Interlude: Musings of the Fellowship, Part III
DT: So, guys, how does the quest look so far?
K: To be honest, I think he has a lot in common with my philosophy. Take for instance the division between phenomenon and logos. Tell me it doesn't reflect my division between sensibility and understanding or reason.
DT: All right. It doesn't reflect your division between sensibility and understanding or reason.
K: But it does!
W: I agree with Kant. You must be bloody stupid to not see it.
DT: I... I... He told me to say that!
TA: It was just a manner of speech, a mere rhetorical device, Dasein-Toni.
DT: Blah, whatever. Go on with your stupid speech Kant.
K: You are.
DT: What?
K: Stupid.
DT: No, you are!
K: No, you are.
W: Guys!
K: Grmph, well, anyway, as I was saying to Stupid-Toni: Heidegger's analysis of phenomenology through the concepts of phenomenon and logos bears similarities to my division between the different faculties of cognition. Most notably the idea that phenomenon is something that is passive from our point of view and logos is active synthesis of us humans. Heidegger does seem to assume that the phenomenon appears by itself, in a sense, whereas the logos actively expresses that which appears in an objective way.
W: That seems to me quite a correct analysis, Kant, but there is something that cannot be overlooked. You divided the cognition to sensibility, understanding and reason...
DT: Sensibility passively receives intuitions or perceptions, understanding synthesises them into concepts or generalities and reason makes active judgments and thus forms new concepts through the concepts given by the understanding, right?
K: Yes, Dasein-Toni, I think you nailed it. Quite remarkable for someone so stupid.
DT: Just because you got PMS, it doesn't mean that you can go bitching all around.
K: How rude!
W: Oh, stop with the bickering already. As I was saying, the division to three does not neatly fit to Heidegger's division to two. Some of the attributes given to phenomenon fit sensibility and some understanding, whereas some of the attributes given to logos fit understanding and some reason.
K: Yes, that is most definately true. It seems to me that Heidegger uses the transcendental method in many things, and even considers some of my ideas quite correct, but then ends up following a quite different path. It is very difficult for me to decipher whether he is actually being more precise or vague.
TA: It is also notable that his historical method bears many resemblances to Hegel's philosophy. It might also be this temporal aspect that makes the philosophy in the end so different from yours, Kant. Consider that your system might indeed be formally better built, but it doesn't fit the bill: it omits the temporal aspect, and that is why it seems clearer. It is like a simplified approximation of the reality. When Heidegger takes into account the historicality of Dasein, it naturally becomes more complicated. Also, history might not be that easy to formalise.
W: Very true, Tobi-Ass, very true. What also crossed my mind was that Heidegger gives far more emphasis to subjective emotions and perspectives, much more worth on the individual's way of seeing himself. Where Kant's system is universal, Heidegger's is not.
K: What do you mean?
W: Well, you thought that rationality is some universal or an absolute. All people would act the same way if they were totally rational. This is the foundation you set your ethics: what is ethical is something that is detached from the particular considerations and in accordance only with the reason itself. You also think that the Categories are the same for all humans.
K: Well, surely they must! They are the necessary conditions for any experience whatsoever.
W: Yes, indeed, I understand that. Yet this is all based on some structure of the mind, and this structure is highly formal. It might be that you have expressed the formal conditions, but you also forget the power of the mind that you yourself set out to prove: the mind can impose itself on the world of appearances, and indeed does that. This is what I tried to say in the Tractatus: even the mood or the outlook of the subject changes the world. Because the world is the world as it appears, how we are in a sense "tuned" to the world, our emotional landscape, if you forgive me the expression, affects the way the world is.
K: But I am no subjective idealist, surely you know that! We cannot change the world at whim.
W: True, and I am not saying that we can. I am simply saying that you assumed that the phenomenal world we experience is something that is shared by all individuals, but there is nothing in your philosophy that would prove this. It is all based on your assumption of the universality of rationality. I am simply saying that perhaps the structure of the world is common to all subjects, and thus the phenomenal world is indeed intersubjectively accessible, but the content of that world is not intersubjective. The world is indeed my world, for it is determined in part by my mood, my desires, my wants, goals and beliefs. The structure of the world is that of language, and therefore of logic, and in that sense we share our world. But you give far too little emphasis on the subjectivity associated in the way we perceive the world.
DT: Hah! That ought to teach you, Kant! You are so totally owned!
K: Regardless of my idiotic companion here, I must concur. So you are saying that Heidegger takes this into account and this leads into a very different considerations, even if the starting point is nearly the same?
W: I am saying exactly that. You know, if I didn't know better, I would think you two were married.
TA: How do you know they aren't, Sir Wittgenstein?
W: Well, of course because "Kant is a bachelor" is an analytic judgment.
TA: Uhh, but the judgment is synthetic.
