Act VI: To Be or Not to Be - Is That a Question?

I am hurled back into being and time (located oddly enough in Citadel Being and Time) onto a cold stone floor. I quickly rise up to take a look at my surroundings. The corridor is dark and silent. Behind me the two doors to torturing chambers are closed and no sound emanates from within. I can see tiny markings written in blood on both doors. Squinting, I can barely make out that they are numbers - or more precisely, clauses. "§10" on the left hand door, "§11" on the opposite side. I shiver at the memories of those clauses.

Adamant in my resolve, I leave these doors and the memories they hold. The corridor makes a sharp turn in the distance. Right before this turn there are two more doors, one on each side. That is where my journey will lead me.

The companions with whom I was travelling are nowhere to be seen. Either they have suffered the same fate as I have or they have left on their own accord - I do not know either way. But there is yet some hope, I remember: Kant is securely in my pocket, ready to spring into action when needed. The power of Kant has only waxed in the course of the year, as has my mastery over him - my slave and bitch. I am also now reinforced with a copy of Sein und Zeit, Being and Time written in the original Demonic that is Heidegger's language.

It is Wittgenstein I am most worried about, when I think of it. When I came across him year a ago, he was but a starving man in rags, huddling pitifully in a corner. Whatever became of him, I can only guess. And I can only hope that, provided that he is still here, our paths will cross again.

But yes, onward I must go. Steeling myself and grasping my Kant tighter I step further into the corridor. Only the echoes of my footsteps greet me as I reach the bulky metal doors.

Part I, Chapter II, §§12-13

§12

In the beginning of this clause Heidegger reminds us that Dasein exists. This appears to be harmless enough a statement, but it is far more indepth than it would seem. We must remind ourselves of the fundamental difference between being and existing as Heidegger would have them. It is not just that Dasein exists, but that only Dasein exists. Most certainly, other things (things present-to-hand - Vorhandensein; that is, all those tables and cars and other things that are not Dasein) are, but they do not exist in the strictest sense of the word. Existence comes into play via the realization of being. Simply put: when a being (a thing) becomes conscious of its own being, it begins to exist. Dasein is, as we have learned, such a being. In addition, Dasein is the only being that can do this - because by definition Dasein is that which can question its own being.

Heidegger continues that, moreover, Dasein is whatever I happen to be. This is related to the idea that Dasein is always me - but as was emphasised, this means merely that we can only ever talk about Dasein in the first person; in this sense Dasein indeed comes close to being "subject", but it is to be remembered that Heidegger is deliberately trying to avoid the standard terminology and Dasein cannot therefore be equated with subject, although it most definitely makes matters easier to grasp, at least for my feeble mind!

Heidegger then says that Dasein's authenticity (dem. Eigentlichkeit) and its corresponding non-authenticity (Uneigentlichkeit) is only possible through this "egocentrism". He notes that Dasein exists always in either of these modi, or is indifferent to them. What are these modi, then? Well, Dasein is its possibilities - the existence of Dasein becomes determined through its possibilities. These possibilities allow it to choose, quite evidently (at least supposing that determinism does not reign and possibilities are therefore actual possibilities). He says that since Dasein is its possibilities, it can either choose (or, "choose" as he puts it, whatever he means by this obstruction of meaning I can only guess) itself or not. It can also lose itself or never reach itself in the first place - or even apparently reach itself without actually doing so. Perhaps surprisingly, it is not so that when Dasein reaches itself, then it is authentic. Instead, the possibility of losing oneself or not reaching oneself, that too is based on authenticity.

