Interlude: Musings of the Fellowship, Part IV

In the few days that followed, Wittgenstein and Levinas were making great progress in healing. At times they even took part in conversations, but when I tried to ask about their experiences, they fell silent and their faces turned dark. Whatever horrors they have endured remained between them. Levinas told us that he too had wandered into the Citadel BAT to find the answer to the question of Being, but said that he was not altogether satisfied with the secrets it held. There was too much egoism here, he complained: the analysis of Dasein was too much centered on the individual and cared too little of the world of Others, of the relationships among which we live. When I pressed him about it, he did not want to explicate further and only said that "you will see for yourself." True enough, I thought, for I had come here to witness the Citadel for myself, and that is exactly what I shall do.

Dasein-Toni: Isn't Wittgenstein pretty when he sleeps? Just like a baby!
Kant: Yeah, he surely is. Lips pursing and all. And look: there is some drool on his pillow! How adorable!
DT: *chuckles* It is indeed. And he is such a good chap all around... hehe, I once heard this story about him. Want to hear it?
K: Sure, go right ahead.
DT: Well, Witty is very ascetic and likes routines. So, this one time he was visiting a friend in a great mansion, and the butler wanted to know what his favourite food was so that they could cook it for the nights festivities. Right. And guess what Wittgenstein answered?
K: Smashed potatoes?
DT: Uhh? No... that wouldn't be funny now would it?
K: Well, Smashing Pumpkins then? Haahaa!
DT: Very clever, wiseass.
K: Thanks.
DT: Oh, well, anyhow, he responded: "I don't care, as long as it is the same!" Haha, what a chap!
K: The same as what?
DT: Huh?
K: You said, "as long as it is the same." I asked: the same as what?
DT: What?! The same... just the same!
K: You can't say "the same" unless you specify the thing it is "the same" to. It's like saying "my nose is funnier than" or "raccoons are identical." That's a violation of the syntax of language.
DT: Oh, come on, you dillweed! It just means that his favourite food is the same, that he likes to eat the same food. That's how addicted to routines he is. I am sure you understand that.
K: No, as a matter of fact I do not understand the nonsense you spew out. I don't care how routined he is, he still can't break the laws of syntax.
DT: You are hopeless.
K: At least I am proficient in language.
DT: You are just a horribly pedantic nitpicking asshole that has no sense of humour.
K: No I am not.
DT: Yes you are.
K: You are.
DT: Fuck... I'm through with this crap. Why don't you give a synopsis of what we have learned instead of being a prick.
K: I will not.
DT: What?
K: I don't want to. You hurt my feelings.
DT: Come on, now. Don't be a baby.
K: Well, you seem to like Wittgenstein as a baby!
DT: Uhh... okay, what's this?
K: Nothing. Forget it.
DT: Kant... are you jealous?
K: No! No I am not. I don't care. You can like Witty as much as you want to. Go ahead. Never mind me.
DT: Oh, Kant, you fuzzy buzzy little pumpkin, come here! I still love you, my napkin.
K: Oh, grizzly-Toni, I've been so lonely lately! *sniff*
DT: That's okay, come here, let it all out...

Heartrending moments later...