W: Leave it for the Dialectical Necromancer to spoil the joke.
TA: Sorry.
DT: Okay, fellows, we must try to form a synopsis of the introduction, to see with what we will have to work on in the future, and what is the general plan of taking over the Citadel of Being and Time.
K: Great idea, Einstein.
DT: You can't even know who Einstein is.
K: You underestimate my skills, Dasein-Toni. I deduced early on that the necessary condition for an overhaul in physics is that the vessel through which the paradigmatic shift is to manifest itself must be something solid and singular. This leads me, in accordance with the Principle of Synthetic Unity of Imagination, to the inescapable conclusion that this solid singular object must be a rock. This is evident because the foundations of Newtonian physics are solid as rock, and so it takes a rock to move them. But because the Unity is something that must necessarily accompany all objects of experience, the transcendental condition of there being a paradigmatic shift is that it is done by a singular rock. Of course, this would translate into German, that is, the Language of the Germs, as Einstein - "ein" being one, and "stein" being a rock. Now the last part of the deduction is to show that it is necessary that this Einstein is intelligent as hell, and because of that intelligence it would most definately enter into common speech as something that denotes someone with high intellectual capacity. But because of the necessary existence of sarcasm, I understood that this could also be used as a slander. See, easy as formatting a hard drive by accident.
DT: Whatever, asshole.
W: I believe that is the most beautiful piece of deduction ever produced.
TA: I concur.
K: Thank you, members of the fellowship. It is well appreciated.
W: In any case, let me give the synopsis, if you people don't mind?
DT: Not at all, Witty. Please proceed.
W: All right, then. According to Heidegger, the meaning of Being has been overlooked in philosophy. After proving that asking for its meaning does not include a circular reasoning, he shows us that it must have a different kind of meaning than other concepts. That meaning cannot be a theoretical one, because that would always require premises, and this would mean reducing Being to something other that is - but there is no way that these other beings could exhaust the meaning of the Being they themselves take part in.
The meaning of Being is in the way it manifests itself, and therefore the method of phenomenology is to be used to unhide it. Moreover, the being that is able to ask questions, Dasein, is privileged in this study. Because only Dasein can question its own being and thus understand it, the study must be founded on analysing how Dasein purports to understand itself.
Dasein understands itself in time and through time. Therefore a historical approach of Dasein is necessary, and to uncover the foundations of this understanding all that is piled on it and obstructs it must be removed through the method of historical destruction. So the study begins from time and the way Dasein understands itself in time, and through the foundations that are unhidden, we can attempt to understand the more general Being.
DT: Very good, Witty. So, which way to go, Tobi-Ass?
TA: I believe it is that door above which it reads: "This way first".
DT: I am glad that you are with us, Tobi-Ass. We would be lost without your special abilities.
TA: Why thank you, Da...
A sudden loud crash interrupts the conversation. We all startle and turn around to find a pile of stones fallen from the ceiling of the antechamber. Amidst the dust we can hear loud coughing and cursing.
IS: Mein Gott, scheißlich Glück!
DT: Sir? Are you all right?
IS: Bestimmt, I am fine. Mein apologiesch for crasching amidscht you scho.
DT: Who are you?
IS: Ach, natürlich. Ich bin I-Say-Aah, und I wasch examining thisch wunderbar Platz, when the floor gave in unter mich.
DT: What is that demonic speech you spew out of your mouth?
IS: Demonisch, indeed! I am one of the schecret organischazion of Demon-Babblersch.
TA: I know that group! You are able to decipher whatever occult gibberish the likes of Heidegger use in their unspeakable spells. I bow before you, I-Say-Aah of the Demon-Babblers!
IS: Ach, I had expected one of the Dialectical Necromancersch of Hegel to posschessch schuch knowledge! Rische, Schir Tobi-Aschsch, for you need not bow before ich.
DT: We would be honoured if you joined our quest, I-Say-Aah. What say you?
IS: Aah!
And so the party had gained another member. As most of you might be aware, this means that there is room for only one more. Six is the utmost total of party members in any quest. In any case, the Introduction has been unhidden, and so our journey leads further into the depths of the Citadel. Hand in hand and singing merry travelling tunes, the Fabulous Five enters the First Part of the Dungeons of Being and Time, to style... uhh, to retrieve back to light the hidden Words of Power of Heidegger.
K: To be honest, I think he has a lot in common with my philosophy. Take for instance the division between phenomenon and logos. Tell me it doesn't reflect my division between sensibility and understanding or reason.
DT: All right. It doesn't reflect your division between sensibility and understanding or reason.
K: But it does!
W: I agree with Kant. You must be bloody stupid to not see it.
DT: I... I... He told me to say that!
TA: It was just a manner of speech, a mere rhetorical device, Dasein-Toni.