How to make sense of this? I guess the key to understanding this is the noticing of the fact that he explicitly says that non-authenticity is not lesser being than authenticity. So it is not about deficiencies, apparently. Being authentic is equally important to being non-authentic. We have but one option: to try to figure out what Dasein's authentic being is. Authenticity is of course about being what one is in a sense meant to be. An authentic piece of art is the real piece of art, the piece of art that we think it is; perhaps Mona Lisa and not its cheap copy. A diamond is authentic when it indeed is a diamond and not a piece of glass. So Dasein would be authentic if it really were Dasein. What makes Dasein Dasein? According to Heidegger, surely that it asks about its own being. Could it be so that when Dasein is faced with the question of its being, only then it is Dasein proper, that is, authentic? And when it is not exhibiting this ability, then it is non-authentic? This seems plausible enough, no? It is not that Dasein is not capable of anything else but asking questions about its own being, certainly, but that what makes it Dasein, and separates it from other mere things, is the fact that it is capable of doing that. Since authenticity is all about appearances (a rabbit is not a non-authentic wombat, since it is never even supposed to be a wombat – in the same sense art is not pseudoscience as it is not ever meant to be science in the first place; authenticity is about posing as something either rightfully or not), I hereby suggest that the authenticity of Dasein is to be understood through whether it poses itself as a Dasein, that is, whether it appears as a Dasein or not.

If this interpretation is to make sense, non-authentic Dasein must be understood as well: can there be non-authentic Dasein? I would think so: when I am walking down the street the people that I pass do not appear to me as Dasein, but as things – things that I must avoid, things among which I must move. One could say that this is obvious, since Dasein is only to be spoken of in the first person. True enough – so can I as a Dasein be non-authentic? Happily enough, I can! It would surely be a horrible fate to be faced with the question of one’s being, as they say, 24/7. To be hurled into an eternal flood of questions of one’s being. And that is no ordinary question: everyone has faced the horrible, crushing weight of the question “What am I? Why am I me?” – To be forever condemned to that question... now that is a terrible, terrible fate.

So, yes, I-as-Dasein can be authentic (when I am pondering my own existence) or non-authentic (when I am not, for instance when I am pushing out a good poop, my forehead wrinkled with concentration). Does this fit well with the idea that only in the authentic level can I truly either be or not be me? In one sense, yes: only on the authentic level I can be faced with the fact that I either am what I am “supposed to be” or I am not. When I am deeply immersed in the act of pooping, that is not something that is present – it matters not whether I am what I am supposed to be, but only that the damned poop comes out. In another sense, no: it could be argued that no matter what I might be thinking about at the moment (be that my being or my poop), I still am or am not whatever I am “supposed to be”. But I think this argument would be in error. Only in the context of some divine plan is the idea of “supposed to be” possible in any ontological (or ontic!) sense, and no such context is present in Being and Time. No, instead the “supposed to be” part is to be read as an epistemological condition: the Dasein may wish to be something, and that something henceforward becomes what it is supposed to be. Therefore only in the authentic state, in which Dasein may reflect upon its being, existence and potentialities, can Dasein truly fail to be what it is supposed to be, i.e. what it at that time wishes to be.

Yet it is worth emphasising that this does not make the matter merely subjective. Dasein can indeed think that it is what it wishes to be, but instead it is not. This is even quite common in the world of men – we think we have it all made, but instead the truth is quite different and far more bleak.

This, at least, is my rather lengthy take on what Heidegger is trying to say. Take it or leave it, but I am out of ideas!

Nonetheless, we must move on. The most important parts of the clause are the terms Being-in-the-World (In-der-Welt-Sein) and Being-in (In-Sein). Being-in-the-World is the mode of being of Dasein, that is, Dasein is in the world, according to Heidegger. And in order to understand Dasein, we must understand this being-in-the-world. As an attempt to explicate the term Being-in-the-world, Heidegger notes that it has three constituents.

(1) “In-the-world.” According to Heidegger this forces us to ask about the ontological structure of the world, about the concept of worldhood (Weltlichkeit). This he promises to give later in chapter three. Basically, as I understand this, it merely says that in order to explicate the idea of Dasein that always is in the world, the concept and nature of world must be explicated. We cannot understand Dasein if we do not understand the world it inhabits and its structure.

(2) The being that is always in the manner of being-in-the-world. Heidegger adds that this is the answer to the question “who?” This will be done in chapter four. It is worth noting that this relates to Heidegger’s idea of Dasein as a first-person-agent. Because Dasein can only ever be a first person, it is also prudent to ask who it is, instead of what – since “what” refers to beings that are not Dasein, but mere things present-to-hand. This idea is actually implemented in our language already, since we distinguish sharply between “(s)he” and “it”.