DT: Could you give us the synopsis now, please?
K: Well, okay. Here goes. In the latest passages Heidegger examines the way in which Dasein exists in the world. He calls this manner of being being-in-the-world. The basic idea seems to be that the certain intensionality, or directedness, of Dasein creates a relation between the world and Dasein. This relation could perhaps be characterized as consciousness.
DT: Yeah, Dasein's ability to question its existence sort of creates a second-order being: being that not only is, but is also able to reflect on its being.
K: That's right. It is this reflexive relation that creates consciousness. A reflexive relation is, of course, a relation in which something is related to itself, in this case a being is related to itself through reflection.
DT: Of course. But didn't you have a similar thesis?
K: I sure did. The whole point of transcendental unity of apperception is that in order for us to be conscious to begin with, we must be able to say "I think" of any representation we have.
DT: You mean, of course, that consciousness arises when a being thinks of itself. That consciousness is nothing but continuous apperception.
K: Precisely. One could say that consciousness arises when a subject that examines an object takes itself as the object of examination: the subject examines subject and thus objectifies itself. The subject-as-an-object is the self we experience.
DT: Simply put: when a subject realises that when it examines a certain object it is in fact examining itself, then it becomes conscious. It sort of realises itself as a being among other beings. It is like a mental analogy for realising that the thing reflected in a mirror is oneself - indeed something that is often taken as a sign of consciousness - perhaps faultily though, because the inability to realise this may as well be a result of different eyesight or other factors.
K: Right. So we could say that Heidegger has the same sort of idea here: that the being of a being that realises its own being is different from the being of a being that does not realise its being.
DT: Whoa! Well, I guess it makes sense when I think of it - just seems like a load of indecipherable nonsense when I first heard it. A being that realises its own being is Dasein and the being that does not is just a present-to-hand-being, and the manner of being of the former is different from that of the latter. Okay, got it.
K: Glad to have you with us.
DT: Thanks, mr. smartypants.
K: Hah! Well, anyhow. To really examine being we must examine this manner of being that is our being, that is, being-in-the-world. For this reason objective sciences are not enough for resolving this issue, since they explicitly examine things of the world instead of our manner of being in the world. This is not very different from my thesis that transcendental philosophy, that is, philosophy that examines the mode of and the conditions for our being, precedes science as well as metaphysical expositions.
DT: Yeah. It could be said that science applies the methods and tools we have been given within the framework of our being, whereas your transcendental philosophy and Heidegger's fundamental ontology studies beyond these tools to their very nature.
K: Kind of, yes. But I think the talk about "beyonds" remain far too vague to properly grasp. After all, one could ask why sciences could not use their tools to examine their tools - a microscope can be used to examine another microscope and so on. What is important is that these tools are very fundamental indeed: reason, logic, senses. You can't use senses to examine the trustworthiness of senses, after all. Therefore empirical, scientific study cannot get to the bottom of things, because it cannot study the most fundamental tools it has in a proper fashion.
DT: Yeah, good clarification. It remains a huge problem as to how these tools should be examined then. Your transcendental philosophy attempts to explicate them through necessary conditions: you use certain counterfactual thought-experiments to show that in order for us to have a certain given thing, such as experience, in the first place, something else is required. Heidegger seems to want to examine these boundaries through phenomenological analysis: there is something to be uncovered in our very experience. It may not be scientifically valid information we get out of this, but it will be information nonetheless, and since science has already been ruled out as a possible source for knowledge about these things, the phenomenological analysis surely holds its ground.
K: Well said. I am not sure if anyone understands one bit of that, but at least it sounds cool.
DT: Thanks. That's what I live for.
K: Anyway. There is still another aspect to our study. It is the idea of authenticity.
DT: Yeah, almost forgot about that. Whac'ha think?
K: "Whac'ha"?
DT: Sorry.
K: You are pardoned. Now authenticity may sound complicated, but I think it is fairly simple. Dasein can be in different modes: it can sort of "live" its essence of questioning its being, that is, ponder about its existence; or it can choose not to do this. In our everyday life we are not pondering about this question of being, we are not perplexed about it, so to speak. In this mode we are non-authentic. We are more or less like other things in the world: we are men and women, we are desk-clerks, bus-drivers and university lecturers. In the mode of authenticity we face the problem of our existence, and I think it is safe to say that everyone is in this mode at least from time to time.
DT: Especially at night we tend to think the Big Questions: What is my purpose here? Who am I? Why am I me? What should I do with my life? Where am I heading? And so on.
K: Indeed. Some think of these more often than others, surely. Yet Heidegger clearly says that neither of these modes is "worse" than the other: it is certainly a poor life in which one never thinks of these things, but it is equally useless to be always indulged in mere pondering of being. That is: we must think of how we live, but we must also remember to actually live.
DT: It seems that at times Heidegger proves very important aspects of our being. He works a sort of fundamental psychology. He does not merely psychologize that we must remember to live our lives instead of just planning it, but shows its fundamental, almost ontological significance.
K: Quite. Now in the authentic mode, that is, in the pondering mode, we construct ourselves. It is in that mode where we take an inventory of our possibilities and actualities and choose our direction. Either we note that we are not what we should be and perhaps work to remedy that, or we see that we are on the right track. Or perhaps we simply think we are on the right track because we lack the insight to see otherwise. This is also an interesting point about being human: we ourselves change who we are by this immense psychological process. It is not easy to change oneself, but it is what we should do - and what, indeed, we must do. The phrase "I can't help myself" is the biggest lie there is.
DT: Agreed wholeheartedly! I don't know, but I have the feeling that Heidegger will find the key to happiness deep within our being, just where I think it ought to lie. It is not the world that makes us happy or unhappy, but it is us: we choose the way we relate to the world, and happiness is just one feature of this relation.
K: Yes, it would seem that this point can be extracted from Heidegger's philosophy. Whether he himself makes the claim, we shall see.
DT: Indeed. Thanks for the synopsis, Kant. I guess we ought to rest now, since tomorrow our journey continues to whatever horrors lie ahead. Good night.
K: Good night, Dasein-Toni.

The Rescue

Kant: So, what's with you and feces, Dasein-Toni?
Dasein-Toni: Uhh... What?
K: Feces. According to my dictionary, feces means "The matter that is discharged from the bowel during defecation; excrement."
DT: I know what feces are! But what's your point?
K: Well, it is just that you used "poop" or "pooping" five times in your last entry.
DT: So?
K: You don't think that's weird?
DT: Why would I? It was just something that sprang into my mind.
K: You are wading through the endless maze that is the Being and Time trying to find the answer to the arcane question of Being, all the while witnessing unspeakable horrors and overpowering mental onslaught, and the first thing that comes into your mind is "poop"? Don't say there is nothing odd there!
DT: Well, perhaps I had to poop, so it came to my mind.
K: Yeah, right. It just happened to be so that in both consecutive days the first thing that sprang into your mind was "poop".
DT: Okay, so I have to poop often, big deal. What's with you anyway?
K: Fine. If you don't want to admit that you have a problem, that's all right.
DT: I don't have a problem with poop, ok!
K: Fool the other one.
DT: Don't make me smack you.
K: You wouldn't get so upset if I hadn't hit the nerve.
DT: Now that's just a load of crap.
K: Ahh, "crap", eh? Just the first thing that sprang into your mind, was it now?
DT: Gahh... you are so aggravating!
K: Just trying to help, that's all.
DT: Right. Why don't you say something helpful for a change then?
K: OK: You are a dumbass.
DT: WHAT?! How on Earth is that helpful you... you... man with a funny nose!
K: There is NOTHING funny in my nose. And you are pretty stupid really. Wonder if Wittgenstein, who happened to disappear before two doors that lead to torturing chambers would perhaps be in one of those chambers, hmm? Did it cross your feeble mind to check that, dumbass, did it? Huh?
DT: Gosh.
K: Gosh?
DT: You might actually be right! Damn. I really must go and take a look. I can't allow for the possibility that he is there, enduring horrendous agony in the hands of the infernal beasts of Citadel BAT! On to the rescue!
K: Hold on a sec.
DT: What is it now?
K: I just wanted to talk to you about your unhealthy interest in wombats.
DT: What the...?! Wittgenstein might be experiencing excruciating pain and you want to talk about my unhealthy interest in wombats?
K: So you admit it?
DT: Huh? No! No I don't admit to anything of the sort. I just happen to like wombats, that's all. Really.
K: Like feces?
DT: Oh, fuck you! I've had enough of this. I'm going to save Wittgenstein and you can drag your sorry ass behind me if you will, see if I care!

