Vacation

I will leave on a trip to continental Europe on 18th of June. I will return some three weeks after, around 10th of July. I will most probably not be able to continue the blog during this period, so the journey will halt for the time being (Yes, pun intended).

Yours faithfully,
Dasein-Toni

Act V: Existential Analytics and Torturing Chambers (§§9-11)

As I turn the key (Named: The Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein) on the lock of the door above which it says: "This way first", I begin to tremble. This far I have only been to the waiting halls and antechambers of the Citadel Being and Time, or Citadel BAT, for short. The horrors witnessed there have at times nearly crushed my mind, but it might be nothing in comparison to what lies ahead. Among the perils there lies the mystical, foul demons of Sorge and fearsome dragons of Fallenness. But in the process I have also gained confidence, courage and friends. There is hope yet.

The door opens with a reluctant squeal. We half expect to see bloodthirsty beasts of the BAT spring at us, but the hallway before us is quiet and empty. In the furthest corner I think I see movement within the shadows, but when I blink, all is still. Must be my imagination, I think as I remind myself to remain calm. We enter the hallway in expectant silence.

We have taken only a few steps into the corridor when the door behind us clangs shut with a deafening boom of grim finality. There is no turning back now, I think as we advance further into the eerie corridor that soon starts its ominous descend ever deeper and deeper into the Citadel.

Part I, Chapter I, §§9-11

The first chapter intends to expose the existential analysis of Dasein and to show how this relates to other similar studies.

§9

First Heidegger states that we will here analyse that being that we ourselves always are: Dasein, “here-being” or “there-being”. This sort of being, Dasein, has a relation to its own being: to it its being is like something. According to Heidegger, this brings forth two things:

(1) The essence of this being is included in that it must be. Therefore the what-being (essence) of Dasein is to be determined from its being (existence), if we wish to speak of essence at all. Therefore Dasein’s essence is not in its properties, but in its way of being, it’s mode of being. I think this is to be taken as saying that the essence of man is not any set of properties, but in the way man is: as something that has the ability to have a view on its own being, to question it and to try to understand it. Dasein does not, therefore, express some object such as a table, but a way in which something is – no matter what the actual object that has this mode of being happens to be. I take this to mean that a computer can be Dasein, if it can question its own being, and a human can be non-Dasein, and actually is just that when turned into a corpse (or a vegetable - like me).

(2) Dasein is always my being. I take this to mean not that Heidegger is saying that all Daseins are him, but that of every Dasein we must use a personal pronoun: me, you, him etc. Basically, I understand this as a similar thing to Kant’s Transcendental Unity of Apperception, that is, the necessary condition for a subject to be a subject is that he is able to say “I think” of every perception that he has. Heidegger is saying, I believe, that every Dasein can say of himself that “I am”, so to speak. Every Dasein is “I”, for himself. Heidegger then differentiates between Dasein and Vorhandensein, that being a sort of “present-to-hand-being”, as it is sometimes translated. Things that are not Dasein can be present to hand, that is, as something that is before us, accessible and present - a mere object that cannot be a subject. To these present-to-hand-beings their being is irrelevant (as it is, assumably, irrelevant to a table that it exists). But for Dasein, as explained before, his being cannot be irrelevant.

Heidegger says that Dasein is always its own possibility. This possibility is not something it owns like something that is present-to-hand. It is not an object. This possibility is Dasein. But what does Heidegger mean by “possibility”? In the introduction we saw that possibility for Heidegger is something that the Dasein can be. This is: the horizon it sees before itself. I think that I can be a philosopher. It is possible for me, and it is something that I can reach. I can become a philosopher, if I choose to. Now the totality of these possibilities is for Heidegger the Dasein’s possibility, and this possibility is what the Dasein is – of course, this Dasein is a particular Dasein, like me, not Dasein in general. Dasein is in the world, with all his desires, dreams, wants and principles. This totality of what the Dasein sees is his possibility, and it is this totality that determines what the particular Dasein is. In non-Heideggerian: I am the totality of my dreams, beliefs, desires, thoughts and so on and so on. That is, as me. Of course, I am also a body, but that body is not the Dasein. When I speak of me, I speak of me-as-a-subject: me-as-a-Dasein. It is not, for Heidegger, just that I have dreams and beliefs, but that I am those. This is a strong claim, but I think it holds. As long as this “possibility” is defined broadly enough (as it is now: it is simply the totality of all that I consider myself to be in relation with), it spans the whole of my subjectivity. And as a subject, I am these subjective notions. As an object I might be a body, but as a subject I am something that has a relation to his body. I think of my body in a certain way. This which in me thinks of things in a certain way is the Dasein.

It should be made clear that this is in a sense Heidegger’s philosophy of mind. Heidegger seems to think that being a subject is simply to “be there”, to have a relation to where one is. This returns us directly to the common notion that for a subject, for a consciousness, things are like something. For a table the floor on which it stands is not like anything, but for me it is. This like-being, so to speak, is not something that the object itself has, but what the subject projects to it. Therefore Heidegger says that being a conscious subject is to have this like-relation to things. And what is then this subject? It is the totality of these like-relations. Why? Perhaps – I am just speculating here – because if we take away all these like-relations, what do we have left? Nothing at least that would make the thing we are left with conscious (there is nothing that is like something to it). Perhaps the only thing that he has is the potentiality of being in like-relation to something. That is, the Dasein. Is the Dasein then the necessary condition for being a subject? An impersonal subjectivity? Those of you that know of these things must have already guessed what I am aiming at: is the Dasein the transcendental subject? That same limit of subjectivity that for Kant was the transcendental subject, for Wittgenstein the eye, and for Husserl the transcendental ego? It seems plausible.

But I am not through with Heidegger's philosophy of mind yet. What is known as Brentano’s thesis is that being a subject is about being an intentional being – that is, having intentional states of mind. Intentionality means having a certain directed relation to things. Basically: my states of mind are directed at things. Either things within my consciousness, within my body or totally external to me. Is Heidegger an intentionalist? I cannot see why he would not be. After all, the whole point of Dasein is that he can ask questions. What are questions? They are something that have the one who asks it (the subject) and the question itself that is directed to something of which it is asked (the object). This ability to ask questions is then equivalent with the ability to have a certain directed relation to objects. Also, the like-relation is such a relation: something (object) is like something to something (subject). The being-like-something is intentional, because the state of mind is directed at an object of which the being-like-something is said. I think this is enough to prove that Heidegger is an intentionalist. Let the demons of the Citadel Being and Time strike me down, if they will to oppose my judgment!

In any case, it is important to understand that for Dasein existence comes before essence (Heidegger is an existentialist) - because the essence is a way of being - and that it is always egocentric (this has unwanted connotations – it would perhaps be better to say me-centred).

Heidegger says that Dasein must be exposed through existential analysis of its existence (that is, through analysing the formal structure of Dasein’s existence), but in this we must not start by postulating a certain kind of existence, but we must start from the vague generality of Dasein’s existence: averageness. This everyday averageness of Dasein is the foundation of its ontic being (ontic, remember, was about things that are, in opposition to the way things are in general), and as such it is the closest to us in the ontic sense. But that which is closest to us ontically is the furthest away from us ontologically (That which is closest to us has a structure that is hardest to determine, because we cannot detach ourselves from it to see it in its totality) . Therefore, according to Heidegger, this averageness can now be “passed by”. I am rather baffled at this. Reading again and again what Heidegger is saying about this does not make it any clearer, to my utter annoyance. It seems to me that Heidegger might be trying to say that the averageness is something that we always are, but what is not something directly associated with the structure of being. That is, averageness is a name for all the vague additional stuff in our lives that obstructs our being, even though it is in a sense a foundation for our being (in the ontic sense). But this does not open up for me, and I will have to look at this later, if I can.