DT: Blah, whatever. Go on with your stupid speech Kant.
K: You are.
DT: What?
K: Stupid.
DT: No, you are!
K: No, you are.
W: Guys!
K: Grmph, well, anyway, as I was saying to Stupid-Toni: Heidegger's analysis of phenomenology through the concepts of phenomenon and logos bears similarities to my division between the different faculties of cognition. Most notably the idea that phenomenon is something that is passive from our point of view and logos is active synthesis of us humans. Heidegger does seem to assume that the phenomenon appears by itself, in a sense, whereas the logos actively expresses that which appears in an objective way.
W: That seems to me quite a correct analysis, Kant, but there is something that cannot be overlooked. You divided the cognition to sensibility, understanding and reason...
DT: Sensibility passively receives intuitions or perceptions, understanding synthesises them into concepts or generalities and reason makes active judgments and thus forms new concepts through the concepts given by the understanding, right?
K: Yes, Dasein-Toni, I think you nailed it. Quite remarkable for someone so stupid.
DT: Just because you got PMS, it doesn't mean that you can go bitching all around.
K: How rude!
W: Oh, stop with the bickering already. As I was saying, the division to three does not neatly fit to Heidegger's division to two. Some of the attributes given to phenomenon fit sensibility and some understanding, whereas some of the attributes given to logos fit understanding and some reason.
K: Yes, that is most definately true. It seems to me that Heidegger uses the transcendental method in many things, and even considers some of my ideas quite correct, but then ends up following a quite different path. It is very difficult for me to decipher whether he is actually being more precise or vague.
TA: It is also notable that his historical method bears many resemblances to Hegel's philosophy. It might also be this temporal aspect that makes the philosophy in the end so different from yours, Kant. Consider that your system might indeed be formally better built, but it doesn't fit the bill: it omits the temporal aspect, and that is why it seems clearer. It is like a simplified approximation of the reality. When Heidegger takes into account the historicality of Dasein, it naturally becomes more complicated. Also, history might not be that easy to formalise.
W: Very true, Tobi-Ass, very true. What also crossed my mind was that Heidegger gives far more emphasis to subjective emotions and perspectives, much more worth on the individual's way of seeing himself. Where Kant's system is universal, Heidegger's is not.
K: What do you mean?
W: Well, you thought that rationality is some universal or an absolute. All people would act the same way if they were totally rational. This is the foundation you set your ethics: what is ethical is something that is detached from the particular considerations and in accordance only with the reason itself. You also think that the Categories are the same for all humans.
K: Well, surely they must! They are the necessary conditions for any experience whatsoever.
W: Yes, indeed, I understand that. Yet this is all based on some structure of the mind, and this structure is highly formal. It might be that you have expressed the formal conditions, but you also forget the power of the mind that you yourself set out to prove: the mind can impose itself on the world of appearances, and indeed does that. This is what I tried to say in the Tractatus: even the mood or the outlook of the subject changes the world. Because the world is the world as it appears, how we are in a sense "tuned" to the world, our emotional landscape, if you forgive me the expression, affects the way the world is.
K: But I am no subjective idealist, surely you know that! We cannot change the world at whim.
W: True, and I am not saying that we can. I am simply saying that you assumed that the phenomenal world we experience is something that is shared by all individuals, but there is nothing in your philosophy that would prove this. It is all based on your assumption of the universality of rationality. I am simply saying that perhaps the structure of the world is common to all subjects, and thus the phenomenal world is indeed intersubjectively accessible, but the content of that world is not intersubjective. The world is indeed my world, for it is determined in part by my mood, my desires, my wants, goals and beliefs. The structure of the world is that of language, and therefore of logic, and in that sense we share our world. But you give far too little emphasis on the subjectivity associated in the way we perceive the world.
DT: Hah! That ought to teach you, Kant! You are so totally owned!
K: Regardless of my idiotic companion here, I must concur. So you are saying that Heidegger takes this into account and this leads into a very different considerations, even if the starting point is nearly the same?
W: I am saying exactly that. You know, if I didn't know better, I would think you two were married.
TA: How do you know they aren't, Sir Wittgenstein?
W: Well, of course because "Kant is a bachelor" is an analytic judgment.
TA: Uhh, but the judgment is synthetic.
W: Leave it for the Dialectical Necromancer to spoil the joke.
TA: Sorry.
DT: Okay, fellows, we must try to form a synopsis of the introduction, to see with what we will have to work on in the future, and what is the general plan of taking over the Citadel of Being and Time.
K: Great idea, Einstein.
DT: You can't even know who Einstein is.