And so we rushed in urgent haste to the doors leading to the torturing chambers, Kant immersed deeply in ponderings about the true relationship between Dasein-Toni and feces. Was he forced to eat shit when he was a child? Did he poop in his pants in elementary school so that everyone pointed their evil fingers at him and laughed? Was he, perchance, called by names like "Poop-Toni" or "FecesBoy" in his early years, or later in adulthood by his abusive friends? Or perhaps he just has a really bad constipation or diarrhea... Most probably we will never know.

I reach the door to the torturing chamber number §10, reserved specifically for Anthropology, Psychology and Biology. The door is unlocked and opens with a reluctant squeal. All is silent within, and as I once before left it: the special sciences are still caged in the room, huddling in miserable silence. Yet there are fresh stains of blood. The smell in the room is overwhelming and I gag - I grieve that they must suffer this indignity of being forced to lie in their own waste. Wittgenstein is nowhere in sight. There is nothing but agony here, I think to myself, as I close the door and retreat back to the corridor.

Lump in my throat, I push open the second door, number 11. The iron maiden is still there in the corner, I note, as I scan the room for Wittgenstein, blood racing through my veins. And there he is! A ragged figure in the corner near what seems to me to be Ethnology, but it is hard to tell from all the dried blood. As I cry out "Witty!" I become face to face with my carelessness. A terrible fiend of the Citadel BAT steps forward to face me, nostrils flaring and red eyes glimmering with sadistic anticipation. Its figure is immense, towering at least three meters. Its skin is red with blotches of black as if burned. It resembles what we have come to know as a minotaur - perhaps it was here in the Citadel BAT that the minotaur of Minos was born among its kind. As the creature lungs at me, there is but a moment to act.

I draw out my copy of Kritik der reinen Vernunft and take a page at random. On it a text is written in glowing red letters. I draw a deep breath and start the incantation:

Man versuche es daher einmal,
ob wir nicht in den Aufgaben der Metaphysik damit besser fortkommen,

The creature halts in bewilderment, its face distorting before these Demonisch words. Encouraged, I speak the rest of the words more confidently in a commanding tone.

daß wir annehmen,
die Gegenstände müssen sich nach unserem Erkenntnis richten,
welches so schon besser mit der verlangten Möglichkeit
einer Erkenntnis derselben a priori zusammenstimmt,
die über Gegenstände,
ehe sie uns gegeben werden,
etwas festsetzen soll.
Es ist hiemit eben so,
als mit den ersten Gedanken des K o p e r n i k u s bewandt!

As the last words fill the air, the creature howls in pain and is sent into a horribly unnatural spin that lifts its huge body into air like it was but a leaf in an autumn storm. It strikes the opposite wall of the chamber with a deafening crash, sending bricks and dust flying in the room. And then, all is still.

The Copernican Revolution has spoken.

I rush to Wittgenstein who seems to be barely alive. His head hangs limply as I take him to my arms. "It is me, Dasein-Toni, you will be allright", I whisper to him softly and soothingly. He responds with a small smile and then tries to say something that ends in violent spasms and coughing. I give him some water, and he drinks eagerly, spilling the water.

Just as I am about to carry him out of the wretched place, he whispers: "Dasein... Toni... Take him... with you." He points weakly to a pile of rags beside him. At first I am confused, but then I recognize it as not a pile of rags, but a horribly abused human being. I bow to see his face and gasp, for he is not just an ordinary trespasser of Citadel BAT. "Levinas," I mutter in awe - will this place never cease to amaze me?

Weary yet content that I have found my friend Wittgenstein and, indeed, a new friend as well, I carry them out of the torturing chamber. I give them some more water, close the door and keep watch as they sleep.

Act VI: To Be or Not to Be - Is That a Question?

I am hurled back into being and time (located oddly enough in Citadel Being and Time) onto a cold stone floor. I quickly rise up to take a look at my surroundings. The corridor is dark and silent. Behind me the two doors to torturing chambers are closed and no sound emanates from within. I can see tiny markings written in blood on both doors. Squinting, I can barely make out that they are numbers - or more precisely, clauses. "§10" on the left hand door, "§11" on the opposite side. I shiver at the memories of those clauses.

Adamant in my resolve, I leave these doors and the memories they hold. The corridor makes a sharp turn in the distance. Right before this turn there are two more doors, one on each side. That is where my journey will lead me.

The companions with whom I was travelling are nowhere to be seen. Either they have suffered the same fate as I have or they have left on their own accord - I do not know either way. But there is yet some hope, I remember: Kant is securely in my pocket, ready to spring into action when needed. The power of Kant has only waxed in the course of the year, as has my mastery over him - my slave and bitch. I am also now reinforced with a copy of Sein und Zeit, Being and Time written in the original Demonic that is Heidegger's language.

It is Wittgenstein I am most worried about, when I think of it. When I came across him year a ago, he was but a starving man in rags, huddling pitifully in a corner. Whatever became of him, I can only guess. And I can only hope that, provided that he is still here, our paths will cross again.

But yes, onward I must go. Steeling myself and grasping my Kant tighter I step further into the corridor. Only the echoes of my footsteps greet me as I reach the bulky metal doors.

Part I, Chapter II, §§12-13

§12

In the beginning of this clause Heidegger reminds us that Dasein exists. This appears to be harmless enough a statement, but it is far more indepth than it would seem. We must remind ourselves of the fundamental difference between being and existing as Heidegger would have them. It is not just that Dasein exists, but that only Dasein exists. Most certainly, other things (things present-to-hand - Vorhandensein; that is, all those tables and cars and other things that are not Dasein) are, but they do not exist in the strictest sense of the word. Existence comes into play via the realization of being. Simply put: when a being (a thing) becomes conscious of its own being, it begins to exist. Dasein is, as we have learned, such a being. In addition, Dasein is the only being that can do this - because by definition Dasein is that which can question its own being.