Nonetheless, the explications gained from analysing Dasein are called existentials. They are the ways Dasein can be – in this they share a relation to categories (for Aristotle: ways for objects to be, for Kant: ways to think of objects). Therefore existentials are the specific ways in which the Dasein is – apart from other beings. Categories explicate the ways non-Dasein-beings can be. For Heidegger existentials and categories are both the fundamental possibilities for things to be. The existentials pertain to beings that are who (existence) and categories to beings that are what (being present-at-hand in general – objects). How these two are related together can be resolved only after the horizon of asking the question about being has been uncovered.

§10

We come by two metal doors on both sides of the corridor. Looking at my fellows for support, I swallow and turn the handle on the door on the right side.

The door opens silently and reveals a horrid sight. The special sciences known as Anthropology, Psychology and Biology are caged in a room filled with torturing devices. On the wall it reads in letters of blood: "The special sciences work within the Being and cannot explain it. Thus as slaves to Fundamental Analysis of Dasein, they must forever succumb to my rule." In horror I realize that these poor bastards are of no use in finding the meaning of Being and are therefore abandoned in this torturing chamber of particular sciences. The meaning of Being can only be exposed through fundamental analysis on the existentiality of Dasein, and never through the special sciences that only explicate empirical matters within the framework of existentiality of Dasein. I hastily close the door, grieving for the fate of these sciences.

§11

As I open the other door, I find myself face to face with another torturing chamber. I hear some muffled screams about the difference between primitivity (as studied in anthropology and ethnology, a level of sophistication of a culture) and averageness. A bloody iron maiden of “natural world” (which has been at least in part constructed by the Dasein himself) is also seen in the corner. I feel sick, and gagging I close the door and hope that the next corridor will expose something else than mere cruelty of massacred empirical sciences.

Interlude: Musings of the Fellowship, Part III

DT: So, guys, how does the quest look so far?
K: To be honest, I think he has a lot in common with my philosophy. Take for instance the division between phenomenon and logos. Tell me it doesn't reflect my division between sensibility and understanding or reason.
DT: All right. It doesn't reflect your division between sensibility and understanding or reason.
K: But it does!
W: I agree with Kant. You must be bloody stupid to not see it.
DT: I... I... He told me to say that!
TA: It was just a manner of speech, a mere rhetorical device, Dasein-Toni.
DT: Blah, whatever. Go on with your stupid speech Kant.
K: You are.
DT: What?
K: Stupid.
DT: No, you are!
K: No, you are.
W: Guys!
K: Grmph, well, anyway, as I was saying to Stupid-Toni: Heidegger's analysis of phenomenology through the concepts of phenomenon and logos bears similarities to my division between the different faculties of cognition. Most notably the idea that phenomenon is something that is passive from our point of view and logos is active synthesis of us humans. Heidegger does seem to assume that the phenomenon appears by itself, in a sense, whereas the logos actively expresses that which appears in an objective way.
W: That seems to me quite a correct analysis, Kant, but there is something that cannot be overlooked. You divided the cognition to sensibility, understanding and reason...
DT: Sensibility passively receives intuitions or perceptions, understanding synthesises them into concepts or generalities and reason makes active judgments and thus forms new concepts through the concepts given by the understanding, right?
K: Yes, Dasein-Toni, I think you nailed it. Quite remarkable for someone so stupid.
DT: Just because you got PMS, it doesn't mean that you can go bitching all around.
K: How rude!
W: Oh, stop with the bickering already. As I was saying, the division to three does not neatly fit to Heidegger's division to two. Some of the attributes given to phenomenon fit sensibility and some understanding, whereas some of the attributes given to logos fit understanding and some reason.
K: Yes, that is most definately true. It seems to me that Heidegger uses the transcendental method in many things, and even considers some of my ideas quite correct, but then ends up following a quite different path. It is very difficult for me to decipher whether he is actually being more precise or vague.
TA: It is also notable that his historical method bears many resemblances to Hegel's philosophy. It might also be this temporal aspect that makes the philosophy in the end so different from yours, Kant. Consider that your system might indeed be formally better built, but it doesn't fit the bill: it omits the temporal aspect, and that is why it seems clearer. It is like a simplified approximation of the reality. When Heidegger takes into account the historicality of Dasein, it naturally becomes more complicated. Also, history might not be that easy to formalise.
W: Very true, Tobi-Ass, very true. What also crossed my mind was that Heidegger gives far more emphasis to subjective emotions and perspectives, much more worth on the individual's way of seeing himself. Where Kant's system is universal, Heidegger's is not.
K: What do you mean?
W: Well, you thought that rationality is some universal or an absolute. All people would act the same way if they were totally rational. This is the foundation you set your ethics: what is ethical is something that is detached from the particular considerations and in accordance only with the reason itself. You also think that the Categories are the same for all humans.
K: Well, surely they must! They are the necessary conditions for any experience whatsoever.
W: Yes, indeed, I understand that. Yet this is all based on some structure of the mind, and this structure is highly formal. It might be that you have expressed the formal conditions, but you also forget the power of the mind that you yourself set out to prove: the mind can impose itself on the world of appearances, and indeed does that. This is what I tried to say in the Tractatus: even the mood or the outlook of the subject changes the world. Because the world is the world as it appears, how we are in a sense "tuned" to the world, our emotional landscape, if you forgive me the expression, affects the way the world is.
K: But I am no subjective idealist, surely you know that! We cannot change the world at whim.
W: True, and I am not saying that we can. I am simply saying that you assumed that the phenomenal world we experience is something that is shared by all individuals, but there is nothing in your philosophy that would prove this. It is all based on your assumption of the universality of rationality. I am simply saying that perhaps the structure of the world is common to all subjects, and thus the phenomenal world is indeed intersubjectively accessible, but the content of that world is not intersubjective. The world is indeed my world, for it is determined in part by my mood, my desires, my wants, goals and beliefs. The structure of the world is that of language, and therefore of logic, and in that sense we share our world. But you give far too little emphasis on the subjectivity associated in the way we perceive the world.
DT: Hah! That ought to teach you, Kant! You are so totally owned!
K: Regardless of my idiotic companion here, I must concur. So you are saying that Heidegger takes this into account and this leads into a very different considerations, even if the starting point is nearly the same?
W: I am saying exactly that. You know, if I didn't know better, I would think you two were married.
TA: How do you know they aren't, Sir Wittgenstein?
W: Well, of course because "Kant is a bachelor" is an analytic judgment.
TA: Uhh, but the judgment is synthetic.
W: Leave it for the Dialectical Necromancer to spoil the joke.
TA: Sorry.
DT: Okay, fellows, we must try to form a synopsis of the introduction, to see with what we will have to work on in the future, and what is the general plan of taking over the Citadel of Being and Time.
K: Great idea, Einstein.
DT: You can't even know who Einstein is.
K: You underestimate my skills, Dasein-Toni. I deduced early on that the necessary condition for an overhaul in physics is that the vessel through which the paradigmatic shift is to manifest itself must be something solid and singular. This leads me, in accordance with the Principle of Synthetic Unity of Imagination, to the inescapable conclusion that this solid singular object must be a rock. This is evident because the foundations of Newtonian physics are solid as rock, and so it takes a rock to move them. But because the Unity is something that must necessarily accompany all objects of experience, the transcendental condition of there being a paradigmatic shift is that it is done by a singular rock. Of course, this would translate into German, that is, the Language of the Germs, as Einstein - "ein" being one, and "stein" being a rock. Now the last part of the deduction is to show that it is necessary that this Einstein is intelligent as hell, and because of that intelligence it would most definately enter into common speech as something that denotes someone with high intellectual capacity. But because of the necessary existence of sarcasm, I understood that this could also be used as a slander. See, easy as formatting a hard drive by accident.
DT: Whatever, asshole.
W: I believe that is the most beautiful piece of deduction ever produced.
TA: I concur.
K: Thank you, members of the fellowship. It is well appreciated.
W: In any case, let me give the synopsis, if you people don't mind?
DT: Not at all, Witty. Please proceed.