K: You underestimate my skills, Dasein-Toni. I deduced early on that the necessary condition for an overhaul in physics is that the vessel through which the paradigmatic shift is to manifest itself must be something solid and singular. This leads me, in accordance with the Principle of Synthetic Unity of Imagination, to the inescapable conclusion that this solid singular object must be a rock. This is evident because the foundations of Newtonian physics are solid as rock, and so it takes a rock to move them. But because the Unity is something that must necessarily accompany all objects of experience, the transcendental condition of there being a paradigmatic shift is that it is done by a singular rock. Of course, this would translate into German, that is, the Language of the Germs, as Einstein - "ein" being one, and "stein" being a rock. Now the last part of the deduction is to show that it is necessary that this Einstein is intelligent as hell, and because of that intelligence it would most definately enter into common speech as something that denotes someone with high intellectual capacity. But because of the necessary existence of sarcasm, I understood that this could also be used as a slander. See, easy as formatting a hard drive by accident.
DT: Whatever, asshole.
W: I believe that is the most beautiful piece of deduction ever produced.
TA: I concur.
K: Thank you, members of the fellowship. It is well appreciated.
W: In any case, let me give the synopsis, if you people don't mind?
DT: Not at all, Witty. Please proceed.
W: All right, then. According to Heidegger, the meaning of Being has been overlooked in philosophy. After proving that asking for its meaning does not include a circular reasoning, he shows us that it must have a different kind of meaning than other concepts. That meaning cannot be a theoretical one, because that would always require premises, and this would mean reducing Being to something other that is - but there is no way that these other beings could exhaust the meaning of the Being they themselves take part in.
The meaning of Being is in the way it manifests itself, and therefore the method of phenomenology is to be used to unhide it. Moreover, the being that is able to ask questions, Dasein, is privileged in this study. Because only Dasein can question its own being and thus understand it, the study must be founded on analysing how Dasein purports to understand itself.
Dasein understands itself in time and through time. Therefore a historical approach of Dasein is necessary, and to uncover the foundations of this understanding all that is piled on it and obstructs it must be removed through the method of historical destruction. So the study begins from time and the way Dasein understands itself in time, and through the foundations that are unhidden, we can attempt to understand the more general Being.
DT: Very good, Witty. So, which way to go, Tobi-Ass?
TA: I believe it is that door above which it reads: "This way first".
DT: I am glad that you are with us, Tobi-Ass. We would be lost without your special abilities.
TA: Why thank you, Da...
A sudden loud crash interrupts the conversation. We all startle and turn around to find a pile of stones fallen from the ceiling of the antechamber. Amidst the dust we can hear loud coughing and cursing.
IS: Mein Gott, scheißlich Glück!
DT: Sir? Are you all right?
IS: Bestimmt, I am fine. Mein apologiesch for crasching amidscht you scho.
DT: Who are you?
IS: Ach, natürlich. Ich bin I-Say-Aah, und I wasch examining thisch wunderbar Platz, when the floor gave in unter mich.
DT: What is that demonic speech you spew out of your mouth?
IS: Demonisch, indeed! I am one of the schecret organischazion of Demon-Babblersch.
TA: I know that group! You are able to decipher whatever occult gibberish the likes of Heidegger use in their unspeakable spells. I bow before you, I-Say-Aah of the Demon-Babblers!
IS: Ach, I had expected one of the Dialectical Necromancersch of Hegel to posschessch schuch knowledge! Rische, Schir Tobi-Aschsch, for you need not bow before ich.
DT: We would be honoured if you joined our quest, I-Say-Aah. What say you?
IS: Aah!
And so the party had gained another member. As most of you might be aware, this means that there is room for only one more. Six is the utmost total of party members in any quest. In any case, the Introduction has been unhidden, and so our journey leads further into the depths of the Citadel. Hand in hand and singing merry travelling tunes, the Fabulous Five enters the First Part of the Dungeons of Being and Time, to style... uhh, to retrieve back to light the hidden Words of Power of Heidegger.
posted by TK at 1:42 PM
4 Comments:
I got the PM. Did I forget to reply? I will look into that, but I got it, yes.
I would resurrect Kierkegaard too, but I have so little knowledge on the good fellow that I loathe to speak through his mouth at all. But I think I have a way of adding Kierkegaard into the text to accord with what you might say of him in these comments (I will try to enter the fundamentals of these discussions into the blog itself).
I like that Not Without My TUA Approach :D
I noticed W. says "Where Kant's system is universal, Heidegger's is not." Shouldn't that be the converse?
Well, it might be a bit clumsily put, but I explain what it means, as Kant himself asks what does it mean ;)
It is not supposed to be the other way around. What I mean is that Kant thought that rationality makes the world of rational men be alike both in form and content. I think Heidegger gives more emphasis on subjective differences in the construction of the world. What I then meant was to comment on the universality of Kant's rationality, and point out that Heidegger is not as strict.
- Dasein-Toni -
You understand me, One Eye Chills?
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