Heidegger continues that, moreover, Dasein is whatever I happen to be. This is related to the idea that Dasein is always me - but as was emphasised, this means merely that we can only ever talk about Dasein in the first person; in this sense Dasein indeed comes close to being "subject", but it is to be remembered that Heidegger is deliberately trying to avoid the standard terminology and Dasein cannot therefore be equated with subject, although it most definitely makes matters easier to grasp, at least for my feeble mind!

Heidegger then says that Dasein's authenticity (dem. Eigentlichkeit) and its corresponding non-authenticity (Uneigentlichkeit) is only possible through this "egocentrism". He notes that Dasein exists always in either of these modi, or is indifferent to them. What are these modi, then? Well, Dasein is its possibilities - the existence of Dasein becomes determined through its possibilities. These possibilities allow it to choose, quite evidently (at least supposing that determinism does not reign and possibilities are therefore actual possibilities). He says that since Dasein is its possibilities, it can either choose (or, "choose" as he puts it, whatever he means by this obstruction of meaning I can only guess) itself or not. It can also lose itself or never reach itself in the first place - or even apparently reach itself without actually doing so. Perhaps surprisingly, it is not so that when Dasein reaches itself, then it is authentic. Instead, the possibility of losing oneself or not reaching oneself, that too is based on authenticity.

How to make sense of this? I guess the key to understanding this is the noticing of the fact that he explicitly says that non-authenticity is not lesser being than authenticity. So it is not about deficiencies, apparently. Being authentic is equally important to being non-authentic. We have but one option: to try to figure out what Dasein's authentic being is. Authenticity is of course about being what one is in a sense meant to be. An authentic piece of art is the real piece of art, the piece of art that we think it is; perhaps Mona Lisa and not its cheap copy. A diamond is authentic when it indeed is a diamond and not a piece of glass. So Dasein would be authentic if it really were Dasein. What makes Dasein Dasein? According to Heidegger, surely that it asks about its own being. Could it be so that when Dasein is faced with the question of its being, only then it is Dasein proper, that is, authentic? And when it is not exhibiting this ability, then it is non-authentic? This seems plausible enough, no? It is not that Dasein is not capable of anything else but asking questions about its own being, certainly, but that what makes it Dasein, and separates it from other mere things, is the fact that it is capable of doing that. Since authenticity is all about appearances (a rabbit is not a non-authentic wombat, since it is never even supposed to be a wombat – in the same sense art is not pseudoscience as it is not ever meant to be science in the first place; authenticity is about posing as something either rightfully or not), I hereby suggest that the authenticity of Dasein is to be understood through whether it poses itself as a Dasein, that is, whether it appears as a Dasein or not.

If this interpretation is to make sense, non-authentic Dasein must be understood as well: can there be non-authentic Dasein? I would think so: when I am walking down the street the people that I pass do not appear to me as Dasein, but as things – things that I must avoid, things among which I must move. One could say that this is obvious, since Dasein is only to be spoken of in the first person. True enough – so can I as a Dasein be non-authentic? Happily enough, I can! It would surely be a horrible fate to be faced with the question of one’s being, as they say, 24/7. To be hurled into an eternal flood of questions of one’s being. And that is no ordinary question: everyone has faced the horrible, crushing weight of the question “What am I? Why am I me?” – To be forever condemned to that question... now that is a terrible, terrible fate.

So, yes, I-as-Dasein can be authentic (when I am pondering my own existence) or non-authentic (when I am not, for instance when I am pushing out a good poop, my forehead wrinkled with concentration). Does this fit well with the idea that only in the authentic level can I truly either be or not be me? In one sense, yes: only on the authentic level I can be faced with the fact that I either am what I am “supposed to be” or I am not. When I am deeply immersed in the act of pooping, that is not something that is present – it matters not whether I am what I am supposed to be, but only that the damned poop comes out. In another sense, no: it could be argued that no matter what I might be thinking about at the moment (be that my being or my poop), I still am or am not whatever I am “supposed to be”. But I think this argument would be in error. Only in the context of some divine plan is the idea of “supposed to be” possible in any ontological (or ontic!) sense, and no such context is present in Being and Time. No, instead the “supposed to be” part is to be read as an epistemological condition: the Dasein may wish to be something, and that something henceforward becomes what it is supposed to be. Therefore only in the authentic state, in which Dasein may reflect upon its being, existence and potentialities, can Dasein truly fail to be what it is supposed to be, i.e. what it at that time wishes to be.

Yet it is worth emphasising that this does not make the matter merely subjective. Dasein can indeed think that it is what it wishes to be, but instead it is not. This is even quite common in the world of men – we think we have it all made, but instead the truth is quite different and far more bleak.

This, at least, is my rather lengthy take on what Heidegger is trying to say. Take it or leave it, but I am out of ideas!

Nonetheless, we must move on. The most important parts of the clause are the terms Being-in-the-World (In-der-Welt-Sein) and Being-in (In-Sein). Being-in-the-World is the mode of being of Dasein, that is, Dasein is in the world, according to Heidegger. And in order to understand Dasein, we must understand this being-in-the-world. As an attempt to explicate the term Being-in-the-world, Heidegger notes that it has three constituents.

(1) “In-the-world.” According to Heidegger this forces us to ask about the ontological structure of the world, about the concept of worldhood (Weltlichkeit). This he promises to give later in chapter three. Basically, as I understand this, it merely says that in order to explicate the idea of Dasein that always is in the world, the concept and nature of world must be explicated. We cannot understand Dasein if we do not understand the world it inhabits and its structure.

(2) The being that is always in the manner of being-in-the-world. Heidegger adds that this is the answer to the question “who?” This will be done in chapter four. It is worth noting that this relates to Heidegger’s idea of Dasein as a first-person-agent. Because Dasein can only ever be a first person, it is also prudent to ask who it is, instead of what – since “what” refers to beings that are not Dasein, but mere things present-to-hand. This idea is actually implemented in our language already, since we distinguish sharply between “(s)he” and “it”.