(3) Being-in as such. Heidegger does not say much about this but merely points out that the ontological constitution of this must be brought out – and that this will be done in chapter five. I guess we will be wiser then...

Even though being-in-the-world can be thus analysed, Heidegger emphasises that the whole “phenomenon” is always in view: that is, basically, that it must be understood as a whole. By this he must mean that the constituents themselves are not that important but the manner in which they relate to each other.

What I find particularly interesting is that Heidegger says that being-in-the-world is an a priori form of Dasein. It makes me feel all warm and fuzzy inside to see such Kantian approach here: this, of course, means that being-in-the-world is a kind of category for Dasein. The way Heidegger puts it makes it clear that Kant is in his mind here. We will return to this a bit later.

Heidegger turns to explicate the idea of being-in. He notes that, when we are talking about present-to-hand beings, that is, about ordinary objects of the world, their being-in is to be understood as being-in “the world”. By this rather confusing linguistic trick he means to say that they are in the world like things normally are within something: for example, a coat being in a closet or my mom in a supermarket. Therefore it is about spatial relations of two things, where another is spatially within another. This sort of being Heidegger dubs categorical, and it only fits of ordinary objects (or Dasein considered as ordinary objects, like my mom when I consider her as a “thing” in a supermarket, not as a specific subject.)

When we speak of being-in proper, then it is something that fits Dasein: it is how Dasein is in the world, and therefore it is existential – because Dasein’s being is existing. This cannot be thought spatially. Basically I understand him to mean this: when Dasein is, it always is as a thing that is capable of questioning its own being, and therefore it has a relation to its own being unlike tables and chairs – or ever wombats if we believe Heidegger. Since it has this relation to its own being, it also has a special relation to where it is. This is quite clear, when we think that we as conscious human beings are in places in a different sense than ordinary things are: we are able to recognize that we are in a certain place, and we are even able to philosophically reflect on our being there. (Why are we exactly here, on this very planet? – This question for one has had immense interest theologically, indeed to the point of considering the place where we are, the Earth, as the centre of the world.) Simply put: this kind of being that is reflected cannot be explained wholly via spatial determinations. My being in Finland is not a matter of mere spatiality, although it certainly does have that aspect as well, but also of there being some intersubjective, cultural thing like Finland that is based on complex relations between human beings. I can also have a different relationship to being in Finland than to being in a shop, for instance, since I may also think that I am a Finn. When we consider this further, we will find ideas such as that I can “be” in Finland without being in Finland – my heart may be in Finland, my thoughts may be in Finland. In any case, the basic idea is that our relation to the place we are in cannot be reduced to mere spatiality.

Heidegger also emphasises that being-in, as understood here, is also about being in something familiar. This I take to be another way of saying that we have a different relation to the thing we are in than in the case of mere things such as cars. It is familiar in the sense that we have a relation to it.

Heidegger’s idea is that being-in is an existential of Dasein. The term existential bears a relation to what I said earlier about Kant’s categories. Since this being-in is a mode of being for Dasein and it is existential being instead of mere categorical being, this existential becomes directly related with a category. If we take categories to be either ways in which things are (Aristotle) or ways in which objects are thought (Kant), then existentials become the Daseinic (Hah! Perhaps I just made up a word that even Heidegger didn’t come up with!) counterparts of categories that are only fit for present-to-hand-things. That is, we can take Heidegger as saying that the categories are not enough for exhausting the ways Dasein can be / can be thought, but in addition specific existentials are needed.

Didn’t get it? Worry not, for Heidegger promises to return to the analysis of being-in later on more thoroughly – here he merely wants to bring up the basic idea.

