above in (1)-(2). We will now turn to the concept of logos.

B. The concept of logos

Logos means “speech”. It is also, according to Heidegger, translated as reason, proposition, concept, definition, foundation or relation. This shows that the concept of logos is horribly vague. Heidegger purports to find the foundation of the word to explain how the ambiguous term “speech” could be defined so as to include or derive all these other meanings.

Heidegger states that logos as “speech” should be understood more like as making it evident what the speech is about. Logos brings something forth that is seen by the speaker to be seen by all that take part in the discussion. This becomes clear, when it is understood that when I speak something – as I do now, even though through text – I speak of something that appears to me, and labour to express it so that those that listen to me could see that same thing. So Heidegger distinguishes between that which is said from that which the speech is about. You see what is said, but that does not always suffice for you to see what the speech is about. This seems to me like a more general conception of word and its referent. Heidegger also notes that acts of speech such as praying or begging bring forth that which is seen by the speaker, but in a slightly different way. This “bringing forth” Heidegger labels as “to make evident”. “I have an itch” makes evident that I have an itch, even though this analytical way of putting this probably doesn’t do justice to Heidegger.

But logos also makes something evident as something. This takes Heidegger to his conception of truth, for logos can either be true or false. As true it brings something forth in a way that it becomes unhidden – it makes it evident as unhidden. As false it brings that something forth in a way that it becomes obstructed. But, Heidegger goes on: this is not what truth really means; truth is something linked with our perceptions. Truth is not a property of a proposition, but a property of perception. Perception is true in this sense if it shows something like it is, and false if it does not. This is, of course, diagonally opposed to almost every modern conception of truth, that take truth to be a property of a proposition, that is, as something that belongs to reason, not perception. I will not explicate Heidegger’s idea further, because it would take us far too deep into modern truth theories. But I will, nonetheless, offer a link (that is, a teleport to a pocket dimension) a short explication of what Heidegger means by truth: http://www.mv.helsinki.fi/home/tkannist/thoughts/heidegger.htm.

Heidegger ends the presentation by noting that logos is synthesis whenever it is not pure, direct understanding of perceptions. (That is, I assume, always.) By synthesis he does not as much mean linking together as bringing something forth as something, that is, in connection with something else. This is highly Kantian, even though Heidegger to some extent denies this. For Kant logos without synthesis would appear when some being could directly perceive objects as they are (Kant actually speaks of such a possible being in theory – and notes that God would be such a being, if He exists). All the cognition available for humans is synthesis for Kant, that is, based on forming concepts from perceptions. This means that particular perceptions are synthesised into concepts that are sort of generalisations. Heidegger does not stray far when he speaks of synthesis as being-in-connection: when we understand something as something, we always in a sense put it in relation with other things and judge that it bears resemblance to some things, and does not to others. This connection to Kant is made clear, when we take an example: I see a red car. That red car is seen by me as something, that is, as red and as a car. Because that particular object is for me red, it is then something that in a sense takes part in the concept “red” (and the same applies to being a car). To see the car as red is to see it in relation to at least other colours: not seeing it as e.g. blue.

The important thing to understand here is that synthesis always offers a possibility of obstruction. This is clear: when I see the object as a car, I can either be right in seeing it as a car, or be in error. It might, after all, be a huge turnip that appears as a car (or, it should be said: imposes as a car). But when I see the thing directly, not as something, I cannot be in error. This is also evident in the Kantian interpretation: God cannot err, because there is nothing he could make an error of!

As a conclusion, Heidegger offers some ways to derive the other meanings of logos from this original conception of logos as bringing forth or making evident in speech. There is nothing particularly interesting there, but the understanding that Heidegger thinks the other meanings indeed follow.

C. Preliminary conception of phenomenology

In this last section Heidegger pulls together the results of A and B. He first notes that there seems to be an inner relation between phenomenon and logos. Through analysis of the word “phenomenology” he ends up with the definition: phenomenology brings forth through itself that which appears as it in itself appears.

Huh? What sense to make of this? I must admit, that Heidegger’s use of words here is of no use to me. Perhaps I would fare better if I tried to derive the meaning of phenomenology myself through what I understand of phenomenon and logos? It is worth the attempt, I guess. Now logos brings forth something that is seen by the speaker. Phenomenon is an appearance, or that which appears. Phenomenology should then apparently bring forth phenomena, those that appear. But I believe that phenomenon here means also to appear as itself (as something that is like itself, more precisely). So in this interpretation, phenomenology brings forth those that appear as themselves to appear as they are themselves. I think this is at least close to what Heidegger says above, so I am carefully confident that I got the idea. Could I perhaps, then, somehow express this idea so that it would be understood? (Hah, a nice example of what we spoke of in the presentation of logos). Well, I can try.