(3) Being-in as such. Heidegger does not say much about this but merely points out that the ontological constitution of this must be brought out – and that this will be done in chapter five. I guess we will be wiser then...

Even though being-in-the-world can be thus analysed, Heidegger emphasises that the whole “phenomenon” is always in view: that is, basically, that it must be understood as a whole. By this he must mean that the constituents themselves are not that important but the manner in which they relate to each other.

What I find particularly interesting is that Heidegger says that being-in-the-world is an a priori form of Dasein. It makes me feel all warm and fuzzy inside to see such Kantian approach here: this, of course, means that being-in-the-world is a kind of category for Dasein. The way Heidegger puts it makes it clear that Kant is in his mind here. We will return to this a bit later.

Heidegger turns to explicate the idea of being-in. He notes that, when we are talking about present-to-hand beings, that is, about ordinary objects of the world, their being-in is to be understood as being-in “the world”. By this rather confusing linguistic trick he means to say that they are in the world like things normally are within something: for example, a coat being in a closet or my mom in a supermarket. Therefore it is about spatial relations of two things, where another is spatially within another. This sort of being Heidegger dubs categorical, and it only fits of ordinary objects (or Dasein considered as ordinary objects, like my mom when I consider her as a “thing” in a supermarket, not as a specific subject.)

When we speak of being-in proper, then it is something that fits Dasein: it is how Dasein is in the world, and therefore it is existential – because Dasein’s being is existing. This cannot be thought spatially. Basically I understand him to mean this: when Dasein is, it always is as a thing that is capable of questioning its own being, and therefore it has a relation to its own being unlike tables and chairs – or ever wombats if we believe Heidegger. Since it has this relation to its own being, it also has a special relation to where it is. This is quite clear, when we think that we as conscious human beings are in places in a different sense than ordinary things are: we are able to recognize that we are in a certain place, and we are even able to philosophically reflect on our being there. (Why are we exactly here, on this very planet? – This question for one has had immense interest theologically, indeed to the point of considering the place where we are, the Earth, as the centre of the world.) Simply put: this kind of being that is reflected cannot be explained wholly via spatial determinations. My being in Finland is not a matter of mere spatiality, although it certainly does have that aspect as well, but also of there being some intersubjective, cultural thing like Finland that is based on complex relations between human beings. I can also have a different relationship to being in Finland than to being in a shop, for instance, since I may also think that I am a Finn. When we consider this further, we will find ideas such as that I can “be” in Finland without being in Finland – my heart may be in Finland, my thoughts may be in Finland. In any case, the basic idea is that our relation to the place we are in cannot be reduced to mere spatiality.

Heidegger also emphasises that being-in, as understood here, is also about being in something familiar. This I take to be another way of saying that we have a different relation to the thing we are in than in the case of mere things such as cars. It is familiar in the sense that we have a relation to it.

Heidegger’s idea is that being-in is an existential of Dasein. The term existential bears a relation to what I said earlier about Kant’s categories. Since this being-in is a mode of being for Dasein and it is existential being instead of mere categorical being, this existential becomes directly related with a category. If we take categories to be either ways in which things are (Aristotle) or ways in which objects are thought (Kant), then existentials become the Daseinic (Hah! Perhaps I just made up a word that even Heidegger didn’t come up with!) counterparts of categories that are only fit for present-to-hand-things. That is, we can take Heidegger as saying that the categories are not enough for exhausting the ways Dasein can be / can be thought, but in addition specific existentials are needed.

Didn’t get it? Worry not, for Heidegger promises to return to the analysis of being-in later on more thoroughly – here he merely wants to bring up the basic idea.

The following stuff is difficult for me to decipher – perhaps I am just becoming too tired of this mental onslaught. Nonetheless, Heidegger states first that two things cannot really touch each other, unless they are Dasein. That is, a table cannot truly touch the floor. This is, according to him, because the table would have to be something to the floor that the floor would face or meet. I take this to mean that since they do not have any relation to one another in the sense we have one to things, they cannot meet and therefore they cannot actually touch either. They may be spatially next to one another, but touching is something that requires some sort of relationship in the sense humans have relationships with each other. For me at least this is hard to grasp, even though I think I have a faint idea of what he is aiming at.

Nonetheless, he says then that Dasein’s being in a world is a fact. Now this would not be such a big deal, but he means something specific by this – the facticity of Dasein. Now there is a problem here because of English language. Heidegger distinguishes between Tatsache (a fact) and Factum (a fact), of which the first applies to present-to-hand-beings and the latter to Dasein. With this he means to explicate the difference between a table’s existence being a fact and a Dasein’s existence being a fact. I will not attempt to explicate this further here, for the simple reason that I am unable to. What is to be said, however, is that the fact of Dasein’s existence includes the idea of the Dasein being conscious of its existence, aware of it. This means that Dasein has, again, a relationship to its own being. It also has a relationship to the world it lives in, and this relationship has a great significance for Heidegger: it paves the way for one of his most important concepts: taking care (Besorgen). He says that he will deal with this later. Right now I think the important thing is that Dasein’s being in the world is always laden with this taking care. It is because of Dasein’s relation to its surroundings that it takes care of it: it deals with someone, produces something, cherishes, uses, examines, asks etc. All of these are acts of taking care, but so are their negations as well: neglecting, letting go, abandoning etc. So this term is to be understood in a very wide sense.

Probably the most interesting part is that besorgen is not to be understood as sort of gloominess, about being worried all the time. This is how it is often understood, but this is not the way Heidegger means it. Taking care has nothing to do with particular moods of particular people.

I collapse in exhaustion, totally drained by the jargon of Citadel BAT. Tomorrow, I promise myself, tomorrow...

§13, second day.