The following stuff is difficult for me to decipher – perhaps I am just becoming too tired of this mental onslaught. Nonetheless, Heidegger states first that two things cannot really touch each other, unless they are Dasein. That is, a table cannot truly touch the floor. This is, according to him, because the table would have to be something to the floor that the floor would face or meet. I take this to mean that since they do not have any relation to one another in the sense we have one to things, they cannot meet and therefore they cannot actually touch either. They may be spatially next to one another, but touching is something that requires some sort of relationship in the sense humans have relationships with each other. For me at least this is hard to grasp, even though I think I have a faint idea of what he is aiming at.

Nonetheless, he says then that Dasein’s being in a world is a fact. Now this would not be such a big deal, but he means something specific by this – the facticity of Dasein. Now there is a problem here because of English language. Heidegger distinguishes between Tatsache (a fact) and Factum (a fact), of which the first applies to present-to-hand-beings and the latter to Dasein. With this he means to explicate the difference between a table’s existence being a fact and a Dasein’s existence being a fact. I will not attempt to explicate this further here, for the simple reason that I am unable to. What is to be said, however, is that the fact of Dasein’s existence includes the idea of the Dasein being conscious of its existence, aware of it. This means that Dasein has, again, a relationship to its own being. It also has a relationship to the world it lives in, and this relationship has a great significance for Heidegger: it paves the way for one of his most important concepts: taking care (Besorgen). He says that he will deal with this later. Right now I think the important thing is that Dasein’s being in the world is always laden with this taking care. It is because of Dasein’s relation to its surroundings that it takes care of it: it deals with someone, produces something, cherishes, uses, examines, asks etc. All of these are acts of taking care, but so are their negations as well: neglecting, letting go, abandoning etc. So this term is to be understood in a very wide sense.

Probably the most interesting part is that besorgen is not to be understood as sort of gloominess, about being worried all the time. This is how it is often understood, but this is not the way Heidegger means it. Taking care has nothing to do with particular moods of particular people.

I collapse in exhaustion, totally drained by the jargon of Citadel BAT. Tomorrow, I promise myself, tomorrow...

§13, second day.

Heidegger notes that Dasein appears mostly in the mode of everydayness (Alltäglichkeit). By this he means simply that we do not normally go around being Daseins, that is, pondering our existence. Instead, we find ourselves shopping, walking, eating, talking, pooping... When Dasein is in the world in its everydayness it cannot be fully hidden, i. e. we must be aware of the fact that Dasein is. I take him to mean that it is downright absurd to take the skeptical stance with regard to our everyday existence - and like so many philosophers, he merely brushes skepticism aside as an inconsequential albeit annoying adversary. Therefore the fact that I am here is taken as a given. Heidegger then remarks that in this mode (of everydayness), the idea of knowing is present. This knowing consists of that-which-knows and that-which-is-known, roughly. In our everyday understanding this is reflected by the dichotomy between subject and object. Heidegger is adamant, however, that this manner of speech does not correspond to the dichotomy between Dasein and the world. This is important also when we consider the erroneous (although, I still hold, useful) analogy between Dasein and subject. Dasein is not a mere subject for Heidegger, this much is known already, but here we have the opportunity to reflect more upon the nature of this difference.

The way Heidegger brings this dichotomy up suggests this simple interpretation: that which is known as "subject" belongs to everydayness. It is, basically, the non-authentic Dasein. It is me and you when we are not acting as Daseins. This may be a strech, but my Kantian blood demands this analogy: the subject-object dichotomy is valid only of the empirical world, of the world of (everyday) objects. Kant has his transcendental subject and Heidegger has his Dasein. These concepts arise only on the level of philosophical reflection, for both of these philosophers. Only when we are pondering the nature of our own being do we have to resort to them. Or at least this is how I see it. Nonetheless, what is clear is that the subject-object dichotomy of everydayness is not sufficient for explicating the relation between Dasein and the world it inhabits. Something more is needed.