W: All right, then. According to Heidegger, the meaning of Being has been overlooked in philosophy. After proving that asking for its meaning does not include a circular reasoning, he shows us that it must have a different kind of meaning than other concepts. That meaning cannot be a theoretical one, because that would always require premises, and this would mean reducing Being to something other that is - but there is no way that these other beings could exhaust the meaning of the Being they themselves take part in.

The meaning of Being is in the way it manifests itself, and therefore the method of phenomenology is to be used to unhide it. Moreover, the being that is able to ask questions, Dasein, is privileged in this study. Because only Dasein can question its own being and thus understand it, the study must be founded on analysing how Dasein purports to understand itself.

Dasein understands itself in time and through time. Therefore a historical approach of Dasein is necessary, and to uncover the foundations of this understanding all that is piled on it and obstructs it must be removed through the method of historical destruction. So the study begins from time and the way Dasein understands itself in time, and through the foundations that are unhidden, we can attempt to understand the more general Being.

DT: Very good, Witty. So, which way to go, Tobi-Ass?
TA: I believe it is that door above which it reads: "This way first".
DT: I am glad that you are with us, Tobi-Ass. We would be lost without your special abilities.
TA: Why thank you, Da...

A sudden loud crash interrupts the conversation. We all startle and turn around to find a pile of stones fallen from the ceiling of the antechamber. Amidst the dust we can hear loud coughing and cursing.

IS: Mein Gott, scheißlich Glück!
DT: Sir? Are you all right?
IS: Bestimmt, I am fine. Mein apologiesch for crasching amidscht you scho.
DT: Who are you?
IS: Ach, natürlich. Ich bin I-Say-Aah, und I wasch examining thisch wunderbar Platz, when the floor gave in unter mich.
DT: What is that demonic speech you spew out of your mouth?
IS: Demonisch, indeed! I am one of the schecret organischazion of Demon-Babblersch.
TA: I know that group! You are able to decipher whatever occult gibberish the likes of Heidegger use in their unspeakable spells. I bow before you, I-Say-Aah of the Demon-Babblers!
IS: Ach, I had expected one of the Dialectical Necromancersch of Hegel to posschessch schuch knowledge! Rische, Schir Tobi-Aschsch, for you need not bow before ich.
DT: We would be honoured if you joined our quest, I-Say-Aah. What say you?
IS: Aah!

And so the party had gained another member. As most of you might be aware, this means that there is room for only one more. Six is the utmost total of party members in any quest. In any case, the Introduction has been unhidden, and so our journey leads further into the depths of the Citadel. Hand in hand and singing merry travelling tunes, the Fabulous Five enters the First Part of the Dungeons of Being and Time, to style... uhh, to retrieve back to light the hidden Words of Power of Heidegger.

Act IV: The Path Made Clear

Into the mood

While examining the gothic inscriptions on the wall of the antechamber, I find a copper plate on the wall. At first it looks blank, but soon I begin to recognize very fine lines in the shining surface, almost too insignificant to notice. Unable to decipher the curves, I call Tobi-Ass to my aid. He examines the plate for a while and then nods slightly. “I know what this is: it contains arcane knowledge on Heideggerian terminology. It is normally only readable to Heideggerian initiates, and I am surprised to find out that you could even make out the lines, even if not uncover their meaning. Heidegger must have a stronger hold on you that you would perhaps care to admit. Mmm. I know how to deal with this. Stand back!”

I step back hastily and watch as Tobi-Ass sets his cheek (well, asses have no hands, but asses do have cheeks. He can’t use his hoofs, now can he? Oh, well, come to think of it, he could, but that wouldn't be nearly as fun. And considering how unfunny this is, it is best that he sets his cheek instead of his hoof...) against the plate and whispers softly: “Ich habe ein Bratwurst in meine Lederhose”. I hold my breath.

Nothing happens. Kant and Wittgenstein share glances - apparently they know something that I don't... probably has something to do with their mastery of the foul language Tobi-Ass has been forced to learn in his studies of Dialectical Necromancy. Tobi-Ass coughs nervously and murmurs: “Blah. That was of course the secret entrance code for the even more secret organization of snowunicorns, how could I forget.” He then sets his cheek again on the plate and speaks in a clear, loud voice: “Nacktfrosch”.

The plate immediately starts shimmering and letters of fire emerge to fill the surface. “There you go, Dasein-Toni”, Tobi-Ass declares proudly, and a lump in my throat I shuffle nearer and immerse myself in the secrets of the plate.

Introduction, Part II, §§7-8

§7

In the beginning of the seventh clause, Heidegger explains that we must now explicate the method used in studying the meaning of Being. That is, the method of ontology. As Heidegger’s ontology differs from every other kind of conception of ontology, he states that this method should not be looked for in the history of philosophy. Then he states that the method must be that of phenomenology. Also, it is important to note that phenomenology is not an aspect or a field of philosophy, but a mere method: it only explicates how the study is conducted, not what is studied.

What is phenomenology? I am fully aware that I am on a thin ice here, for my arcane knowledge on the occult magic of phenomenology is rather limited. Heidegger himself is at this point so vague, that I start to wonder if even he knows! He says that phenomenology is a maxim (I kick Kant’s ankle sharply and he whispers: “a subjective law, or a principle!”) that could be expressed by the slogan: “Into the things themselves!” Okay, Heidegger, sounds classy, but what do you mean? He explicates that phenomenology does not accept any principle that is not conclusively proven, and it opposes pseudo-questions that prevail through generations. As soon as I exclamate that this is what all sciences purport to do, he himself admits that someone could say that. Indeed! And what does he do then? Nothing. Or, not exactly true: he says that we are in fact dealing with such self-evidencies, and that he is just explicating the preliminary idea of phenomenology here. Well, all fine and dandy, Heidegger – at least now I know that phenomenology adheres to the same principles as any other science that should be taken seriously.

But I have not slept through all of my phenomenology classes (Actually, I have not slept through any of my phenomenology classes, because I have never had any). Phenomenology is something that concerns itself with what is experienced. That is, it analyses our experiences. Everything in phenomenology should be directly based on experience, or should be reduced through proven steps to something that is thusly founded. The exact details are not of importance in our preliminary examination: I think it is enough to understand that as we found out in the former clauses, the study must start from the everyday existence of Dasein, and therefore it must be based on the way Dasein experiences the world it lives in. This, of course, gives direct justification for choosing the method of phenomenology.

Heidegger states that the word phenomenology translates directly as “science of the phenomena”, that is, as a science that studies appearances, or how things appear to us. He then sets to explain the two constituent words of phenomenology, phenomenon and logos, in a more detailed manner.

A. The concept of phenomenon

He throws a lot of Greek on my face in an attempt to either explain in detail what he is speaking of, or to put me off balance. In any case, the basic idea that can be found within the lesson on Greek is clear: phenomenon means something that shows/presents itself or is evident. But Heidegger also notes that something can appear either as something that it is, or as something that it is not, depending on the aspect we take to it. “It appears that the tyre is flat” expresses “appearance” in a positive sense (we think that it is rather clear that the tyre is indeed flat), or “It appeared to be solid, but in fact it wasn’t” expresses “appearance” in a negative sense (something appeared as it really was not). We could also explicate the difference through the English word “to seem”, which holds similar connotations. In any case, the word phenomenon then includes the idea that something can appear to us either as it is, or as it is not.

He also explains at length how such terms as “express” or “imply” or some such bear a relation to “appear”. Such a case would be symptoms of a disease, where the disease that itself does not appear is expressed by the symptoms, or that the symptoms imply the disease that itself does not appear. This is not appearing in the negative sense, because that which does not appear at all, cannot either appear as it is or as it is not. So even though different sorts of indications share the structure of appearance, they must still be distinguished from each other.