Heidegger notes that Dasein appears mostly in the mode of everydayness (Alltäglichkeit). By this he means simply that we do not normally go around being Daseins, that is, pondering our existence. Instead, we find ourselves shopping, walking, eating, talking, pooping... When Dasein is in the world in its everydayness it cannot be fully hidden, i. e. we must be aware of the fact that Dasein is. I take him to mean that it is downright absurd to take the skeptical stance with regard to our everyday existence - and like so many philosophers, he merely brushes skepticism aside as an inconsequential albeit annoying adversary. Therefore the fact that I am here is taken as a given. Heidegger then remarks that in this mode (of everydayness), the idea of knowing is present. This knowing consists of that-which-knows and that-which-is-known, roughly. In our everyday understanding this is reflected by the dichotomy between subject and object. Heidegger is adamant, however, that this manner of speech does not correspond to the dichotomy between Dasein and the world. This is important also when we consider the erroneous (although, I still hold, useful) analogy between Dasein and subject. Dasein is not a mere subject for Heidegger, this much is known already, but here we have the opportunity to reflect more upon the nature of this difference.

The way Heidegger brings this dichotomy up suggests this simple interpretation: that which is known as "subject" belongs to everydayness. It is, basically, the non-authentic Dasein. It is me and you when we are not acting as Daseins. This may be a strech, but my Kantian blood demands this analogy: the subject-object dichotomy is valid only of the empirical world, of the world of (everyday) objects. Kant has his transcendental subject and Heidegger has his Dasein. These concepts arise only on the level of philosophical reflection, for both of these philosophers. Only when we are pondering the nature of our own being do we have to resort to them. Or at least this is how I see it. Nonetheless, what is clear is that the subject-object dichotomy of everydayness is not sufficient for explicating the relation between Dasein and the world it inhabits. Something more is needed.

Heidegger explains further that when we speak of the subject-object relationship we most often "forget" to ask about the actual mode of being of the subject. This I think is a valid point, and extremely actual. For example in philosophy of mind this is very present: many philosophers, physicalists in the forefront, tend to examine the subject as a sort of object - thus in effect circumventing the whole crux of the problem altogether. This is essentially what is being said in, for example, Thomas Nagel's What Is It Like to Be a Bat? In that renown essay he ponders how we could ever scientifically explain what it is like to be, for instance, a wombat (and is that anything like being a bat, since it seems to be only a bat with a "wom" - like a woman is a man with a "wo"...). I think that Nagel's main point is that the difference between "what is x?" and "what is it like to be x?" is very fundamental and very difficult to overcome, since science deals only with questions of the former type. It is difficult to see how we could move from the former to the latter: to explain what it is like to experience red by explaining all the scientific facts associated with it. It seems to me that the only way to know what it is like to be a wombat is to be a wombat - to experience being a wombat.

Here it seems, Heidegger would agree with me. To him the question of the nature of the subject is fundamentally different from the everyday question of certain objects. The nature of the subject - the questioning being - is, of course, Dasein. So this is yet another way of saying that the ordinary questions as posed in, e.g., science are inadequate for a thorough analysis of the being of Dasein - philosophical, or even better, phenomenological study is required. In short: Heidegger's fundamental ontology is the only discipline able to truly examine Dasein's being.

Heidegger claims that knowing is in fact a mode of being-in-the-world. It is therefore a mode of Dasein's being. There is, I think, two ways of explicating this. The first is that since the being of subject (that is the one that knows, which to Heidegger's mind is the same as saying that knowing is in the subject) is not explicable in everydayness, it must somehow belong to Dasein. Another, and my preferred way, is this: Dasein is something that has the ability to make questions. To know is to answer a question, to have an answer. Therefore knowing is subject to making questions, and consequently it is something that belongs to Dasein.

Coincidentally Heidegger himself demonstrates the truth of his claim in a strikingly similar fashion a bit later on. He first notes that knowing is an aspect of taking care. It is not so that we simply stand before things, but that we have a relation to these things, or we must have to know anything about them. We are, simply, directed at things. This directedness can be "properly aimed" or not - we may succeed in directing ourselves to something or we may fail to do so. In this we are also in control: we can focus ourselves, direct ourselves better. This is what asking questions is about: when I ask, for instance, how come the sky is blue, I direct myself at this blueness of the sky, focus myself to it. By asking subsequent questions and by answering them I get closer to the reasons behind this blueness. And, when I get close enough in this regard, I know why the sky is blue. Only through this relation based on taking care and therefore on Dasein can we produce propositions (e.g. "The sky is blue because the pesky Martians painted it such") that may or may not reflect the structure of the world, or, as it is often said, correspond to the states of affairs of the world. Basically then, it is this directedness of Dasein that allows knowledge, and therefore knowledge is indeed something that belongs to Dasein. I can merely marvel the beauty of this deduction.

This then, according to Heidegger, shows that in knowing Dasein receives a new relationship to the world that becomes unhidden in being-in-the-world. That is, knowledge does not create this relationship, but is merely a development of it. This is equivalent to saying that it is being-in-the-world that is fundamental, not knowledge, and it is this being-in-the-world that we must examine. This also has some interesting connotations. One is the ever-present Heidegger's idea that fundamental ontology founds sciences, or is beyond or before sciences. Sciences produce knowledge, they make ever clearer our relationship to the world we live in and even allow us to modify or alter the world, and as such it has an important role. But that knowledge itself cannot ever go beyond itself, it cannot reach the pre-cognitive being-in-the-world in its most fundamental way of being - it cannot reach Dasein. It also has a connotation that is interesting within the field of philosophy: does not Heidegger opt for the primacy of ontology over epistemology? It is not knowledge that we must analyse and examine to secure the foundations of being, but instead the being-in-the-world, the fact of being itself. I think this primacy of ontology over epistemology, contra so many philosophers, including Kant, is evident here.

The rooms of this part of the corridor have been ransacked for all the knowledge they can produce. I think we are making progress, getting ever closer to the answer we are seeking for. Although there is much I do not understand, and probably even more that I only think I do, I am content and more restful. There is hope yet, even in the Citadel (wom?)BAT.