Heidegger explains further that when we speak of the subject-object relationship we most often "forget" to ask about the actual mode of being of the subject. This I think is a valid point, and extremely actual. For example in philosophy of mind this is very present: many philosophers, physicalists in the forefront, tend to examine the subject as a sort of object - thus in effect circumventing the whole crux of the problem altogether. This is essentially what is being said in, for example, Thomas Nagel's What Is It Like to Be a Bat? In that renown essay he ponders how we could ever scientifically explain what it is like to be, for instance, a wombat (and is that anything like being a bat, since it seems to be only a bat with a "wom" - like a woman is a man with a "wo"...). I think that Nagel's main point is that the difference between "what is x?" and "what is it like to be x?" is very fundamental and very difficult to overcome, since science deals only with questions of the former type. It is difficult to see how we could move from the former to the latter: to explain what it is like to experience red by explaining all the scientific facts associated with it. It seems to me that the only way to know what it is like to be a wombat is to be a wombat - to experience being a wombat.

Here it seems, Heidegger would agree with me. To him the question of the nature of the subject is fundamentally different from the everyday question of certain objects. The nature of the subject - the questioning being - is, of course, Dasein. So this is yet another way of saying that the ordinary questions as posed in, e.g., science are inadequate for a thorough analysis of the being of Dasein - philosophical, or even better, phenomenological study is required. In short: Heidegger's fundamental ontology is the only discipline able to truly examine Dasein's being.

Heidegger claims that knowing is in fact a mode of being-in-the-world. It is therefore a mode of Dasein's being. There is, I think, two ways of explicating this. The first is that since the being of subject (that is the one that knows, which to Heidegger's mind is the same as saying that knowing is in the subject) is not explicable in everydayness, it must somehow belong to Dasein. Another, and my preferred way, is this: Dasein is something that has the ability to make questions. To know is to answer a question, to have an answer. Therefore knowing is subject to making questions, and consequently it is something that belongs to Dasein.

Coincidentally Heidegger himself demonstrates the truth of his claim in a strikingly similar fashion a bit later on. He first notes that knowing is an aspect of taking care. It is not so that we simply stand before things, but that we have a relation to these things, or we must have to know anything about them. We are, simply, directed at things. This directedness can be "properly aimed" or not - we may succeed in directing ourselves to something or we may fail to do so. In this we are also in control: we can focus ourselves, direct ourselves better. This is what asking questions is about: when I ask, for instance, how come the sky is blue, I direct myself at this blueness of the sky, focus myself to it. By asking subsequent questions and by answering them I get closer to the reasons behind this blueness. And, when I get close enough in this regard, I know why the sky is blue. Only through this relation based on taking care and therefore on Dasein can we produce propositions (e.g. "The sky is blue because the pesky Martians painted it such") that may or may not reflect the structure of the world, or, as it is often said, correspond to the states of affairs of the world. Basically then, it is this directedness of Dasein that allows knowledge, and therefore knowledge is indeed something that belongs to Dasein. I can merely marvel the beauty of this deduction.

This then, according to Heidegger, shows that in knowing Dasein receives a new relationship to the world that becomes unhidden in being-in-the-world. That is, knowledge does not create this relationship, but is merely a development of it. This is equivalent to saying that it is being-in-the-world that is fundamental, not knowledge, and it is this being-in-the-world that we must examine. This also has some interesting connotations. One is the ever-present Heidegger's idea that fundamental ontology founds sciences, or is beyond or before sciences. Sciences produce knowledge, they make ever clearer our relationship to the world we live in and even allow us to modify or alter the world, and as such it has an important role. But that knowledge itself cannot ever go beyond itself, it cannot reach the pre-cognitive being-in-the-world in its most fundamental way of being - it cannot reach Dasein. It also has a connotation that is interesting within the field of philosophy: does not Heidegger opt for the primacy of ontology over epistemology? It is not knowledge that we must analyse and examine to secure the foundations of being, but instead the being-in-the-world, the fact of being itself. I think this primacy of ontology over epistemology, contra so many philosophers, including Kant, is evident here.

The rooms of this part of the corridor have been ransacked for all the knowledge they can produce. I think we are making progress, getting ever closer to the answer we are seeking for. Although there is much I do not understand, and probably even more that I only think I do, I am content and more restful. There is hope yet, even in the Citadel (wom?)BAT.