The next part is nigh unintelligible. That is okay, I think, because Heidegger himself expresses that this is a source of a lot of confusion. Nonetheless, I will try to explain the different ways for things to appear.

(1) Something can appear as it is, or as it is not. In this the thing is somehow present, but can be distorted.

(2) Something appears only through sort of symptoms or indications. In these cases the thing is not itself present at all (it does not appear in the sense of (1)), but something indicates it, points to it. This way of appearing can be divided into three different senses:

(2. 1.) Something “lets itself be heard/known”. It appears in the sense that things that point to it are manifest, but it itself is hidden. Diseases are mostly like this, for example.

(2. 2.) Something appears as an indicator itself. The symptoms of a disease are like this: their appearance implies something that does not itself appear, that is, lets itself be heard (very Heideggerian. Tsk, tsk, Dasein-Toni!).

(2. 3.) Something appears so as to both indicate something, and to hide that which is indicated. This is difficult to understand at first, but Heidegger points nicely to Kant. This makes it clear that the appearances as used by Kant mean appearances in this sense (although according to him Kant confused the different meanings from time to time): they are appearances of the Ding an sich, the thing in itself, but even though they in a sense express the things in themselves, they also hide them. That-which-lets-itself-be-heard is cloaked by that-which-is-heard, so to speak. Thus instead of speaking of “appearances”, we should say “mere appearances”.

Heidegger pulls the threads together (phew!) in a rather nice way. If we consider the word phenomenon, it holds within it a manifold: appearance (1), presentation (2.1.), manifestation (2.2.) and mere manifestation (2.3.). Manifestation could also be translated as expression, for example. As a synopsis: appearance is something that is itself present, either like it really is, or like something else (in which case the term deception could perhaps be used). Presentation is something that is itself not present, but is presented or indicated by something: for example a disease. Manifestation is that-which-presents some presentation, that is, for example, the symptoms of a disease. Mere manifestation is a manifestation that simultaneously presents or indicates something and hides it (so that it cannot be found even in principle).

As a closing remark, Heidegger states that the phenomenon in the sense it is used in phenomenology differs from the usage of appearance in the common speech. What is appearance in common speech, for Heidegger? Simply our perceptions. I take this to mean that for Heidegger phenomenology is not a science about perceptions, but about something rather different, although interconnected. What that is, is expressed above in (1)-(2). We will now turn to the concept of logos.

B. The concept of logos

Logos means “speech”. It is also, according to Heidegger, translated as reason, proposition, concept, definition, foundation or relation. This shows that the concept of logos is horribly vague. Heidegger purports to find the foundation of the word to explain how the ambiguous term “speech” could be defined so as to include or derive all these other meanings.

Heidegger states that logos as “speech” should be understood more like as making it evident what the speech is about. Logos brings something forth that is seen by the speaker to be seen by all that take part in the discussion. This becomes clear, when it is understood that when I speak something – as I do now, even though through text – I speak of something that appears to me, and labour to express it so that those that listen to me could see that same thing. So Heidegger distinguishes between that which is said from that which the speech is about. You see what is said, but that does not always suffice for you to see what the speech is about. This seems to me like a more general conception of word and its referent. Heidegger also notes that acts of speech such as praying or begging bring forth that which is seen by the speaker, but in a slightly different way. This “bringing forth” Heidegger labels as “to make evident”. “I have an itch” makes evident that I have an itch, even though this analytical way of putting this probably doesn’t do justice to Heidegger.

But logos also makes something evident as something. This takes Heidegger to his conception of truth, for logos can either be true or false. As true it brings something forth in a way that it becomes unhidden – it makes it evident as unhidden. As false it brings that something forth in a way that it becomes obstructed. But, Heidegger goes on: this is not what truth really means; truth is something linked with our perceptions. Truth is not a property of a proposition, but a property of perception. Perception is true in this sense if it shows something like it is, and false if it does not. This is, of course, diagonally opposed to almost every modern conception of truth, that take truth to be a property of a proposition, that is, as something that belongs to reason, not perception. I will not explicate Heidegger’s idea further, because it would take us far too deep into modern truth theories. But I will, nonetheless, offer a link (that is, a teleport to a pocket dimension) a short explication of what Heidegger means by truth: http://www.mv.helsinki.fi/home/tkannist/thoughts/heidegger.htm.

Heidegger ends the presentation by noting that logos is synthesis whenever it is not pure, direct understanding of perceptions. (That is, I assume, always.) By synthesis he does not as much mean linking together as bringing something forth as something, that is, in connection with something else. This is highly Kantian, even though Heidegger to some extent denies this. For Kant logos without synthesis would appear when some being could directly perceive objects as they are (Kant actually speaks of such a possible being in theory – and notes that God would be such a being, if He exists). All the cognition available for humans is synthesis for Kant, that is, based on forming concepts from perceptions. This means that particular perceptions are synthesised into concepts that are sort of generalisations. Heidegger does not stray far when he speaks of synthesis as being-in-connection: when we understand something as something, we always in a sense put it in relation with other things and judge that it bears resemblance to some things, and does not to others. This connection to Kant is made clear, when we take an example: I see a red car. That red car is seen by me as something, that is, as red and as a car. Because that particular object is for me red, it is then something that in a sense takes part in the concept “red” (and the same applies to being a car). To see the car as red is to see it in relation to at least other colours: not seeing it as e.g. blue.

The important thing to understand here is that synthesis always offers a possibility of obstruction. This is clear: when I see the object as a car, I can either be right in seeing it as a car, or be in error. It might, after all, be a huge turnip that appears as a car (or, it should be said: imposes as a car). But when I see the thing directly, not as something, I cannot be in error. This is also evident in the Kantian interpretation: God cannot err, because there is nothing he could make an error of!

As a conclusion, Heidegger offers some ways to derive the other meanings of logos from this original conception of logos as bringing forth or making evident in speech. There is nothing particularly interesting there, but the understanding that Heidegger thinks the other meanings indeed follow.

C. Preliminary conception of phenomenology

In this last section Heidegger pulls together the results of A and B. He first notes that there seems to be an inner relation between phenomenon and logos. Through analysis of the word “phenomenology” he ends up with the definition: phenomenology brings forth through itself that which appears as it in itself appears.

Huh? What sense to make of this? I must admit, that Heidegger’s use of words here is of no use to me. Perhaps I would fare better if I tried to derive the meaning of phenomenology myself through what I understand of phenomenon and logos? It is worth the attempt, I guess. Now logos brings forth something that is seen by the speaker. Phenomenon is an appearance, or that which appears. Phenomenology should then apparently bring forth phenomena, those that appear. But I believe that phenomenon here means also to appear as itself (as something that is like itself, more precisely). So in this interpretation, phenomenology brings forth those that appear as themselves to appear as they are themselves. I think this is at least close to what Heidegger says above, so I am carefully confident that I got the idea. Could I perhaps, then, somehow express this idea so that it would be understood? (Hah, a nice example of what we spoke of in the presentation of logos). Well, I can try.

Phenomenology is the study of appearances. Appearances are something that are not only perceptions, but some things that present themselves in some way – either as themselves or as not themselves. I have a lot of these appearances: the computer screen before appears to me like a computer screen (of course, it might not be one), for example. Phenomenology would then study these appearances. But how? By bringing these appearances forth into objective discourse. But bringing forth was to bring forth as something. As what does phenomenology attempt to bring forth these appearances? As themselves, that is, as appearances! Phenomenology studies appearances as appearances, not as something else. It does not study appearances as psychology does (as manifestations of some deeper level activity), but simply as appearances themselves. So it is made evident what Heidegger said before: phenomenology has no specific subject matter, but it is a method. It does not matter what the appearances are about, because phenomenology simply studies the appearances, not the things they present, or manifest, or whatever. I hope this is clear enough.