Back In Business

In a sea of darkness a mangled body drifts in silence. There is nothing but the endless swirling of concepts and the ever present, ever elusive substance. And the broken mind of a Kantian too brave for his own good.

"Where am I?" The question echoes, gaining momentum until the lack of answer becomes a horrifying answer in itself. Desperation overwhelms. What is this place? How did I get here? How long have I been like this? The questions flood, each more urgent than the preceding one, until one question ends it all: "Who am I?"

Threads of memories dangle loosely in my mind, taunting me. I remember a citadel, I remember dark tunnels and torturing chambers and I remember... Heidegger. The word sends spasms through my mind - eerily familiar and strangely soothing, that name. Yes, Heidegger. That one is a handful, I remember that much. The citadel... Citadel of Being and Time, yes! The endless journey through the maze of near incomprehensible gibberish. Friends found and friends lost. The ghost of Wittgenstein and - I smile - the power of Kant.

Ah, but there is work to do. Who knows how long I have floated in this abysmal Limbo (A year and four days - note from the editor). Who knows what horrors they were that struck me down so, but who cares either, right? There is the Secret of Citadel BAT to discover, and discovered it shall be, or my name is not... uhh... what IS my name?

I think, therefore I am. That much is clear. Thanks Carty - for a dualist you ain't so bad. But I could not realise my being if I did not realise my potentiality for non-being. This one goes for Hegel, good job mate! And to realise my potentiality I must be able to overcome mere existence, to reach the non-existence, the potentialities and possibilities. Yes, that's right Heidegger, you old goober, I must be Dasein. And there it is! I am Dasein-Toni, and I am here to kick ass! (Got a bit carried away there, sorry.)

Yes, I am back and I WILL find the answer to the question of being!

Or at least find some better questions.

The Great Surrender

Well, it seems like my motivation to continue with the blog was snuffed out by the trip. I am not sure if I will ever return to this project, but if I will, it will probably be after a while. I managed to delve through the introduction, which is probably the most important part of the book, so that's something. And it stands alone even if no additions will be made.

Thanks to all that have been there to tell me that I do not suck whenever I had some doubts about continuing the project. At least now I do not stop because no one reads it ;). And my apologies.

Yours faithfully,
Dasein-Toni

Vacation

I will leave on a trip to continental Europe on 18th of June. I will return some three weeks after, around 10th of July. I will most probably not be able to continue the blog during this period, so the journey will halt for the time being (Yes, pun intended).

Yours faithfully,
Dasein-Toni

Act V: Existential Analytics and Torturing Chambers (§§9-11)

As I turn the key (Named: The Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein) on the lock of the door above which it says: "This way first", I begin to tremble. This far I have only been to the waiting halls and antechambers of the Citadel Being and Time, or Citadel BAT, for short. The horrors witnessed there have at times nearly crushed my mind, but it might be nothing in comparison to what lies ahead. Among the perils there lies the mystical, foul demons of Sorge and fearsome dragons of Fallenness. But in the process I have also gained confidence, courage and friends. There is hope yet.

The door opens with a reluctant squeal. We half expect to see bloodthirsty beasts of the BAT spring at us, but the hallway before us is quiet and empty. In the furthest corner I think I see movement within the shadows, but when I blink, all is still. Must be my imagination, I think as I remind myself to remain calm. We enter the hallway in expectant silence.

We have taken only a few steps into the corridor when the door behind us clangs shut with a deafening boom of grim finality. There is no turning back now, I think as we advance further into the eerie corridor that soon starts its ominous descend ever deeper and deeper into the Citadel.

Part I, Chapter I, §§9-11

The first chapter intends to expose the existential analysis of Dasein and to show how this relates to other similar studies.

§9

First Heidegger states that we will here analyse that being that we ourselves always are: Dasein, “here-being” or “there-being”. This sort of being, Dasein, has a relation to its own being: to it its being is like something. According to Heidegger, this brings forth two things:

(1) The essence of this being is included in that it must be. Therefore the what-being (essence) of Dasein is to be determined from its being (existence), if we wish to speak of essence at all. Therefore Dasein’s essence is not in its properties, but in its way of being, it’s mode of being. I think this is to be taken as saying that the essence of man is not any set of properties, but in the way man is: as something that has the ability to have a view on its own being, to question it and to try to understand it. Dasein does not, therefore, express some object such as a table, but a way in which something is – no matter what the actual object that has this mode of being happens to be. I take this to mean that a computer can be Dasein, if it can question its own being, and a human can be non-Dasein, and actually is just that when turned into a corpse (or a vegetable - like me).

(2) Dasein is always my being. I take this to mean not that Heidegger is saying that all Daseins are him, but that of every Dasein we must use a personal pronoun: me, you, him etc. Basically, I understand this as a similar thing to Kant’s Transcendental Unity of Apperception, that is, the necessary condition for a subject to be a subject is that he is able to say “I think” of every perception that he has. Heidegger is saying, I believe, that every Dasein can say of himself that “I am”, so to speak. Every Dasein is “I”, for himself. Heidegger then differentiates between Dasein and Vorhandensein, that being a sort of “present-to-hand-being”, as it is sometimes translated. Things that are not Dasein can be present to hand, that is, as something that is before us, accessible and present - a mere object that cannot be a subject. To these present-to-hand-beings their being is irrelevant (as it is, assumably, irrelevant to a table that it exists). But for Dasein, as explained before, his being cannot be irrelevant.