Phenomenology is the study of appearances. Appearances are something that are not only perceptions, but some things that present themselves in some way – either as themselves or as not themselves. I have a lot of these appearances: the computer screen before appears to me like a computer screen (of course, it might not be one), for example. Phenomenology would then study these appearances. But how? By bringing these appearances forth into objective discourse. But bringing forth was to bring forth as something. As what does phenomenology attempt to bring forth these appearances? As themselves, that is, as appearances! Phenomenology studies appearances as appearances, not as something else. It does not study appearances as psychology does (as manifestations of some deeper level activity), but simply as appearances themselves. So it is made evident what Heidegger said before: phenomenology has no specific subject matter, but it is a method. It does not matter what the appearances are about, because phenomenology simply studies the appearances, not the things they present, or manifest, or whatever. I hope this is clear enough.

What is phenomenology suppose to “bring forth”? What is that which is to be called “phenomenon”? Reading this part again and again, I scratch my head in confusion. Could it be that Heidegger is saying, that the “phenomenon” itself is something that is present in all appearing, something that is necessarily indicated by all appearances? (Remember, this is (2.1.).) It seems plausible. This would explain why Heidegger turns so suddenly from phenomenon to Being. It seems that Heidegger has found the connection he needed: that which is indicated by all things that are, is the being of Being itself. Being is manifested (2.2.) through particular modes of being, or simply through things that are. And so Heidegger comes to the conclusion that what phenomenology is ultimately studying is Being itself and states: “Ontology is possible only as phenomenology”. (Remember that ontology bears special meaning for Heidegger).

I must say, that this is remarkable. The sheer complexity of the structure Heidegger builds is formidable, and yet he manages to tie the knots in a rather beautiful way. Assuming, that I understood what he was trying to say. I am truly beginning to like this man who demands so much of one’s brains, forces one to think until steam arises from one’s ears, but in the end also gives a lot. Not only has he managed to point of evident flaws in the foundations of our thinking, the vacuity of conceptions like “being”, but he has also, at least this far, managed to give plausible answers. He is difficult to understand simply because he thinks so differently, and forces one to think differently too. It is always difficult to learn another way of thinking (consider learning mathematics or logic for the first time). But when one learns to navigate, in a sense learns to swim in the new ocean, it starts to feel natural. I only hope that I have not already lost my touch in reality, and already speak in Heideggerian so that my words are incomprehensible. In some cases it is understandable because of the sheer complexity of the ideas I am trying to express, but it cannot be continuous. It cannot be a habit. Cold shivers run down my spine: have I become so immersed in the spell that is Being and Time, that I cannot even recognize the threat anymore? I must focus, however, and so let us move forth to end our survey that today is exceptionally long.

Phenomenology is then the study of the being of Being – ontology. When ontology was considered before, it was understood that Dasein is the fundament from which we must set out. I do not understand where Heidegger gets this from, but it still sounds plausible: Phenomenology of Dasein is hermeneutics, that is, interpretation of itself. Dasein’s phenomenology is then about Dasein trying to understand itself through interpreting itself. From this Heidegger finds the last loose thread and ties it to his knot: hermeneutics is the analytics of existence’s existentiality. As we might remember, existence was about Dasein’s being as like something for itself. Existentiality concerns the structure or form of this Dasein’s consideration of itself as like something. Hermeneutics is then, I believe, a science that studies Dasein as it sees itself: interpretation of Dasein’s way of being in the world. What is Dasein’s way of being? Most prominently culture: literature, history, sciences.

So philosophy for Heidegger is phenomenological ontology that starts from hermeneutics of Dasein and from those foundations aims to the Being itself.

This ends our analysis of §7, which has been clearly the longest clause this far. I feel quite good, because I was expecting a real intellectual breakdown, but instead gained a whole lot of clarity. Either I am starting to understand what this book is all about, or I am finally becoming insane.

§8

The analysis of Being must start from a particular mode of being: Dasein. Through the historical analysis of Dasein, it is possible to set the horizon of the study that is the Being and Time, or so says Heidegger. He then ends the whole of Introduction by explaining the structure of the tome in short:

The first part studies Dasein’s relation to time and explicates time as a transcendental horizon for asking about Being. (Transcendental horizon would mean that the necessary condition of asking about Being is the study of Dasein’s relation to time.) It divides into three questions:
(1) The preliminary fundamental analysis of Dasein.
(2) Dasein and temporality.
(3) Time and Being (Very clever to switch the order…)

The second part uses the method of phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology. It also divides into three sections:
(1) Kant’s (Woohoo!) ideas of schematism and time as the first step of the problematic of temporality.
(2) Descartes’s Cogito Sum’s ontological priming and the connection of Medieval ontology to the problematic of res cogitans (That would, as far as my Latin is concerned, a thinking being/thing).
(3) Aristotle’s study of time as a method of seeing the phenomenological foundations and limits of the ontology of Antique.

So, I have crawled through the endless ideas hurled at me during my journey through the entrance hall and its corridors that lead to the antechamber of the citadel that is Being and Time. Through the copper plate, with the assistance of Tobi-Ass the Dialectical Necromancer, I have interpreted the keys to the halls of the citadel. And one by one, we shall enter these halls to find the truths they have hidden. The journey will be long and arduous, I am sure, yet my initial success has given me courage. There is sense to be made here, no doubt. With the help of my newfound (and newly gravedigged) friends, we shall see our quest through and escape the Citadel of Being and Time with the well-guarded truths that it harbours deep within its endless corridors and vast halls.