What is phenomenology suppose to “bring forth”? What is that which is to be called “phenomenon”? Reading this part again and again, I scratch my head in confusion. Could it be that Heidegger is saying, that the “phenomenon” itself is something that is present in all appearing, something that is necessarily indicated by all appearances? (Remember, this is (2.1.).) It seems plausible. This would explain why Heidegger turns so suddenly from phenomenon to Being. It seems that Heidegger has found the connection he needed: that which is indicated by all things that are, is the being of Being itself. Being is manifested (2.2.) through particular modes of being, or simply through things that are. And so Heidegger comes to the conclusion that what phenomenology is ultimately studying is Being itself and states: “Ontology is possible only as phenomenology”. (Remember that ontology bears special meaning for Heidegger).

I must say, that this is remarkable. The sheer complexity of the structure Heidegger builds is formidable, and yet he manages to tie the knots in a rather beautiful way. Assuming, that I understood what he was trying to say. I am truly beginning to like this man who demands so much of one’s brains, forces one to think until steam arises from one’s ears, but in the end also gives a lot. Not only has he managed to point of evident flaws in the foundations of our thinking, the vacuity of conceptions like “being”, but he has also, at least this far, managed to give plausible answers. He is difficult to understand simply because he thinks so differently, and forces one to think differently too. It is always difficult to learn another way of thinking (consider learning mathematics or logic for the first time). But when one learns to navigate, in a sense learns to swim in the new ocean, it starts to feel natural. I only hope that I have not already lost my touch in reality, and already speak in Heideggerian so that my words are incomprehensible. In some cases it is understandable because of the sheer complexity of the ideas I am trying to express, but it cannot be continuous. It cannot be a habit. Cold shivers run down my spine: have I become so immersed in the spell that is Being and Time, that I cannot even recognize the threat anymore? I must focus, however, and so let us move forth to end our survey that today is exceptionally long.

Phenomenology is then the study of the being of Being – ontology. When ontology was considered before, it was understood that Dasein is the fundament from which we must set out. I do not understand where Heidegger gets this from, but it still sounds plausible: Phenomenology of Dasein is hermeneutics, that is, interpretation of itself. Dasein’s phenomenology is then about Dasein trying to understand itself through interpreting itself. From this Heidegger finds the last loose thread and ties it to his knot: hermeneutics is the analytics of existence’s existentiality. As we might remember, existence was about Dasein’s being as like something for itself. Existentiality concerns the structure or form of this Dasein’s consideration of itself as like something. Hermeneutics is then, I believe, a science that studies Dasein as it sees itself: interpretation of Dasein’s way of being in the world. What is Dasein’s way of being? Most prominently culture: literature, history, sciences.

So philosophy for Heidegger is phenomenological ontology that starts from hermeneutics of Dasein and from those foundations aims to the Being itself.

This ends our analysis of §7, which has been clearly the longest clause this far. I feel quite good, because I was expecting a real intellectual breakdown, but instead gained a whole lot of clarity. Either I am starting to understand what this book is all about, or I am finally becoming insane.

§8

The analysis of Being must start from a particular mode of being: Dasein. Through the historical analysis of Dasein, it is possible to set the horizon of the study that is the Being and Time, or so says Heidegger. He then ends the whole of Introduction by explaining the structure of the tome in short:

The first part studies Dasein’s relation to time and explicates time as a transcendental horizon for asking about Being. (Transcendental horizon would mean that the necessary condition of asking about Being is the study of Dasein’s relation to time.) It divides into three questions:
(1) The preliminary fundamental analysis of Dasein.
(2) Dasein and temporality.
(3) Time and Being (Very clever to switch the order…)

The second part uses the method of phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology. It also divides into three sections:
(1) Kant’s (Woohoo!) ideas of schematism and time as the first step of the problematic of temporality.
(2) Descartes’s Cogito Sum’s ontological priming and the connection of Medieval ontology to the problematic of res cogitans (That would, as far as my Latin is concerned, a thinking being/thing).
(3) Aristotle’s study of time as a method of seeing the phenomenological foundations and limits of the ontology of Antique.

So, I have crawled through the endless ideas hurled at me during my journey through the entrance hall and its corridors that lead to the antechamber of the citadel that is Being and Time. Through the copper plate, with the assistance of Tobi-Ass the Dialectical Necromancer, I have interpreted the keys to the halls of the citadel. And one by one, we shall enter these halls to find the truths they have hidden. The journey will be long and arduous, I am sure, yet my initial success has given me courage. There is sense to be made here, no doubt. With the help of my newfound (and newly gravedigged) friends, we shall see our quest through and escape the Citadel of Being and Time with the well-guarded truths that it harbours deep within its endless corridors and vast halls.

Interlude: Musings of the Fellowship, Part II.

I find a dark corner of the antechamber, and carefully take out Kant from my pocket.

DT: How are you faring Kant?
K: As well as one could expect from someone stuffed into your smelly pocket.
DT: Grumpy, eh?
K: ...
DT: I am sorry that I have kept you there, but it is not safe for you here. I am not at all sure if your transcendental reflection holds any power in this place. But as Wittgenstein has managed to survive here for so long, I thought it would be safe to let you out for a while.
K: Very considerate of you.
DT: Well, what do you think of this place? What does Heideggerian philosophy sound like to you?
K: Actually, I think - which by the way is something that should always be able to accompany all of the sensible manifold of intuitions in order for me to recognize these experiences as my own, which in turn is then necessary for...
DT: Yes, the Principle of Transcendental Unity of Apperception. You are drifting Kant.
K: Sorry. You know me.
DT: I believe we all know you and your ability to start sentences far better than to finish them.
K: Grmph. Well, as I was saying, I think that Heidegger is actually a rather Kantian philosopher in many ways - stop giggling, it sounds better than saying that he is a me-like philosopher. His method is that of transcendental philosophy. He takes experience as granted and purports to show through careful transcendental analysis of these experiences what their necessary conditions are. His Dasein is in accordance with my division between transcendentality and empiricality. Dasein is something that is always within the world, and that bears a relation to the world as partly its constituter.
DT: I agree. His methods are those of a transcendental philosopher. But surely he has differences too?
K: Most definately. For one, he seems to be far more realistic than I would dare to be. Sure, I postulated the Ding an sich, but that is of course something that is beyond our cognition's reach. Heidegger too assumes the world behind the interpretations of Dasein, but he seems to also assume that we can through careful analysis say something of the world itself. The other possibility is that he actually drops the whole notion of Ding an sich and restricts himself to the phenomenal world, and that Dasein is in fact something that bears a relation to this phenomenal world. But this would of course leave the questions concerning how this phenomenal world comes to be totally unanswered.
DT: He also seems to have a different view on temporality than you do.
K: Yes. It is more fundamental to him. To me time is just one of the forms of sensibility, necessary condition for any possible object of experience to be represented in a manifold of sensible intuition within our cognition.
DT: You are saying that all intuitions or perceptions are always in space and in time, yes?
K: Sure. That's what I said, didn't I?
DT: Uhh, well, sort of.
K: Anyway, even though I do recognize the time's importance in self-consciousness and in experience in general, I have not reduced the mode of being for subjects to temporality as clearly as Heidegger is doing.
DT: Heidegger thought that you were simply too fixated in Cartesian concepts.
K: Bah, what does he know.
DT: I think he has a point.
K: Et tu, Dasein-Toni? I am hurt.
DT: Stop being a jerk, Kant.
K: But... but... I am not a Cartesian philosopher!
DT: I am not saying that you are - I recognize your philosophy for what it is, non-Cartesian critical philosophy. I am just saying that you too were blinded by the way Descartes set his questions. You were still working within the problems Descartes saw as important, to the extent that you didn't question some of your basic premises or concepts sufficiently enough. One of those is Being, as expressed by Heidegger. You spoke of subjectivity and Categories and understandability and all those things without ever stopping to ask what it is for these to be.
K: Fair enough.
DT: You also didn't have a more general temporal aspect to your philosophy, did you?
K: What do you mean?
DT: Well, to you subjects were in a sense stationary in time. Understanding, sensibility and reason as faculties of cognition were perhaps not objects, but they lacked a temporal dimension as well.
K: But time is just a form of sensibility!
DT: Is it indeed? Wouldn't you then agree that understanding must work outside time?
K: I guess.
DT: But what is activity of understanding, if it doesn't happen in time?
K: Well... Uhh... Look now, I died two hundred years ago, so wouldn't you think I deserve a break?
DT: Of course you do. Your work in philosophy has been prolific, to say the least, but it was not conclusive. Temporality was still something to you that it shouldn't have been, and so it evolved in later philosophy especially through Hegel. Heidegger is also someone who is deeply influenced by a historical approach to philosophy. Both of the aspects Heidegger is examining here, Being and Time, seem to me to rise from transcendental reflection and in that he is following your footsteps, but they are also some things that you never took into account well enough.
K: I can do nothing, but agree.
DT: That's a good boy! What about the decorations her...