Heidegger says that Dasein is always its own possibility. This possibility is not something it owns like something that is present-to-hand. It is not an object. This possibility is Dasein. But what does Heidegger mean by “possibility”? In the introduction we saw that possibility for Heidegger is something that the Dasein can be. This is: the horizon it sees before itself. I think that I can be a philosopher. It is possible for me, and it is something that I can reach. I can become a philosopher, if I choose to. Now the totality of these possibilities is for Heidegger the Dasein’s possibility, and this possibility is what the Dasein is – of course, this Dasein is a particular Dasein, like me, not Dasein in general. Dasein is in the world, with all his desires, dreams, wants and principles. This totality of what the Dasein sees is his possibility, and it is this totality that determines what the particular Dasein is. In non-Heideggerian: I am the totality of my dreams, beliefs, desires, thoughts and so on and so on. That is, as me. Of course, I am also a body, but that body is not the Dasein. When I speak of me, I speak of me-as-a-subject: me-as-a-Dasein. It is not, for Heidegger, just that I have dreams and beliefs, but that I am those. This is a strong claim, but I think it holds. As long as this “possibility” is defined broadly enough (as it is now: it is simply the totality of all that I consider myself to be in relation with), it spans the whole of my subjectivity. And as a subject, I am these subjective notions. As an object I might be a body, but as a subject I am something that has a relation to his body. I think of my body in a certain way. This which in me thinks of things in a certain way is the Dasein.

It should be made clear that this is in a sense Heidegger’s philosophy of mind. Heidegger seems to think that being a subject is simply to “be there”, to have a relation to where one is. This returns us directly to the common notion that for a subject, for a consciousness, things are like something. For a table the floor on which it stands is not like anything, but for me it is. This like-being, so to speak, is not something that the object itself has, but what the subject projects to it. Therefore Heidegger says that being a conscious subject is to have this like-relation to things. And what is then this subject? It is the totality of these like-relations. Why? Perhaps – I am just speculating here – because if we take away all these like-relations, what do we have left? Nothing at least that would make the thing we are left with conscious (there is nothing that is like something to it). Perhaps the only thing that he has is the potentiality of being in like-relation to something. That is, the Dasein. Is the Dasein then the necessary condition for being a subject? An impersonal subjectivity? Those of you that know of these things must have already guessed what I am aiming at: is the Dasein the transcendental subject? That same limit of subjectivity that for Kant was the transcendental subject, for Wittgenstein the eye, and for Husserl the transcendental ego? It seems plausible.

But I am not through with Heidegger's philosophy of mind yet. What is known as Brentano’s thesis is that being a subject is about being an intentional being – that is, having intentional states of mind. Intentionality means having a certain directed relation to things. Basically: my states of mind are directed at things. Either things within my consciousness, within my body or totally external to me. Is Heidegger an intentionalist? I cannot see why he would not be. After all, the whole point of Dasein is that he can ask questions. What are questions? They are something that have the one who asks it (the subject) and the question itself that is directed to something of which it is asked (the object). This ability to ask questions is then equivalent with the ability to have a certain directed relation to objects. Also, the like-relation is such a relation: something (object) is like something to something (subject). The being-like-something is intentional, because the state of mind is directed at an object of which the being-like-something is said. I think this is enough to prove that Heidegger is an intentionalist. Let the demons of the Citadel Being and Time strike me down, if they will to oppose my judgment!

In any case, it is important to understand that for Dasein existence comes before essence (Heidegger is an existentialist) - because the essence is a way of being - and that it is always egocentric (this has unwanted connotations – it would perhaps be better to say me-centred).

Heidegger says that Dasein must be exposed through existential analysis of its existence (that is, through analysing the formal structure of Dasein’s existence), but in this we must not start by postulating a certain kind of existence, but we must start from the vague generality of Dasein’s existence: averageness. This everyday averageness of Dasein is the foundation of its ontic being (ontic, remember, was about things that are, in opposition to the way things are in general), and as such it is the closest to us in the ontic sense. But that which is closest to us ontically is the furthest away from us ontologically (That which is closest to us has a structure that is hardest to determine, because we cannot detach ourselves from it to see it in its totality) . Therefore, according to Heidegger, this averageness can now be “passed by”. I am rather baffled at this. Reading again and again what Heidegger is saying about this does not make it any clearer, to my utter annoyance. It seems to me that Heidegger might be trying to say that the averageness is something that we always are, but what is not something directly associated with the structure of being. That is, averageness is a name for all the vague additional stuff in our lives that obstructs our being, even though it is in a sense a foundation for our being (in the ontic sense). But this does not open up for me, and I will have to look at this later, if I can.

Nonetheless, the explications gained from analysing Dasein are called existentials. They are the ways Dasein can be – in this they share a relation to categories (for Aristotle: ways for objects to be, for Kant: ways to think of objects). Therefore existentials are the specific ways in which the Dasein is – apart from other beings. Categories explicate the ways non-Dasein-beings can be. For Heidegger existentials and categories are both the fundamental possibilities for things to be. The existentials pertain to beings that are who (existence) and categories to beings that are what (being present-at-hand in general – objects). How these two are related together can be resolved only after the horizon of asking the question about being has been uncovered.

§10

We come by two metal doors on both sides of the corridor. Looking at my fellows for support, I swallow and turn the handle on the door on the right side.

The door opens silently and reveals a horrid sight. The special sciences known as Anthropology, Psychology and Biology are caged in a room filled with torturing devices. On the wall it reads in letters of blood: "The special sciences work within the Being and cannot explain it. Thus as slaves to Fundamental Analysis of Dasein, they must forever succumb to my rule." In horror I realize that these poor bastards are of no use in finding the meaning of Being and are therefore abandoned in this torturing chamber of particular sciences. The meaning of Being can only be exposed through fundamental analysis on the existentiality of Dasein, and never through the special sciences that only explicate empirical matters within the framework of existentiality of Dasein. I hastily close the door, grieving for the fate of these sciences.

§11

As I open the other door, I find myself face to face with another torturing chamber. I hear some muffled screams about the difference between primitivity (as studied in anthropology and ethnology, a level of sophistication of a culture) and averageness. A bloody iron maiden of “natural world” (which has been at least in part constructed by the Dasein himself) is also seen in the corner. I feel sick, and gagging I close the door and hope that the next corridor will expose something else than mere cruelty of massacred empirical sciences.