My idle chatter is suddenly interrupted by a flash of light and a smell of sulphur that follows it. I find myself staring mouth open at a floating ass (yes, the animal, of course...).

TA: Good day to you, Sir Dasein-Toni! I am Tobi-Ass of the Secret Order of Dialectical Necromancers. I have been watching you and marked your progress. I am sympathetic to your cause and wish to offer you my skills.
DT: Dear God! Why is it that you look like an ass?
TA: Uhh...? Oh, yes! It is just the form I take in the bit-universe.
DT: Bit... universe?
TA: Yes. We of the Secret Order of Dialectical Necromancers have for the longest time known that we all exist solely within a network of computers that they call the Internet.
DT: Computers? What are you talking about?
TA: Perhaps it is best that I will not confuse you with my occult lore.
DT: Okay, whatever. So, Tobi-Ass, what are your skills?
TA: As one might guess, I am proficient in the arcane magic of Dialectical Necromancy, and I am a devout follower of Hegel. I am able to help you in many ways throughout your journey in this dark place. I too have a bone to pick with Heidegger, and would happily travel with you into the depths of his realm, to find out the truth about Being and Time.
DT: That's all fine and well, but what I really wanted to know was: what are your statistics?
TA: Statistics?
DT: Yes.
TA: Oh! Statistics! Of course. Just a minute, I will have to look for my character sheet.
DT: ...
K: Character sheet?
DT: Of course. That is where his statistics are.
K: ...
TA: Ah, there it is. Okay, so I am a 14th level Dialectical Necromancer. I am only 55,000 experience points from the 15th level - that's only one archdemon, mind you! - so I should get a level raise sometime soon. My strength is 13, dexterity 16 - I am very nimble, I can show you some tricks with my fingers - constitution is 7. Okay, that is a bit measly, but I still have 38 hit points. That is, you can hit my neck four times with a long sword with all your might (not counting the strength bonus, of course) and I will still have enough hit points to survive a magic missile. In any case, my wisdom is 17. It used to be 18, but I got into a rather unhappy encounter with a mind flayer with a bad temper. My intelligence is 18, of course, and charisma is rather high. Or would be, if I didn't look like an ass. 17 it reads in the sheet, but my metamorphosis to an ass drops it to 7. It is better than being a hairy ass, though. Should one look like a hairy animal such as an ass, it would be 3 no doubt.
DT: But, Tobi-Ass, that sounds wonderful! I think we could use a guy like you, with those dialectical necromancy -skills and all. Welcome aboard!
TA: Thank you. I will float around in my ass-form if you don't mind. I am trying to keep my identity a secret.
DT: Sure, that's fine. Right, guys?
K: Of course. I am used to seeing floating asses.
W: Yes, it is fine. Welcome aboard, Sir Tobi-Ass of the Secret Order of Dialectical Necromancers.
TA: Thank you fellows. I am sure our adventure will be a success.

And so we journeyd on, stronger than before due to our suprise reinforcements. The appearance of a powerful Dialectical Necromancer gave me enough courage to take Kant out of the pocket, at least for the time being. The next clause will be something that we will have to tackle later, for its sheer lenght is intimidating. Until then, friends.

Act III: From Being to Time

Preliminary Considerations

I have now travelled through the corridor that leads from the entrance to the antechamber of Being and Time. I have both gained great insight, and experienced utter confusion. I have understood the terminology of Heidegger to some extent, and in the process started to speak in Heideggerian as well. The spell that is the Being and Time is potent indeed, and I must take better care not to fall totally under its influence. The tome twists my mind into this and that direction, leading me on to believe that I understand, and then in a single show of power strike me into spinning amidst the endless maze of concepts. Is this the good cop – bad cop strategy at work here? You know that one where the bad cop intimidates the interrogated and then the good cop steps in, so that the contrast is made clear. This has been noted to work: the interrogated will succumb to the good cop after being treated by the bad cop, simply because he is so relieved. Perhaps Being and Time is doing the same thing?

I do not know. There is yet the antechamber before me, and in there perhaps things will become clear at last.

On the door to the antechamber there is a picture of a snake turning onto itself, eating its own tail and forming a circle. This I recognize as the ancient, mythical Oroborus. Perhaps it is chosen as the sign of this place, for it seems to me that Being is like this serpent. It is not only a mere circle, but its own meaning turns back onto itself – its whole essence is that of an endless circle, where one can travel on forever. The true Being cannot be seen from within the circle, for one will only see endless repeat, questions turning back into themselves in a never ending cycle. The truth of Being, the essence of it, is only understood as the circle itself. Perhaps this makes sense, perhaps not. I put my musings aside, and turn the handle of the door to the antechamber and enter, fearful of what will await me there.

Introduction, Part II, §§5-6

§5

In the preceding clauses Heidegger purported to show that examination of Dasein is primary to examination of Being itself. Now the problem then naturally arises: how to examine the Dasein? First Heidegger notes that Dasein is ontically the nearest to us, but ontologically furthest away. What does he mean? Well, as we factually are the Dasein, we are not only close to it, but as close to it as we can get. Basically I think this can be analogized to our subjectivity, which is something that is present in everything we do, because we arethat subjectivity. But it too is ontologically the furthest away, because precisely due to this ontic closeness it is so difficult to see the structure of our subjectivity. What is it to be a subject? How to explain this, if one has no experience of ever being anything else? How does one set out to recognize that which is our subjectivity in our experience, to say what is it like? What is a colour like? Or an emotion? We are too close to Dasein to see it clearly.

And so Heidegger says that Dasein is trying to understand its own being through understanding what it is not, by reflecting on the non-Dasein, that being the world itself. The world is our mirror through which we try to understand ourselves. So it is only through that being into which the Dasein is always in relation (the world) that any understanding can arise. Dasein is always understood as being already in a relation to the world, and it is understood only through understanding this relation, and for each Dasein this relation is individual.

Heidegger says that we have a huge amount of different interpretations of Dasein at our disposal. He lists for example psychology, anthropology, ethics and history as such interpretations, and then asks whether the existential analysis of these fields is done carefully enough. By this he means that if these are ways to see the Dasein, have we sufficiently studied the structure of these ways: have we determined the foundations of these disciplines clearly enough to see how they really purport to explain Dasein?

Heidegger says, in my opinion, that Dasein should not be examined theoretically, but practically. It should be studied through examining its everyday mode of being. We must try to understand how Dasein really is in its everyday being – not idealise it through some semi-arbitrary theoretical structure. He then states that we shall find out that meaning of Dasein is its temporality. He does not explicate further what this means here; that will be done later. But instead he says that this interpretation of Dasein sets the foundation from which we stand a chance to find the answer to the meaning of Being in general.

Time is not time in its ordinary sense for Heidegger. (Surprise, surprise.) Time is that from which the Dasein attempts to understand itself. It is the horizon of interpretation of Being. I do not claim to understand what Heidegger is saying here, because I don’t believe it is understandable as of yet. But it seems that he is trying to get from the ordinary conception of time as a sort of dimension into a more fundamental conception: in which time is a sort of basis from which any understanding is possible. I will call this conception of time here Time, for it seems to me that there is still need for the ordinary sense of understanding time, for it is something that is derived from Time itself. I am not doing this to sound mystical, but only to differentiate between these two. I will also at times speak of Time as temporality. By this I try to express that this is not about certain moments of time, or how it expresses itself in reality, but about the phenomenon of Time in general, temporality. The basic difference Heidegger is explicating here is that between time itself and things that are in time. Form and content.

This is important to see: being in time presupposes Being, but Time itself does not presuppose Being for Heidegger, but indeed takes part in its determination. Heidegger calls this meaning of Being that is determined by Time its “temporal qualification/determination”. The meaning of Being must then be partly exposed through examination of temporality.

Fair enough, Heidegger, although I do not really understand why this is so. It seems to me as vaguely acceptable that Time is something that understanding requires, but I am unable to explicate my sentiments, and as Heidegger himself leaves this more or less open for the time being (no pun intended), perhaps we should too. Being is always temporal, let us remember this, and also bear in mind that Heidegger is not speaking of some naïve conception of time as physical time, but as something far more fundamental. Whatever that is, we will probably find out later.

This leads us then to considerations of history, as Heidegger says that the meaning of Being cannot be stationary, but is always understood through Time, and thus as something dynamic, more or less. To understand Being, we must understand historiality (again, this is not the same thing as history), which is the manifestation of Time. So, let us move on.

§6

Historiality is the form of Dasein’s being as something “happening”. Well, this is strange, but I think he means that Dasein is acting in the world, and this way of being as something that happens, or acts, is called historiality. History then is the succession of these happenings, or events. The historiality of Dasein is hard to grasp. Heidegger is saying that the past of Dasein is not something that comes behind it, but that always already goes before it. But this sounds totally incomprehensible. How can past go before anything, as it is something that is behind? I think this is only understandable as follows: Dasein is always temporal, and is therefore always determined by its historiality. That is, Dasein understands itself as a temporal being, and as a continuum, so to speak. Now it is in a sense true that past goes before us, because my past does not only tell me what I have done, but also where I am coming from, and thus where I am heading. It is like looking at a car’s path to a single point, and seeing that this path determines the future of the car to some extent. If the history of a car includes coming to a corner too fast, its future consists of sliding off the road. So the past in this sense does go before the Dasein, not only behind it.

But there is also another aspect to the historiality of Dasein: it cannot be understood merely as the history of one Dasein, but as the history of a whole culture. Culture is something that arises from tradition, and thus arises from the past. But this culture is also something that in a most profound way affects the way we will continue to do things. We are always within a culture, and thus within a history, and this history forms a context for us to develop in. In this sense the past determines Dasein and its future, and goes before the Dasein as well as behind it.

This temporality of Dasein has been ignored, according to Heidegger. It is to be understood that questions are always temporal, and are partly determined by the context of the culture they rise in. This is, I think, very understandable, because the questions we tend to ask in our culture are based on our culture itself: for example the scientific knowledge we possess. Questions concerning environment arise only when the relationship between our culture and its environment become problematic. Now Heidegger notes that the question about Being is of course itself also temporal, and this has been forgotten. He speaks of tradition that hides its own foundations. So Heidegger arrives at his most peculiar idea: the whole history of Western philosophy has been a certain line of interpretation, and now we must return to the roots to reinterpret the Ancients. But not just because they were somehow far wiser than us, but because they had the context in which the question about Being arose, and that context has been hidden by the tradition that forgot the problems and instead concentrated on the answers. And here Heidegger exposes his idea of destruction – the tradition must be broken into pieces to find out that which it has hidden. In this sense we must travel back through the history of philosophy to its roots to once again give philosophy some meaning. And it is this that must be done to expose the meaning of Being.

Destruction is not negative, but positive. It is supposed to recover something, not to make it obsolete. Heidegger then says something delightful: Kant is the first one to expose the problem of time. But Kant couldn’t have understood Time, because he bypassed, as Heidegger says, the ontological analysis of subject’s subjectivity. He then gives a demonstration of his destruction by tracing Kant’s error into Cartesian conception of subjectivity, that Kant used (I do not strictly agree: I am sure Kant’s idea of subjectivity is affected by Cartesian subjectivity, but for Kant subjectivity is very different from the Cartesian one – but I believe Heidegger’s idea is simply to show that Kant is still attached to Cartesian principles and this makes it impossible for him to see what he should see: that he never ever asked about the meaning of being itself). This Cartesian conception is then retraced to his usage of Medieval concepts and so forth back into the Ancients themselves.

He says that for the Ancients the meaning of Being included its temporality (its mode of being was linked to the present), and that for one Plato understood the essence of human as something that speaks – unlike other beings. Therefore his philosophy is dialectical. Thus Heidegger ends the clause by saying that indeed, the search for meaning of Being must be started from this sort of destruction that takes us to the “spring” of the question itself.

The next clause is the longest by far, and I will have to rest before entering its wonders. After the next analysis I believe I have finished the Introduction as a whole. I am starting to calm down and get a better handle on Heidegger. I think I understand the basic idea that he is aiming at, and this makes it easier for me to get a hold onto the details. There is still much in his philosophy that I do not understand. It also always makes me wary if I agree too much. It is often a sign of not understanding. What sounds good is not always good, but if one does not grasp the ideas properly enough, it is nigh impossible to really criticise the validity of the ideas. My whole brainpower is going into understanding what he is trying to say. In that very little energy is left to actually appraise this what he is saying, and also there is the possibility of reading too much into Heidegger. Assuming that he makes sense, but that I just don’t understand it, makes me look for possible ways to explain his words. In this it might be that I am inserting ideas into them that do not really exist there.

But I am confident that if I get it wrong, Heidegger will mob the floor with my misconceptions sooner or later. In any case, it will be a long and arduous summer.

Interlude: Musings of the Fellowship, Part I.

DT: Ludwig?
W: Yes, Dasein-Toni?
DT: Is it true that your brother was a one-handed pianist?
W: Indeed it is, and a good one at that, I must add.
DT: It is just so strange to think of a one-handed pianist. Then again, I guess I am a one-handed pianist even though I have two hands, so perhaps the difference is just in the nature of the disability.
W: To some extent, yes, but we must bear in mind that even you, Dasein-Toni, could learn to play the piano with both hands, if you tried really hard.
DT: That was a nice thing to say, Big W.
W: My brother on the other hand, no pun intended, of course, didn’t manage to grow another arm as much as he tried.
DT: Pardon? Grow another arm? How would one go about doing something like that anyhow?
W: He used to sit hours in a corner staring out of the window, using his willpower to make it grow.
DT: You are pulling my leg.
W: No, no, it is true. Well, at least he used to sit in a corner doing something.
DT: But how do you know he was using willpower to grow his hand back? Did you ask?
W: No, I didn’t. You can’t really go to someone and ask: “So, huh, u usin' like ur willpa'wa to make ur arm gro' back on? Like, cool, huh huh.”
DT: Well, I am sure I too would have troubles to sound like Beavis and Butt-head.
W: Pardon?
DT: Ah, never mind. Just a facet of modern society you managed to miss by dying, that’s all.
W: I didn’t die.
DT: Oh, yes, sorry. You came here to look for your stolen ideas and got lost. We thought you did, though.
W: They are saying that I am dead?
DT: I am afraid so.
W: How intolerable! When I get back from this dump, I will set things straight.
DT: I am sure you will find Derrida delightful.
W: Who?
DT: Never mind. --- So, about your brother. Perhaps he was just looking out of the window? People do that sort of thing even when they have two hands.
W: Grmph. Perhaps you are right. Oh, well, but anyway. A fine pianist, nonetheless.
DT: I am sure. You know what’s weird, Witty, though?
W: That if you take a carrot and stick it in the forehead of a snowman, it still doesn’t look like a snow-unicorn.
DT: Uhh, yeah, okay, that’s weird, but I was thinking more of the fact that all notable one-handed pianists were left-handed pianists. If you calculate the odds, it simply doesn’t work. Although, there are not so many renown one-handed pianists in the world. It might be that either left hand is better for playing a piano (which would explain my lack of success, as I play on my right hand), or that as most people are right-handed, they tend to lose their right hand.
W: How come?
DT: Well, at least for me it works that way. Whenever I fall or stumble, my right hand reacts the fastest and gets the bruises. I nearly always end up with bruises in my right hand instead of left, so if there is an accident, perhaps it is more probable for the better arm to get smashed? And that would be, according to probabilities again, the right hand: leaving you as not only a one-handed pianist, but a left-handed at that.
W: Fascinating.
DT: Well, yeah. But that’s enough of that, I think. The last time you gave such a nice synopsis of what we went through before. Would you care to do one again, today? Yesterday ended with such a confusion, that a brief recollection would be in order.
W: Why, certainly, Dasein-Toni. Should there be any readers left, it would be good for them too, do you not think so?
DT: I surely would, if there were anyone reading. It is just so quiet and lonely down here. Eerie, even.
W: I know what you mean, Dasein-Toni. But endure we must, so on to the briefing.
DT: Ready when you are, Wittgenstein.
W: Right. In the clause §3 we ended up with the idea that all sciences are based on some axiomatic foundations, and that their value of progression is in their ability to cause crisis in those foundations. We also understood that all these foundations are parts taken from the most general Being, and that understanding this Being would be useful in two ways: in securing the foundations of particular sciences, and to produce new sciences altogether.
DT: That we did indeed, Witty. We also noted a connection to Kuhn that was interesting.
W: Who is Kuhn?
DT: Ah, I always forget that you di… went missing a half century ago. It’s just one guy.
W: Anyway, in clause §4 we plunged knee deep into shit.
DT: Wittgenstein!
W: Uh, sorry, but we did. Well, umm, found ourselves in dire straits indeed. Mr. Heidegger tried to explain to us his concepts of ontology, onticality, existentialism and existence, and to prove that Dasein was the most primary way of Being, through which all other ways are determined. I will try to explain briefly what is meant with these concepts.
Ontology:it deals with the structure of Being. It is not ontology in the common sense (that is, in the sense whether substances exist or what is causality), but a name for a discipline that tries to uncover the underlying structure of Being.
Onticality:this is about the things that are. Whereas ontology concerns the structure of Being, onticality studies things within that structure.
Existentialism: in the same way as above, this studies the structure of ways of Being, that is, existence. It is about the way existence manifests itself, how it is structured and how it functions, in a sense.
Existence: this was the trickiest of all. Existence seems to be a sort way of being only available for the Dasein, because it includes the ability to both see one's possibilities and reflect on themselves as well as to choose between the possibilities. It is the Dasein’s way of considering itself like something, and to affect this somethingness. It seems to be a common name for all the individual ways for the Dasein to perceive itself, and thus it is always in connection with the individuality in question. Existence is always determined in relation to the individual of whose existence it is about.
DT: Huh, those terms give me the creeps.
W: So do they to me. But with those we must dance, you and I. Let me just add that Heidegger’s conclusion was that Dasein is the most fundamental mode of being, because it is in special position both ontically (the only ontic being that can ask questions – in non-Heideggerian this would mean that they are the only entities in the universe that are able to ask questions, and they are privileged in that sense) and ontologically (the only being whose being is about its being – we are determined by our ability and desire to wonder about ourselves and our being). Dasein is then the ontic-ontological condition for ontology, as Heidegger put it. This is probably explained best by saying that Heidegger wants to express his idea that conscious beings (or beings that can ask) are the necessary condition for there to be any sensible structure to ontology at all (it is downright useless to ask about the structure of ontology without there being someone to ask about it – that is, Dasein).
DT: Fascinating, Witty. I think he, in a most perverse way, has a point there. I have pondered about the problematic of questions a lot lately, and it seems clear to me that answers hold no value, or indeed, no sense whatsoever without the questions. The question is primary, not the answer. Consider this answer: 2.718. What is the value of that? Quite simply: nothing before one explicates the question to which it is the answer. That is the approximate value of Napier-number e. (The exact value of this answer is known to all mathematicians and physicists, and I will not pursue it here.) Isn’t Heidegger simply saying that the answer to the meaning of Being can be considered sensible only if we explicate the question itself? Didn’t he actually say that in the beginning of the introduction, when he stated that we must first try to look at the question from a proper angle? Ah, I think I have indeed understood what Heidegger is maintaining here!
W: Fantastic, Dasein-Toni! And here we find another of the ideas that I lost!
DT: We did?
W: Sure. Do you remember that in Philosophical Investigations I pointed out that the concept of “the shortest way” is meaningless unless we first explicate where is it that we want to go, and from where?
DT: I do indeed. (After all, I am writing your lines too, you silly man.)
W: Well, that is all about the primacy of the question, again. The answers themselves only exist in relation to the questions. Of course, it could be argued that the objects that would become the answers do exist before the questions – like 2.718 was real before anyone asked about the Napier-number’s approximation. And I believe Heidegger is saying that, when he differentiates between the questioned and the object of the question. The object of question is impossible to reach unless the questioned is first set. That is, the things that would become the answers can exist without the questions, but they are answers only when a question is asked. Therefore Heidegger is saying that before we can even begin to seek the answer to the meaning of Being, we must first determine the exact question we are asking, and because only Dasein, that is, us, can ask questions, we must first ask: what is Dasein? Here is the primacy Heidegger purports to show.
DT: There is another question I would like to ask from you, Witty, if you don’t mind.
W: Shoot.
DT: “Shoot”?
W: I am trying to relate to the modern society and make my feeble attempts at not only to be Wittgenstein, but to be Cool-Wittgenstein.
DT: Oh dear.
K: You called?
DT: Ah, Kant! No, dear, go back into the pocket, I didn’t mean to call you.
K: Uhh, okay. Well, play with Wittgenstein then. I don’t mind. Really.
DT: Yeah, yeah. So, Wittgenstein: isn’t here another of your ideas manifest? I am referring to Heidegger’s apparent primacy of ethics – that after all is something you also attempted to say in the Tractatus, is it not?
W: Yes, it is indeed. In Lecture on Ethics I also express the primacy of ethics. In Tractatus I say that the world of the sad is a different world than the world of the happy. Not only does sadness change the way we see the world, it changes the world itself. This is ultimately because ethics and through them emotions, values and all those things are transcendent. They are not in the world, but beyond the world, determining the world. This is basically a rather Kantian notion, because it rests on the idea that the world we live in is a world-as-we-see-it, not the cognition-independent world. The transcendental subject is the eye, the border of the world that is the field of sight. If the world is a world of answers, then it is determined by the questions, and the questions are, in the end, something that arises from values, desires and ethics. Truly, ethics is primary to ontology. Through this it might be easier to understand why Heidegger says that Dasein is primary to ontology.
DT: Very interesting, thank you Witty. Not only am I starting to understand Heidegger, I am beginning to see how his philosophy fits the overall picture. And I just started the Being and Time. This has been a wonderful chat, and later on today we must travel onwards, to the second part of introduction that spans the clauses §§5-8. But first, let us rest a bit.
W: That would be prudent.